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ABSTRACT 
 
Modernism, Environmental Assessment and the  
Sustainability Argument:  
Moving towards a New Approach to  
Project-based Decision-making in South Africa. 
 
Through my research I have developed an alternative conceptual approach to project-level 
environmental assessment in South Africa, which begins to move beyond modernism in its 
philosophical, procedural and substantive aspects. This approach draws on the ideas of certain 
radical philosophers, and three innovative thinkers, namely: Bent Flyvbjerg, Amartya Sen and Paul 
Cilliers.   
 
The overall purpose of project-level environmental assessment (i.e. Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA)) is to predict the impacts on the environment of proposed development, and to 
recommend ways to mitigate its negative consequences and enhance its positive effects. However, 
there are a number of recurring problems in the practice of EIA which include: achieving inter-
disciplinarity in the assessment process; effectively undertaking stakeholder engagement; and 
accurately predicting the impacts of proposed developments. Addressing uncertainty and 
adequately considering the implications of cumulative and social impacts are also often poorly 
addressed in environmental assessment procedures.  
 
In this thesis, I describe these problems as symptomatic of the modernist roots of environmental 
assessment, an argument, or similar, which has been made by others in related domains (e.g. 
philosophy), as well as in the international field of environmental assessment itself. I identify the 
following three main problematic assumptions of the modern worldview that are currently 
constraining the effectiveness of this field:  
▪ A system can be understood by observing the behaviour of its parts;  
▪ All processes flow along linear, deterministic, predictable and orderly paths; and 
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▪ Technical, objective, natural science-based information and processes are separate 
from, and superior to, non-technical, subjective, and value-based information and 
processes. 
 
Drawing on my investigation of the core ideas of radical ecologists and of the work of Bent 
Flyvbjerg, Amartya Sen and Paul Cilliers, I challenge the modernist assumptions listed above and 
propose an alternative conceptual approach to environmental assessment, which involves the 
formulation of a ‘sustainability argument’. I explain the philosophical tenets (for example, humans 
and nature are seen as part of an interrelated social-ecological system) and general principles on 
which this approach rests (for example, the normative nature of all knowledge of social-ecological 
systems should be recognised), as well as its key characteristics (for example, the team that 
undertakes the study should comprise disciplinary specialists, key stakeholders and at least one 
‘sustainability practitioner’ who coordinates the development of the argument). These tenets, 
principles and characteristics are designed to guide the development of context-specific processes, 
for the formulation of a sustainability argument that informs project-level development decision-
making.  
 
The ‘sustainability argument’ approach moves beyond the human-nature (or development-
environment) divide inherent in current environmental assessment, in which the impact of the 
former on the latter is determined. The focus is shifted to understanding how the social-ecological 
system is likely to alter, under different conditions, as a result of the proposed development, which 
is seen as a potential change in the system. In addition, the way in which the social-ecological 
system is likely to affect the implementation of this change is described. These effects are 
evaluated in relation to contextually defined sustainability values, which are identified by key 
stakeholders through a participatory process, and guided by the principles proposed as part of the 
sustainability argument approach. The principles include a view of humans and nature as part of 
an interrelated social-ecological system in which diversity, both human and natural, is valued as a 
pre-requisite to sustainability. Human needs are defined beyond the provision of basic goods and 
services, to include the promotion and enhancement of the valuable functionings and capabilities 
of an individual, as described by Sen (1988b). Nature is valued, not only for its role in enabling the 
achievement of these functionings and capabilities, but also for the fact of its existence, as part of 
the overall social-ecological system.  
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OPSOMMING 
 
In my navorsing het ek ŉ alternatiewe, konseptuele benadering tot omgewingsbeoordeling op 
projekvlak in Suid Afrika ontwerp, wat begin om verby die filosofiese, prosedurele en substantiewe 
aspekte van die modernisme te beweeg.  Hierdie benadering berus op die idees van sekere 
radikale filosowe, en drie innoverende denkers, naamlik: Bent Flyvbjerg, Amartya Sen en Paul 
Cilliers. 
 
Die oorkoepelende doelstelling van omgewingsbeoordeling op projekvlak (i.e. Omgewingsimpak-
studie (OIS)) is om die impakte op die omgewing van voorgestelde ontwikkeling te voorspel, en om 
voorstelle te maak om die negatiewe gevolge daarvan te beperk en die positiewe gevolge te 
bevorder. Tog is daar ŉ aantal herhalende probleme in die praktyk van OIS, wat die volgende 
insluit: Die bereiking van interdissiplinariteit in die proses van omgewingsbeoordeling; die 
versekering van effektiewe deelname van belangegroepe; en die akkurate voorspelling van die 
impakte van ŉ voorgestelde ontwikkeling. Die hantering van onsekerhede en die voldoende 
oorweging van die implikasies van kumulatiewe en sosiale impakte word ook nie voldoende 
aangespreek in die ontwerp van omgewingsbeoordeling nie. 
 
In hierdie tesis beskryf ek hierdie probleme as simptome van die modernistiese grondslag van 
omgewingsbeoordeling, wat ŉ soortgelyke punt maak as die argument  wat nie alleen deur ander 
in verwante velde (e.g. filosofie) ontwikkel is nie, maar ook in die internasionale veld van 
omgewingsbeoordeling self. Ek identifiseer die volgende drie problematiese kernaannames van die 
moderne wêreldbeeld, wat tans die doeltreffendheid van omgewingsbeoordeling beperk: 
▪ ŉ Sisteem kan verstaan word deur die gedrag van sy dele waar te neem; 
▪ Alle prosesse volg liniêre, deterministiese, voorspelbare en geordende patrone; en 
▪ Tegniese prosesse en objektiewe, natuurwetenskaplik-begronde inligting is apart van, 
en verhewe bo, nie-tegniese prosesse en subjektiewe en waardegebaseerde 
oorwegings. 
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Op grond van my ondersoek van die kernidees van radikale ekoloë, asook die werke van Bent 
Flyvbjerg, Amartya Sen en Paul Cilliers, daag ek die bogenoemde modernistiese veronderstellings 
uit, en stel ŉ alternatiewe benadering tot omgewingsbeoordeling voor, wat die formulering van ŉ 
‘volhoubaarheidsargument’ insluit. Ek verduidelik die filosofiese uitgangspunte (byvoorbeeld dat 
die mens en die natuur, in onderlinge wisselwerking met mekaar, gesien moet word as deel van ŉ 
geïntegreerde sosio-ekologiese sisteem) en algemene beginsels waarop hierdie benadering berus 
(byvoorbeeld dat die normatiewe aard van alle kennis van sosio-ekologiese sisteme erken behoort 
te word), asook die kenmerkende eienskappe daarvan (byvoorbeeld dat die span, wat die studie 
onderneem, saamgestel moet word uit kenners vanuit verskillende dissiplines, sleutel-
belanghebbendes, en ten minste een ‘volhoubaarheidspraktisyn’ wat die ontwikkeling van die 
argument koördineer). Hierdie uitgangspunte, beginsels en eienskappe is ontwerp om die 
ontwikkeling van konteksspesifieke prosesse te stuur, en vir die formulering van ŉ 
volhoubaarheidsargument wat besluitneming oor ontwikkeling op projekvlak informeer. 
 
Die ‘volhoubaarheidsargument’ benadering beweeg verby die mens-natuur (of ontwikkeling-
omgewing) onderskeid inherent aan die huidige praktyk van omgewingsbeoordeling, waar die 
impak van die eersgenoemde op die laasgenoemde bepaal word.  Die klem verskuif na ŉ begrip vir 
die manier waarop die sosio-ekologiese sisteem moontlik gaan verander, onder sekere toestande, 
as gevolg van die voorgestelde verandering, wat beskou word as ŉ moontlike verandering in die 
sisteem.  Boonop word die manier waarop die sosio-ekologiese sisteem waarskynlik die 
implementering van die verandering gaan beïnvloed ook beskryf.  Hierdie effekte word geëvalueer 
met betrekking tot konteks-gedefinieerde volhoubaarheidswaardes, wat deur ŉ deelnameproses 
geïdentifiseer word deur sleutel belanghebbendes, en gelei deur die beginsels wat voorgestel word 
as deel van die volhoubaarheidsargument benadering. Die beginsels sluit ŉ beskouing van mense 
en die natuur as deel van ŉ interverwante sosio-ekologiese sisteem waarin diversiteit, beide 
menslik en natuurlik, gewaardeer word as ŉ voorwaarde vir volhoubaarheid in.  Menslike behoeftes 
is gedefinieer as meer as net die voorsiening van basiese goedere en dienste om die bevordering 
en verbetering van die waardevolle funksioneringe en vermoëns van ŉ individu, soos beskryf deur 
Sen (1988b), in te sluit.  Die natuur word gewaardeer, nie slegs vir die rol wat dit speel om die 
verwesenliking van hierdie funksioneringe en vermoëns moontlik te maak nie, maar ook vir die feit 
van die natuur se bestaan, as deel van die algehele sosio-ekologiese sisteem.          
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
 
I began this research after working in the field of environmental assessment for about 10 years. 
What prompted me was an increasing sense of discomfort concerning the disparity between our 
highly structured, logical and uniform assessment processes and the more spontaneous, dynamic, 
political, diverse nature of reality. Often the celebrations following the completion of an intricate, 
well-planned, well-executed process had not yet ended, before the world had changed and many 
of the observations that we made had become invalid.   
 
Due to my town and regional planning background, I worked mainly in the area of Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA), which involves the incorporation of environmental concerns into 
the spheres of policy and planning. To a lesser extent, I was involved in Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA), which involves incorporating these issues into project-level decision-making. I 
had a leading role to play in the development of South Africa’s first guidelines for SEA, and 
therefore was instrumental in designing processes that were beginning to cause me uneasiness.  
Although my focus over the years was on SEA, this thesis relates to EIA. The reason for this is that 
SEA has evolved in various forms out of the EIA community, and in order to address in this thesis, 
some of the fundamental assumptions that still underlie the environmental assessment field, I have 
gone back to its classic mode. 
 
During my work in environmental assessment, it also became very clear to me that sustainability is 
as much a value, as it is a scientific analysis about whether the environment will be degraded as a 
result of the proposed development.  As such, it embraces values that people hold and which 
compete for attention in South Africa. This may all seem very obvious, but in my view we do not, as 
environmental practitioners, engage with value-systems deeply enough, despite the rhetoric that 
sustainability in this country concerns biophysical, social and economic issues – the latter two 
spheres being strongly value determined. More interestingly perhaps, there seems to be a general 
assumption that environmental practitioners and scientists themselves have a more-or-less shared 
idea of what sustainability means. However, since this group is also influenced by their belief-
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systems, values and disciplinary background, among other factors, they are likely to associate a 
diverse array of meanings to this word. 
 
My concerns about the environmental assessment process and the largely unexplored value-
systems that influence it, led me to investigate its philosophical roots in order to better understand 
the foundations of my discomfort. 
 
Research Intent 
 
My research intent is to develop an alternative conceptual approach to environmental assessment 
in South Africa, which begins to move beyond modernism in its philosophical, procedural and 
substantive aspects. In particular I aim to investigate how the combined ideas of certain radical 
environmental philosophers and of three innovative thinkers and practitioners (i.e. Bent Flyvbjerg, 
Amartya Sen and Paul Cilliers) can assist in this task.  
 
Environmental Impact Assessment – A Brief Orientation 
 
The evolution of EIA is described in detail in Chapter 1. In this section, however, I will provide a 
brief overview of the process to orientate the reader to better follow the discussion pursued in this 
thesis.  
 
The purpose of EIA is to “… predict both the positive and negative environmental impacts of a 
proposed project and find ways to reduce adverse impacts, shape projects to suit the local 
environment and present the predictions and options to decision-makers” (Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), 2004a: 11). EIA is considered one of the ‘tools’ in the 
environmental management ‘toolbox’ and is designed specifically to address project- and site- 
specific environmental decision-making (DEAT, 2004a). The EIA Regulations (DEAT, 2006a: 9) 
describe EIA as “… the process of collecting, analysing, interpreting and communicating 
information …” that pertains to a development application. This information is provided to 
government authorities who then decide whether the proposed development should be approved, 
usually conditionally, or not.  
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An EIA process typically involves the following stages: screening, scoping, assessment and 
reporting (DEAT, 2004a; Hill, 2004), which are described below (Fuggle, 1994; Preston et al., 
1994; DEAT, 2002a; 2002b; 2004a; 2004b; 2006a; 2006b): 
 
▪ Screening: This first stage of the EIA process involves determining whether an 
environmental assessment is required, and if so, the extent of this assessment; i.e. 
whether an initial or basic assessment is sufficient for decision-making, or whether 
the full EIA process should be followed. This decision is typically guided by regulated 
lists of activities (e.g. construction of power plants) and/or potentially affected 
environments (e.g. sensitive areas such as wetlands) for which either a full or initial 
assessment is required.  An initial assessment does not typically involve scoping, but 
an authority can decide, based on the information provided in such an assessment, to 
send the development application down the ‘full assessment’ route, which begins with 
the scoping procedure.  
 
▪ Scoping: This is the process of determining the spatial and temporal boundaries of 
the EIA, the alternatives to be assessed and the issues to be addressed. One of the 
key objectives of scoping is to focus the assessment on ‘significant’ issues. Scoping 
is undertaken with the participation of stakeholders, including government authorities 
and the development proponent. In South Africa an ‘issues focused’ approach 
(Weaver and Rossouw, 1998) to EIA is typically adopted, where the concerns raised 
by stakeholders in scoping become the core of the assessment and therefore shape 
the terms of reference provided to specialists in the assessment phase. The scoping 
phase is considered complete when a Scoping Report has been produced, reviewed 
by stakeholders and finalised in light of their comments. The Scoping Report usually 
provides an overview of the project, the environment, the issues and development 
alternatives to be considered in the assessment, the EIA process to be followed and 
the terms of reference for supporting specialist investigations.  
 
▪ Assessment and evaluation: The purpose of the assessment stage, which is guided 
by the issues identified in scoping, is to provide government authorities with enough 
‘objective’ information on both the positive and negative aspects of a proposed 
development, in order for them to decide whether it should be approved or not and, if 
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so, under what conditions. The core of the assessment is the evaluation of 
reasonable development alternatives, using methods that enable comparison of these 
alternatives. The emphasis is on ‘objective’ evaluation as stated by Fuggle (1994: 
763) “… environmental evaluations must be free of sectoral or personal bias (as far 
as this is humanly possible)”.  
 
The impacts predicted through EIA are usually characterised in terms of the following: 
their nature (positive, negative, direct, indirect or cumulative); magnitude (high, 
medium or low); their extent; when they will occur (during construction, operation 
and/or decommissioning); their duration (short-term, long-term, intermittent or 
continuous); the extent to which they can be reversed or not; the probability of them 
occurring and their significance at various scales. Characterising impacts is typically 
undertaken using a variety of methods and techniques, such as physical and 
mathematical models, maps, with significance ratings based largely on professional 
judgement. The assessment stage also includes making recommendations for 
mitigating the potential negative impacts of the development and enhancing the 
positive ones. The evaluation of alternative development options is therefore 
undertaken with and without consideration of mitigation options.  
 
The assessment stage is usually informed by studies in which specialists are tasked 
to investigate the issues identified in scoping that are most relevant to their particular 
domains and to characterise the potential impacts (as described above) pertaining to 
these issues. Meetings and workshops may be held where the specialists aim to 
coordinate their studies and to share information; however, most of their work is done 
separately from one another, with the environmental assessment practitioner 
integrating their findings into an Environmental Impact Report (EIR).  
 
▪ Reporting and decision-making: The EIR typically comprises a description of the 
following: the proposed project; the affected environment; the terms of reference and 
approach to EIA; an assessment of the potential impacts of the development and its 
alternatives on the environment; the proposed mitigating measures; a comparative 
evaluation of the alternatives with and without mitigation; a description of the 
stakeholder engagement process; a record of the issues that were raised in this 
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process and how they were addressed; gaps in knowledge; the underlying 
assumptions; the adequacy of prediction methods; and uncertainties encountered in 
compiling the report. The draft EIR is sent for review by stakeholders and is then 
finalised for submission to the environmental authorities for approval.  
 
Stakeholders, including the proponent, authorities and interested and affected parties, are involved 
in various stages of the EIA process. Most importantly, perhaps is the scoping phase where they 
contribute to the issues to be addressed. They also contribute various forms of information to the 
process and comment on draft reports before they are finalised. The participatory process 
associated with an EIA is often coordinated by a stakeholder engagement practitioner, who is 
subcontracted to the lead EIA consultant.    
 
Research Approach 
 
I began this research by identifying constraints to effective environmental assessment, 
investigating its modernist roots in order to do so. Based on my exposure to the field, I made a list 
of what I believed these constrants to be. Thereafter, I undertook a series of interviews with 
selected government officials, environmental assessment practitioners, environmental researchers 
and members of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), to gain an understanding of whether 
these concerns were shared by others.  I selected the interviewees based on my knowledge of the 
leading practitioners and organisations in environmental assessment in South Africa and on an 
identification of certain key environmental decision-makers in provincial and national government in 
this country1. The interview questions are included as Appendix A. It is important to note that the 
purpose of these interviews was not to inform an empirical analysis, or to form the central 
component of the research approach that I adopted, but rather to enhance and support the 
discussion I present in this thesis. The investigation of the constraints to EIA was also informed by 
a review that I undertook of numerous papers presented at the annual conferences of the 
International Association for Impact Assessment: South Africa (IAIAsa)2 since 1996.   
 
                                            
1
  I interviewed six experienced and respected practitioners in the field of environmental assessment in 
South Africa; three individuals that provided an NGO perspective; four officials in environmental 
government departments and two leading environmental researchers.  
2
  IAIAsa is the professional body for environmental assessment practitioners in South Africa and is an 
NGO.  
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I then investigated the modernist roots of environmental assessment in more detail, identifying 
three main philosophical assumptions to which the problems described for EIA could be attributed. 
These assumptions are deconstructed at the end of the thesis before an alternative conceptual 
approach to environmental assessment is proposed. This was informed by an investigation of the 
post-modern worldview aimed at understanding its potential contribution the environmental debate, 
at least at a philosophical level. The purpose of this was not only to identify the modernist 
assumptions supporting the current practice of EIA in more detail, but also to begin developing an 
alternative philosophical basis for the practice of environmental assessment. In undertaking this 
latter task, I investigated the views of certain radical ecologists (i.e. the deep ecologists, social 
ecologists and eco-feminists), as they seem to provide the strongest post-modern response to the 
modern, technocentric roots of EIA.  
 
After identifying, in the first part of the research, a number of key philosophical tenets for an 
approach to EIA that can move it beyond its modernist basis, I investigated the work of three 
leading researchers, namely: Amartya Sen, Bent Flyvbjerg and Paul Cilliers, who are thought 
leaders in the fields of economics, development planning and complexity theory, respectively. The 
purpose of this investigation was again to search for ideas that could assist in formulating an 
alternative, more effective approach to EIA practice. The researchers were selected according to 
the following criteria: 
▪ Their work responds to some critique of modernism and relates in particular to the 
problems facing development and the environment; 
▪ Although they may not phrase it in this way, they address concerns related to the 
subject/object divide within modernism (e.g. they look at integrating some aspect of 
subjectivity into knowledge within their domain); 
▪ They make practical proposals that can be directly applied to the practice of 
environmental assessment in this country;  
▪ They each come from different parts of the world and have different professional 
backgrounds (Flyvbjerg is based in Denmark; Sen is from India and Cilliers from 
South Africa). Flyvbjerg has a planning background, Sen is an economist, and Cilliers 
is a philosopher; and 
▪ They are recognised as innovative and leading thinkers within their respective 
domains.  
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After gaining an understanding of the core ideas of these researchers, as they pertain to 
addressing the assumptions of modernity that I (and others) had identified as problematic, I 
investigated the relevance of these ideas to environmental assessment as it is currently practiced 
in South Africa. Although I drew quite extensively on international literature in this investigation, the 
focus was on understanding the implications of the researchers’ ideas for EIA in this country. I 
completed this stage by listing a number of general principles to guide the development of a new, 
conceptual approach to environmental assessment.  
 
Finally, drawing on the research undertaken throughout, I deconstructed the three problematic 
modernist philosophical assumptions described at the beginning of my study, namely that:  
▪ A system can be understood by observing the behaviour of its parts;  
▪ All processes flow along linear, deterministic, predictable and orderly paths; and 
▪ Technical, objective, natural science-based information and processes are separate 
from, and superior to, non-technical, subjective, and value-based information and 
processes. 
 
I then developed the conceptual approach to environmental assessment based on the 
philosophical tenets and guiding principles already identified.  
 
I have related the proposed approach to the point in the decision-making process at which 
traditional EIA is currently undertaken in South Africa (i.e. once the defining characteristics of a 
potential development have been determined and information is required on whether the 
development should be approved or not, and under what conditions). However, it is possible, with 
some adaptation, to formulate the proposed ‘sustainability argument’ in tandem with the design of 
the potential development. In other words, the formulation of the argument can proactively inform 
the nature of the development, guiding it towards a sustainable trajectory. Such an adaptation of 
the proposed approach would need to be undertaken in context, as it would be strongly influenced 
by the design process and environment to which it relates. The philosophical tenets, principles and 
characteristics presented in this thesis could guide such adaptations of the sustainability argument. 
 
A particular challenge in this research was obtaining information on the experiences and views of 
environmental assessment practitioners, rather than depending on the theoretical and academic 
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literature, both in South Africa and internationally, in this regard. Besides the interviews that I 
conducted, finding this information necessitated an extensive review of the ‘grey literature’ in this 
field, as this is where environmental assessment practitioners typically publish. I have therefore 
drawn from this literature extensively, particularly in Chapter 1. I acknowledge that there is a vast 
amount of formal literature within the international arena on best practice in environmental 
assessment. However, it is despite this knowledge that many problems continue to be experienced 
in practice. Therefore, instead of focusing on this literature, although it has informed my perception 
of the problems within this field, I turned my attention to the fundamental philosophical 
underpinnings of environmental assessment, with the aim of addressing the causes of the 
problems, rather than their symptoms. My suggested alternative to project-level environmental 
decision-making, therefore, rests on a different philosophical foundation. As such, it extends the 
debate beyond recent variations to traditional environmental assessment approaches (e.g. 
sustainability assessment), that have emerged in the international debate, but which do not 
significantly challenge the philosophical foundations of the field.  
 
It is also important to note that, while the problem statement in this thesis emerged from my (and 
others’) experiences in practice, my focus on the philosophical foundations of environmental 
assessment, led this study to a critical exploration of ideas and philosophical positions, rather than 
an empirical analysis. Although a conceptual alternative to project-level environmental decision-
making is proposed, refining this approach for practice, and testing its robustness in addressing the 
problems identified, is outside the scope of this thesis. Such testing should be undertaken in a 
context-specific manner, in future research.  
 
I am aware of the existence of literature from spheres of knowledge, such as resource economics 
and ecological design, which have not been included in this thesis. The reason for this, is that the 
the aim of my research is to address the problems of environmental assessment at the level of 
their philosophical roots and to respond to these problems at the level of principles and conceptual 
ideas. Therefore, I drew primarily on the work of three leading thinkers (i.e. Flyvbjerg, Sen and 
Cilliers), whose research can be directly related to the philosophical assumptions that underpin the 
mainstream approach to project-level environmental decision-making.  
 
I am also aware of the extensive literature on traditional cultural philosophies and practices. 
However, I had to draw on Western philosophy to characterise the modernist roots of 
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environmental assessment, which originated in the United States. In doing so, I gained a greater 
understanding of the critique of modernism (i.e. post-modernism), that if effectively incorporated 
into the debate on environmental assessment, could assist in providing a more appropriate 
philosophical base for the field. Therefore, I focused my attention on the work of researchers and 
practitioners, from both the developed and developing world, whose work can be directly related to 
a critique some aspect of modernism. This is not to say that the literature on traditional cultural 
philosophies cannot contribute extensively to addressing the constraints of modernism in the 
environmental assessment field. However, the inclusion of this vast body of knowledge would 
require a further study and is outside the scope of this particular thesis.  
 
This research is generally informed by the 10 years that I have worked in the field of environmental 
assessment at the CSIR. My ideas have also been strongly influenced by my recent work in the 
emerging field of sustainability science within this organisation and my discussions with colleagues 
on this topic. I have, however, also drawn quite extensively on the views of researchers and 
practitioners from other institutions and countries. From a more philosophical perspective, my 
perceptions have been influenced by a deep personal interest in the work of Ken Wilber, Fritjof 
Capra, Carl Jung and Alan Watts, among several others.  
 
Although described as having being undertaken in clear consecutive stages, my research 
approach has rather been of an iterative nature, as learning from each stage typically altered my 
perceptions of what I had learnt and concluded in previous ones. As a consequence, my 
understanding of the subject of my research has progressively deepened, resulting in my views 
having changed and/or expanded over time.  
 
Structure of this thesis 
 
Looking forward now, to the structure of this thesis, Chapter 1 begins with a description of the 
current environmental problématique from an international, regional, sub-regional and national 
perspective. Thereafter, the international evolution of environmental assessment is presented as a 
response to this problématique, followed by a description of its development within South Africa. 
The focus of the second half of this chapter is on describing the current constraints to EIA in South 
Africa, which are attributed, from a philosophical perspective, mainly to three assumptions within 
the modern worldview.  
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In Chapter 2, the characteristics of modernism and post-modernism are described in more detail.  
Thereafter, the influence of these philosophies on the environmental debate, are presented in 
terms of O’Riordan’s (1981) categories of technocentrism and ecocentrism. The description of 
ecocentrism focuses on the views of the social ecologists, deep ecologists and the eco-feminists 
and has the dual purpose of presenting post-modern responses to the global environmental crisis, 
as well as providing a source of ideas for an alternative philosophical basis for environmental 
assessment. This philosophical basis is presented in the form of a number of tenets listed at the 
end of Chapter 2.  
 
Flyvbjerg, Sen and Cilliers’ critique of some aspect of modernism is presented in Chapter 3. Their 
ideas to overcome the modernist constraints within their fields are also described in the chapter, as 
well as the implications of these ideas for environmental assessment in South Africa. Chapter 3 
concludes with a list of principles, based on the work of Flyvbjerg, Sen and Cilliers, to guide the 
formulation of a new approach to environmental assessment.  
 
In Chapter 4 the three problematic assumptions of modernism are deconstructed using the ideas of 
radical ecologists and those of three researchers discussed in the previous chapter. The 
philosophical tenets for an alternative conceptual approach to environmental assessment are listed 
again, but now slightly expanded. The guiding principles for the design of such an approach are 
then elaborated upon before a particular alternative approach to environmental assessment is 
proposed. Finally, the way in which this proposal addresses the constraints currently being 
experienced in the practice of EIA, as presented in Chapter 1, is discussed.  
 
A note on terminology 
 
The problems and characteristics of environmental assessment, as it is currently practiced, is the 
starting point of my research. Therefore, I have used the recognised terminology within this field in 
my original research intent, as well as in Chapters 1-3 of this thesis. However, as my research 
progressed, it became evident that this terminology would not be the most appropriate for use in 
my final proposal, which is presented in Chapter 4, section 4.5. In this proposal, I suggest that 
practitioners shift the focus from attempting to undertake ‘objective assessments’ to developing a 
‘sustainability argument’ that encompasses a range of values and epistemologies. Therefore in 
Chapter 4, section 4.5., instead of using terms such as ‘environmental assessment’, ‘environmental 
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assessment practitioner’ and ‘environmental assessment team’; I use the terms ‘sustainability 
argument’, ‘sustainability practitioner’ and ‘sustainability team’.  
 
In this thesis I use the term ‘environmental assessment’ interchangeably with EIA and refer to 
‘environmental management’ in a broad sense to include a range of ‘tools’, such as EIA, SEA, 
environmental reporting and environmental management plans (EMPs). Unless otherwise stated, I 
have also used the term ‘environment’ in its widest sense to include social, ecological and 
biophysical concerns (DEAT, 2004a). Following Therivel et al. (1992) and Audouin and Hattingh 
(2008), I have used the concept of ‘sustainability’ in a way which can include the notion of 
‘sustainable development’, but not the reverse. This is because ‘sustainable development’ includes 
the assumption that sustainability and development are compatible, whereas this assumption is not 
inherent to the concept of ‘sustainability’ (Therivel et al., 1992; Audouin and Hattingh, 2008). I have 
not provided a particular definition of ‘sustainability’ as the meaning of this concept should be 
determined within particular contexts, as shown in Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis. It would therefore 
contradict my final proposal, which is presented in Chapter 4, to explain sustainability as a fixed 
point of reference.  
 
Finally, I have used the term ‘project-level decision-making’ to refer to the decision, that EIA 
typically informs, of whether a proposed development project should proceed or not, and under 
what conditions. However, the ‘sustainability argument’ approach that I propose can be applied, 
with some modification, to the earlier stages of project design. 
 
The use of text boxes and tables in this thesis 
 
In instances where I believe that the discussion will benefit from detailed information presented in a 
particular report, or provided by a single author or organisation (e.g. the principles of deep ecology 
listed by Devall and Sessions (1985) and the characteristics of complexity identified by Cilliers 
(2005a)), I have placed this information in boxes, so as not to disrupt the flow of the integrated text. 
In most cases, the tables have been used to summarise a large amount of information, from a 
particular author, which is critical to the orientation of the reader in the integrated discussion that 
follows.   
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The publication of parts of this thesis 
 
An earlier version of sections of this research was published in Burns and Weaver (2008) as a 
chapter entitled Moving Beyond Modernism in Environmental Assessment and Management. My 
primary supervisor, Johan Hattingh, was co-author of this chapter, which includes ideas and 
summaries from the following parts of this thesis: Chapters 1 and 2; as well as sections 3.2 and 
3.5; and sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2. However, the final approach to environmental assessment 
proposed in this book chapter varies in a number of significant ways, to that presented in this 
thesis.  
 
In addition, this research will be an input into the development of a CSIR Research Guide on 
Sustainability Science, as well as an input into the development of a framework for Applied 
Integrative Sustainability Thinking. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
THE CONSTRAINTS TO EFFECTIVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I will describe the environmental crisis from a global, regional, sub-regional and 
national perspective. Thereafter, I will present an overview of the evolution of the field of 
environmental assessment, which is a response to this crisis, from both an international and South 
African viewpoint. I then change focus to the problems that are currently being experienced in the 
implementation of EIA in South Africa, which I argue are due to its modernist roots. Finally, I will 
conclude the chapter with a brief description of three problematic assumptions inherent to the 
modern worldview, which is then discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
1.2 The Environmental Crisis 
 
On a global scale, the proportion of people living in extreme poverty3 is beginning to decrease, 
however this general trend is strongly influenced by Asian economic growth, with the benefits 
flowing to that continent (United Nations (UN), 2007). Sub-Saharan Africa remains the region in the 
world in which the poor are most economically disadvantaged, illustrated for example, by the fact 
that the number of people that lack basic sanitation has increased over the last 14 years (UN, 
2007). This is in spite of a reduction in the region, of the percentage of people living on less than a 
dollar a day. The global trend towards increasing pressure on the world’s already strained 
ecological systems persists, illustrated by the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) who report with certainty that human activities are driving changes in the world’s 
climate (UN, 2007). These trends continue regardless of the efforts made within many realms of 
society, including the political, scientific and industrial spheres, to incorporate the concept of 
sustainable development into policies and actions.   
 
The mainstream response to the environmental crisis over the last 10-15 years has centred on the 
concept of sustainable development and has been applied on an international, regional, national 
                                            
3
  Extreme poverty is defined as living on less than $1 per day. 
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and local scale. Sustainable development, as defined by the Brundtland Commission in their report 
Our Common Future, involves “… meeting the needs of the current generation without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on 
Environment and Development (WCED), 1987: 24). Although this definition was widely popularized 
through Our Common Future, it had already gained purchase, for example, through its use in the 
World Conservation Strategy (International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), 1980).   
 
The aim of achieving sustainable development on an international scale was central to the purpose 
and outcomes of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held 
in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and the follow-up conference that was held in Johannesburg in 2002. 
The first UNCED conference led to a set of principles for sustainable development (The Rio 
Principles) and to a report entitled Agenda 21 (United Nations, 1992). In this report a plan of action 
for implementing the principles of sustainable development within various spheres, such as energy, 
natural resource conservation, urban development, agriculture and poverty, is presented (WCED, 
1987). Several cities implemented a Local Agenda 21 programme and the concept of sustainable 
development was included in the policies and legislation of many countries. Despite these 
initiatives, however, it was reported at the closing of the second UNCED Conference held in 
Johannesburg 10 years later that “… it was hardly a secret – or even a point in dispute – that 
progress in implementing sustainable development has been extremely disappointing since the 
1992 Earth Summit, with poverty deepening and environmental degradation worsening” (UN, 2003: 
http://www.un.org/jsummit/, accessed 29/08/08).  
 
The key output of the second UNCED conference was the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation 
which reaffirms the international community’s commitment to, inter alia, the Rio Principles and 
Agenda 21 (UN, 2002). The Johannesburg Plan also builds on the accomplishments of the Rio 
conference, aiming to expedite the achievement of the remaining goals through concrete actions at 
all levels of governance. In addition the global community’s commitment to the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) was re-enforced in this plan. These eight goals were formulated and 
accepted by leaders from every country seven years ago. The purpose of the MDGs is to provide a 
global framework for development to reduce poverty, hunger and disease, and create a healthier 
environment (UN, 2006). More specifically, the goals are to (UN, 2006):  
▪ Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 
▪ Achieve universal primary education; 
▪ Reduce child mortality; 
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▪ Improve maternal health ; 
▪ Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 
▪ Ensure environmental sustainability; and 
▪ Develop a global partnership for development.  
 
The targets set under each of these goals are extremely challenging and include, for example: 
halving, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger; reducing by 
two-thirds, during the same period, the under-five mortality rate; and integrating the principles of 
sustainable development into country policies and programmes, while reversing the loss of 
environmental resources (UN, 2006).  
 
Progress has been made in achieving the international sustainable development agenda, but it is 
insufficient. For example, the latest MDG progress report4 states that there are improvements in 
several areas, such as the number of children enrolled in primary schools and the number of 
women participating in political life; malaria and tuberculosis are increasingly under control; and the 
rates of poverty and child mortality are beginning to decrease (UN, 2007). In addition, significant 
success has been achieved in protecting the ozone layer. The consumption of ozone depleting 
substances has been drastically reduced following the Montreal Protocol of 1987; however, the UN 
(2007) states that further decreases are needed if the ozone layer is to heal completely and 
ultraviolet radiation is to stop harming human health, crop productivity and wildlife.  
 
Despite these positive trends, several targets are unlikely to be met, such as halving, by 2015, the 
proportion of the world's people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic 
sanitation. Fifty percent of the developing world’s population still lacks access to such sanitation 
and according to current trends about 600 million people will be affected. The MDG progress report 
also points out that in some sectors, particularly health and education, certain countries may be 
achieving the targets, but with the persistence of disparities between geographical areas and 
societal groups. Remote rural areas, poorest households and children of mothers with no formal 
education remain at a severe disadvantage (UN, 2007).    
 
From an ecological point of view the UN (2007) states that the proportion of species threatened 
with extinction continues to grow despite an increase in the number of protected areas. It is 
                                            
4
  The review period reported on in the 2007 UN report varied among the targets set, but ranged generally 
from 1990 to 2004, 2005 or 2006.  
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concluded that: “Unprecedented efforts will be required to conserve habitats and to maintain 
ecosystems and species in a sustainable way if the rate of species loss is to be significantly 
reduced by 2010” (UN, 2007: 23). This report also states that deforestation continues at the 
extremely rapid rate of about 13 million hectares per year.   
 
On a regional scale, the MDG progress report (UN, 2007) shows that sub-Saharan Africa is among 
the regions in the world with the biggest challenge in meeting almost every target set. The region is 
not on track to halve poverty by 2015 and, after southern Asia, continues to have the highest 
proportion of children suffering from hunger. Child survival rates are worst in sub-Saharan Africa 
and the largest percentage of urban population without adequate shelter is found in this region. 
Rates of deforestation are among the highest in the world. The negative trends, reported by the UN 
(2007) exist despite efforts on the part of African leaders, for example, through the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)5, to realise the vision and conviction that “… they 
have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and 
collectively, on a path to sustainable growth and development, and, at the same time, to participate 
actively in the world economy and body politic” (NEPAD, 2001: 1).  
 
On a sub-regional scale, the Southern African Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Scholes and 
Biggs, 2004) reveals that southern Africa is placed in the lowest quarter of global ratings of human 
well-being. Although biodiversity in the sub-region is relatively well conserved, with 80% of the 
region existing in a natural or semi-natural state, threats to ecosystems are increasing (Scholes 
and Biggs, 2004). These threats include climate change, conversion of ecosystems into croplands, 
land degradation, the impact of alien invasive plants, and overgrazing and overharvesting, which 
explain the serious impacts on biodiversity in the region (Scholes and Biggs, 2004).  
 
Corresponding to the international, regional and sub-regional trends, positive progress has been 
made by South Africa in its commitment to the principles of sustainable development within all 
spheres of government, civil society and industry. Despite this, however, the general condition of 
the environment is deteriorating (DEAT, 2006c). In this regard, the water sector provides an 
excellent example. There have been significant innovative developments in the management of 
water since 1994, many of which involve the implementation of the progressive National Water Act 
(No. 36 of 1998); however, the quantity and quality of water that can be allocated has still 
                                            
5
  NEPAD is a pledge that outlines, inter alia, the main concerns for sustainable development in Africa, 
initiatives to mobilize resources and priorities for project implementation.   
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decreased (DEAT, 2006c). Despite South Africa’s increased participation in international 
environmental governance, its increased attention to issues such as cleaner production and 
renewable energy, DEAT (2006c) reports that this country’s natural capital is still being depleted. 
 
The South African Constitution provides everyone with the right (Chapter 2, section 24) “ … to an 
environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and to have the environment 
protected, for the benefit of present and future generations …” (Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
Numerous national Acts have been passed that aim to promote this right, such as the National 
Environmental Management Act (NEMA) (No. 107 of 1998) and the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act (No. 28 of 2002), and the various Acts and regulations promulgated 
under NEMA, for example, the National Forests Act (No. 30 of 1998), the National Water Act (No. 
36 of 1998) and the Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations (DEAT, 2006d). South Africa 
has also committed to implementing the MDGs and is in the process of developing a National 
Strategy for Sustainable Development (NSSD). In addition, a number of sustainability initiatives 
have been undertaken at the municipal level, such as Local Agenda 21 programmes in the cities of 
Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. Civil society, business and industry have also 
implemented sustainable development initiatives (DEAT, 2006d), related for example, to waste 
management, sustainability reporting, corporate social investment (CSI) and the implementation of 
ISO14 000 programmes.  
 
In reporting to the MDG Summit in 2005, the South African government listed a number of positive 
trends. These include an increase in school enrolment, a decrease in gender inequalities in relation 
to access to education, and an increase in access to safe water (DEAT, 2006d). The MDG 
progress report also suggests that the number of people living in poverty in South Africa dropped 
by 3.1 million between 2000 and 2004, mainly due to the issuing of social grants. However, many 
other indicators related to poverty, show a negative trend. Hunger among the poor, for example, 
remains a persistent problem despite interventions. DEAT’s 2006 State of the Environment Report 
also records an increase in the amount of households without access to good basic services 
(between 1996 and 2001), as well as increases in general human vulnerability, due to factors such 
as climate change, the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS and a decline in the quality of natural resources, 
such as water and air.  
 
Both the 2005 MDG reporting and the 2006 State of the Environment Report conclude that, 
although patterns vary across the country, South Africa’s biodiversity and ecosystem health is 
generally declining. Biodiversity loss is increasing, with 34% of the country’s terrestrial ecosystems, 
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82% of main river ecosystems, 36% of freshwater fish, 10% of birds and frogs and 20% of 
mammals now categorized as threatened DEAT, 2006c; 2006d). It has also been estimated that 
50% of the wetlands in South Africa have been destroyed (DEAT, 2006d). DEAT (2006c: 2) states 
that: “The message is clear: we need to act now, both individually and collectively as a nation, to 
reverse environmental deterioration. If we do not act decisively, we run the risk of losing the 
environmental services that we all depend upon.”  
 
One of the key challenges listed in the proposed NSSD, one which I believe to be fundamental to 
many others, is the tension between the need for optimal resource use in sectors such as mining 
and agriculture, and the protection of the natural resources on which such sectors are dependent. 
On a broader scale, the tension is expressed in the report as between achieving the national 
“… economic growth targets set in ASGI-SA and the ability of the environment to sustain growth 
that is coupled to intensified use of natural resources but fails to appreciate the value of ecosystem 
goods and services and the potential environmental and social costs associated with promoting 
high levels of quantitative economic growth” (DEAT, 2006d: 71). 
 
One of the primary ways in which we currently aim to manage this tension, is through procedures 
for environmental management. However, negative trends have persisted on all scales despite 
these interventions. The argument supported in this thesis, is that there are fundamental 
philosophical problems which underlie the concept of sustainable development, and particularly the 
current mainstream approaches to environmental management that aim to promote this concept in 
practice.  Similar or related arguments have been made by several authors in South Africa (e.g. 
Burns, 2002) and internationally (e.g. Jay et al., 2007). 
 
As environmental management is a very broad field, I will focus on the domain of environmental 
assessment within South Africa, to further examine these concerns. To provide a context for this 
discussion, the evolution of environmental assessment internationally and in South Africa, will be 
presented in the section that follows.  
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1.3 Evolution of Environmental Impact Assessment  
 
The field of environmental assessment has evolved internationally over approximately the last 40 
years and over the last 25 years in South Africa. The effectiveness of environmental assessment in 
this country has recently been questioned, when in 2006, the public spotlight was placed on EIA, 
as a result of concerns expressed by senior politicians, that the process was constraining 
development (Weaver and Sibisi, 2007). Such concerns were directly or indirectly expressed by 
past President Thabo Mbeki in his media briefing on the cabinet meeting in July 2006, and by the 
former Minister of Housing, Ms L.N. Sisulu in her 2006/07 budget vote speech to the National 
Assembly (Weaver and Sibisi, 2007). 
 
Frustrations with the EIA process have not only been voiced by political commentators, but also by 
EIA practitioners themselves. For example, one of the leading founders of EIA in South Africa, 
Professor Richard Fuggle, in his keynote address to the International Association for Impact 
Assessment: South Africa’s (IAIAsa) 2004 conference stated that: 
During the past 12 months professional activities related to impact 
assessment have taken me to 12 different countries and five continents.  
From the world’s poorest to its richest, from the most corrupt to the most 
honourable, from South to North and East to West.  I have come into 
contact with politicians and peasants; rich and poor; scientists and 
sociologists; international and local NGOs [Non-Governmental 
Organisations], CBOs [Community Based Organisations] of various types; 
the world’s largest impact assessment consultancies and one person 
consultancies; some of the world’s largest businesses as well as small 
village based self help schemes; international financial institutions and 
small micro-credit schemes.  Why tell you this?  Because, in my personal 
experience, everywhere and across the entire spectrum of persons there is 
a common theme:  disillusionment with measures designed to promote 
sustainable development and scepticism that impact assessments are 
leading to better decisions, be they environmental or economic, health or 
heritage, social or strategic in nature (parenthesis added). 
 
In the sections that follow I will present an overview of the evolution of environmental assessment 
both internationally and in South Africa to the point where failure has begun to manifest. 
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Thereafter, I will describe the practical challenges facing the field within the context specifically of 
its philosophical underpinnings.  
 
1.3.1 International Evolution of Environmental Assessment 
 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was first legislated in the United States through the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, which significantly influenced the development 
of EIA in other parts of the world (Sadler, 1996; Glasson et al, 2005).  The purpose of NEPA, as 
stated in section 2, is:  “To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable 
harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate 
damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich 
the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to 
establish a Council on Environmental Quality”. Among the requirements in NEPA is that federal 
agencies should use a “… systematic, inter-disciplinary approach [that ensures that] presently 
unquantified environmental values may be given appropriate consideration in decision making 
along with economic and technical considerations” (section 102) (Sadler, 1996: 24, parenthesis 
added). Sadler (1996) identifies this requirement as central to most, if not all, definitions of 
environmental assessment and statements of its purpose. The key elements of NEPA are 
summarised in Box 1.1 below.  
 
Box 1.1:  US National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 
 
NEPA is broadly divided into two parts:  
 Title I: which presents the Congressional Declaration of National Environmental Policy that 
outlines the need for the preservation and enhancement of the environment; lists objectives 
in relation to the man and nature interface; and stipulates requirements for procedures to 
determine the impact of legislation and other major Federal actions that significantly affect 
the quality of the environment.  This Title will form the focus of the discussion of NEPA that 
follows.  
 Title II: that deals with the establishment of a Council on Environmental Quality and its 
roles and responsibilities.  
Section 101 (a) of Title I states, inter alia, that the Congress recognises the impact of man's 
activities6 on the natural environment and the need to restore and maintain environmental quality for 
the welfare and development of man. It is therefore the policy of the Federal Government to use all 
                                            
6  The following human activities are mentioned in particular: population growth, high-density urbanization, 
industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and expanding technological advances (NEPA, section 2). 
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practical means “… to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in 
productive harmony, and fulfil the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future 
generations of Americans (section 101 (a)).”   
The values or objectives underpinning NEPA are evident in section 101 (b) which states that it is the 
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practical means to improve and coordinate 
Federal plans, programs and functions in order to:  
 “fulfil the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding 
generations;  
 assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing 
surroundings;  
 attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to 
health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;  
 preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and 
maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity, and variety of 
individual choice;  
 achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high standards of 
living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and  
 enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable 
recycling of depletable resources”.  
The Congress also recognises that each person should be able to enjoy a healthy environment and 
that they also have a responsibility to contribute to its maintenance and enhancement 
(section 101(c)).  
The procedural requirements listed in section 102 (2) require the Federal Government to administer 
the policies, regulations and public laws of the country according to the approach set out below:  
(A) “utilize a systematic, inter-disciplinary approach which will ensure the integrated use of the 
natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in decision-
making which may have an impact on man's environment;  
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the Council on 
Environmental Quality established by Title II of this Act, which will ensure that presently 
unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in 
decision-making along with economic and technical considerations;  
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major 
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed 
statement by the responsible official on: 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action; 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal 
be implemented,  
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(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,  
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and  
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be 
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented”. 
(http://www.nepa.gov/nepa/regs/nepa/nepaeqia.htm, accessed 29 August, 2008) 
 
Subsequent to the promulgation of NEPA, the concept of environmental assessment spread 
widely, in various forms, to other parts of the world. Canada, Australia and New Zealand were the 
first countries to emulate NEPA; through the adoption of EIA procedures in 1973 and 1974, 
followed by a number of other industrial and developing countries (Sadler, 1996). Key milestones 
in the development and spread of EIA include the European Community Directive 85/337/EEC 
passed in 1985, which set minimum requirements for EIA within member states; and the inclusion 
of environmental assessment in Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration of the Rio Earth Summit in 
1992 (Sadler, 1996). A summary of the diffusion of environmental assessment globally is provided 
in Table 1.1 below.  
 
Table 1.1:   Key Stages in the World Wide Adoption of EA  
 
Year/Period Key milestone in development of environmental assessment 
Pre-1969 Consideration of the environmental consequences of projects is limited. 
Mostly technical and economic aspects considered.  
1969 Enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in the 
United States.  
1973 and 1974 Canada, Australia and New Zealand are the first to adopt environmental 
assessment procedures. Canada and New Zealand establish 
administratively-based procedures, while Australia passes 
environmental assessment legislation.  
During 1970s Other countries, both in the industrial (e.g. France, Germany and 
Ireland) and developing world (e.g. Philippines, Colombia and Thailand), 
introduce formal or informal EIA procedures, or elements thereof (e.g. 
requirements for impact statements as part of planning applications for 
development approval).  Also within this period, the Organisation for 
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Year/Period Key milestone in development of environmental assessment 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recommend that 
member states adopt EIA procedures.  
1985 The European Community Directive (85/337/EEC) on EIA is passed, 
stipulating minimum requirements for assessment procedures within 
member states.  
1989 The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) recommends that 
member countries introduce EIA principles and procedures. 
Environmental Assessment becomes a standard requirement for all 
World Bank financed projects and other development banks and donors 
introduce similar requirements. As a result of the need for borrowing 
countries to comply with this, EA processes became widely used in the 
developing world.  
1991 The Espoo Convention on EIA, which requires the consideration of the 
transboundary effects of development, is passed. 
1992 Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration, signed at the Rio Earth Summit, 
states that EIA will be introduced at the national level for proposed 
activities that may have a negative impact on the environment and for 
which national government approval is required. Also, capacity building 
programmes are initiated by various multilateral and donor agencies, 
promoting the further spread of environmental assessment worldwide. 
Generally, in the 1990s, there is a rapid growth in environmental 
assessment training and cooperation activities.  
1996 More than 100 countries have EIA systems. 
1999 The World Bank updates its guidance on EIA.  
2002 The Johannesburg Earth Summit is held. The Plan of Implementation of 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development, which is the main 
output of this Summit, states that all relevant authorities should be 
encouraged to take sustainable development considerations into 
account in decision-making through, inter alia, the use of environmental 
impact assessment (Chapter 3, section 19(e)).  
2007 At least 120 countries have EIA systems. 
(Sadler, 1996; UN, 2002; Wood, 2003; Glasson et al., 2005) 
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The historical evolution of the nature of environmental assessment procedures, clearly illustrates 
an increasing awareness of the interconnectedness of the biophysical, social and economic 
aspects of the environment, resulting in attempts to reconnect these previously compartmentalised 
components. Modak and Biswas (1999: 6) make the observation that “... as the understanding of 
the environment and its multidimensional interdependent nature matured, so did the size and 
scope of environmental legislation”.  
 
Prior to NEPA, project review focused mainly on engineering, technical and economic aspects 
(Sadler, 1996). In the 1970s methods were developed for undertaking impact assessments (e.g. 
checklists and matrices) before a development was given permission to proceed. These 
assessments focused primarily on the project level of decision-making and included 
recommendations for mitigation measures to alleviate or reduce the significance of potential 
negative impacts of a proposed development. The EIAs undertaken at this time mainly focused on 
biophysical aspects, which were separated into categories such as air, land, water and biodiversity, 
with a category for socio-economic aspects sometimes being included (Sadler, 1996; Weaver and 
Rossouw, 1998). Burns (2002) argues that this fragmentation of the environment was part of the 
general trend within EIA, at this stage of its development, to simplify the process as much as 
possible. Consistent with this was the identification of mainly first-order cause-effect relationships, 
focusing EIAs on immediate impacts, with less emphasis on secondary or cumulative effects 
(Burns, 2002).  
 
During this early stage in the development of EIA, social concerns were rarely included directly 
(Taylor et al., 1990; Burns, 2002). Public participation was often confused with Social Impact 
Assessment (SIA) (Taylor et al., 1990), with SIA itself, in many instances, replaced with economic 
assessment. If expanded to include social issues, analysis in EIA was mostly confined to the 
quantifiable effects of development, population changes and the need for community services 
(Taylor et al., 1990). However, from the late 1970s and early 1980s social issues were more 
effectively integrated into EIAs and public participation become an integral part of the development 
process (Sadler, 1996; Burns, 2002). Modak and Biswas (1999) attribute this expansion of EIA to 
an increased understanding of the interrelationship between the various dimensions of the 
environment.  
 
Also in the late 1970s, the need to expand the application of EIA to regional plans was 
acknowledged, as the transboundary and cumulative impacts of development were increasingly 
recognized (Modak and Biswas, 1999). It was realised, for example, that industrial emissions can 
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affect an entire region, and that while a particular industry’s emissions may be within acceptable 
limits, when combined with emissions from others, the cumulative total may exceed the safe 
assimilation limits for the region (i.e. have a negative cumulative impact). From the mid-1980s 
onwards attempts were therefore made to address such cumulative effects in environmental 
assessment (Sadler, 1996). A further consequence of the recognition of regional impacts fairly 
early in the development of EIA was the emergence of Health Impact Assessment (HIA). Although 
health issues were considered as an integral part of an EIA, their significance was raised through 
the development of HIA (Modak and Biswas, 1999).  
 
The 1980s saw another shift in the development of EIA, from a focus on the fragmented parts of 
the environment, to the evaluation of ecosystem wholes (Sadler, 1996; Burns, 2002). The 
development of ecological impact assessment led to the consideration of overall ecosystem 
composition, structure and functioning (Burns, 2002). However, Burns (2002) argues that this tool 
is rarely extensively used at the project level, notwithstanding the potential he identifies for 
ecological assessment to inform more long-term planning and policy-making.  
 
It was mainly in the 1990s that the application of environmental assessment to the policy, plan and 
programme levels of decision-making gained momentum (Dalal-Clayton and Sadler, 2005). 
Although provisions were made in NEPA (section 102) for environmental assessment at these 
levels of decision-making, this occurred to only a limited degree in practice (Dalal-Clayton and 
Sadler, 2005). In the 1990s, however, a range of different forms of environmental assessment at 
the policy, plan and programme level emerged and were instituted in a number of countries 
worldwide and by several international organisations (Dalal-Clayton and Sadler, 2005). In July 
2004, the European Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directive (Directive 2001/42/EC) 
came into force, stipulating requirements for the development of SEA processes within member 
states (Dalal-Clayton and Sadler, 2005). Dalal-Clayton and Sadler reported in 2005 that more than 
25 countries and jurisdictions had SEA systems in place.  
 
With the increased international allegiance to sustainable development in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, EIA was viewed as a means of achieving this goal (Sadler, 1996). This led to more 
attention being paid to sustainability issues in the environmental assessment process, and 
consequently to the links between social, economic and biophysical aspects of the environment 
(Sadler, 1996).  This trend was reflected in SEA, which in some cases developed beyond a mere 
extension of EIA to the policy, plan and programme levels of decision-making (EIA-based SEA), to 
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a way of implementing the principle of sustainability through the identification of context-related 
sustainability objectives for guiding development (i.e. sustainability-led SEA) (Therivel et al.,1992).   
 
The evolution of environmental assessment has therefore led to a proliferation of approaches (e.g. 
HIA, SIA, Risk Assessment, Heritage Assessment and SEA) that focus on a particular stage in the 
decision-making process, or on a particular aspect of the environment. Each of these has 
developed either under the umbrella of EIA, or as non-mandatory specialised assessment 
procedures, alongside financial, economic, environmental and other appraisals (Lee and 
Kirkpatrick, 2000). Lee and Kirkpatrick (2000) presume that this proliferation of procedures is due 
to a concern that certain impacts are either being overlooked or insufficiently analysed, or that the 
incorrect techniques are being used to assess these impacts.  However, this tendency has led to a 
number of problems, which include: difficulties in synchronising the various appraisals with each 
other and with the planning of the proposed project; a greater chance of inconsistencies arising in 
the appraisal techniques used in each assessment; an increase in the likelihood of the 
interdependencies between impacts being overlooked; an increase in the time and other resources 
needed to manage and coordinate separate appraisals; and an increase in the difficulty of 
compiling the overall assessment for decision-makers (Lee and Kirkpatrick, 2000). More integrated 
approaches to development decision-making are being investigated internationally in response to 
the inadequacies and confusion associated with the existence of a multitude of environmental 
assessment processes (Lee and Kirkpatrick, 2000).  
 
Sustainability assessment is an example of such an approach which has recently emerged in the 
environmental assessment arena.  A range of methods to implementing this tool are promoted in 
the literature; however, its general aim is to expand the scope of environmental assessment 
beyond the biophysical, to include the social and economic consequences of decisions in an 
integrated way (Pope et al., 2004). According to Dalal-Clayton and Sadler (2005: 368) this tool aids 
“… an integrated assessment of the environmental, social and economic effects of proposed 
actions at all levels of decision-making, from policy to projects, which is undertaken against a 
national or international framework of sustainability principles, indicators or strategies”. Dalal-
Clayton and Sadler (2005) have identified numerous processes being undertaken under the 
umbrella term of sustainability assessment; however, in the view of Pope et al. (2004) there are 
few examples internationally of its effective implementation.  
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A related development within the field is the emergence of Integrated Sustainability Assessment 
(ISA)7. ISA pertains specifically to the policy-level of decision-making and aims to address multiple 
aspects of integration within policy formulation. These aspects include, for example, the various 
dimensions of sustainability, the qualitative and quantitative tools used in policy-making and the 
different knowledge and values of a range of stakeholders, policymakers and experts (Weaver and 
Rotmans, 2008). The stages in the ISA process are listed in Box 1.2 below.  
 
Box 1.2:  Stages in the ISA process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISA contains some changes to the assessment of policy processes, that are similar to those that 
emerged in this thesis (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) for an alternative conceptual approach to project-level 
environmental assessment in South Africa (e.g. the view of the environment as a social-ecological 
system and the more extensive use of narrative in evaluations). However, its applicability 
specifically to the policy-level of decision-making, limits its usefulness in providing ideas for the 
alternative conceptual approach sought in this thesis. In addition, the development of ISA did not 
include a comprehensive re-evaluation of the philosophical assumptions underlying the 
environmental assessment field itself. Therefore, in my view, many of the problems resulting from 
                                            
7
  A European research project entitled MATISSE (Methods and Tools for Integrated Sustainability 
Assessment) was undertaken to formulate and demonstrate the theory and practice of this approach 
(Weaver and Rotmans, 2008). The description of ISA in this section is drawn primarily from Working 
Paper 1 (Weaver and Rotmans, 2008), which was completed as part of this research project. 
The stages in the cyclical ISA process include briefly: 
 
• The conceptualisation of the problem and the social-ecological system to be addressed;  
• The formulation of a vision for the sustainable future of the system;  
• The identification of pathways (e.g. scenarios) and policy proposals to achieve the vision;  
• The qualitative assessment of the positive and negative impacts of  the preferred pathways to 
sustainability and the policy options identified;  
• The use of experiments that employ tools such as computer modelling to test the vision, policy 
proposals and the assumptions that underlie these (in terms of  their consistency, adequacy, 
robustness and feasibility); and  
• The explicit identification of lessons learnt through this process in order to adjust the problem 
definition, vision and policy options as appropriate.  
(Weaver and Rotmans, 2008) 
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the modernist base of the field, as described in section 1.4 of this chapter, are not addressed in a 
fundamentally new way.  
 
1.3.2 Evolution of Environmental Assessment in South Africa 
 
Environmental assessments were practiced in South Africa well before the promulgation of EIA in 
legislation in 1997. As early as the 1970s, EIAs were being undertaken voluntarily, or at the 
discretion of authorities, with this practice gaining momentum in the 1980s (Sowman et al., 1995; 
Barbour and Brownlie, 2002). The need to incorporate environmental concerns into project 
planning and decision-making was recognized in the 1980 White Paper on a National Policy 
Regarding Environmental Conservation, which formed the basis for the Environmental 
Conservation Act (No. 100 of 1982) (Sowman et al., 1995). This Act did not explicitly require EIA, 
but made provision for the establishment of a statutory Council for the Environment to advise the 
Minister on environmental issues (Sowman et al., 1995). This Council formed a committee in 1984 
to recommend a strategy to ensure that environmental concerns were incorporated into 
development planning and project implementation (Preston et al., 1994). The extensive research 
and consultation process that followed resulted in the publication of a document on Integrated 
Environmental Management (IEM) in South Africa (Preston et al., 1994; Sowman et al., 1995). 
Sowman et al. (1995: 51) point out that the term IEM was chosen as it implied the integration of 
environmental issues into all stages of the development process, from planning to post-
assessment monitoring; as opposed to EIA, which appeared to be “… too limited in scope, 
reactive, anti-development, too separate from the planning process, and often the cause of costly 
delays”. 
 
Although the international evolution of environmental management and assessment, particularly 
the enactment of NEPA, encouraged South African policy-makers to consider the possibilities of 
introducing such a process in this country, IEM was specifically designed to meet the needs of 
South Africa as part of the developing world (Preston 1995). Hill and Fuggle (1988)8 argued in a 
paper to the 1988 Annual Transportation Convention, that the US concept of EIA had not 
succeeded in developing countries because of the difference in priorities and values in these 
countries to those in the United States. In general, the authors argue that a fundamental 
                                            
8
  Dr Richard Hill was a member of the team that compiled the IEM Guidelines and Professor Richard 
Fuggle was the chairman of the Committee for Environmental Impact Assessment that was established 
by the Council for the Environment (DEA (Council for the Environment, 1988; Department of 
Environmental Affairs), 1992).  
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assumption built into the American approach to environmental assessment was that environmental 
conservation was a high voter priority and a concern that would be seriously taken into account by 
decision-makers. This priority, they argued, was borne out of a concern for the long-term 
sustainability of the environment which was being threatened by human activities. In addition, the 
aesthetic, scientific and educational value of the natural environment was considered important in 
development decision-making in the United States. Lastly, Hill and Fuggle (1988) argue that the 
US EIA process depended on an open system of government and the wide disclosure of 
information, a context which did not exist in apartheid South Africa.  
 
Contrary to the situation in the United States, meeting basic human needs, such as food and 
housing are priorities in many developing countries (Hill and Fuggle, 1988). Hill and Fuggle (1988) 
point out that in such countries, the environment is often seen as a threat to humans, rather than 
humans as a threat to the environment. This perception is the result of extreme events such as 
floods and droughts. Under such circumstances meeting basic human needs is the immediate 
priority rather than, for example, aesthetic issues or the interests of future generations (Hill and 
Fuggle, 1988). For these reasons, South Africa’s IEM procedure aimed to guide rather than 
constrain development and focused on making such development environmentally acceptable 
through, for example, the mitigation of negative impacts (Preston et al., 1994; Sowman et al., 
1995). The main emphasis was on establishing a compromise that would respond to development 
needs, while minimising environmental degradation; rather than on informing a single decision-
point, late in the planning process, at which permission to proceed with development was either 
granted or not (Hill and Fuggle, 1988). Moreover, rather than attempting to integrate a range of 
separate assessment procedures, the IEM approach included a broad definition of the 
environment, which comprises social, economic and biophysical aspects (Preston et al., 1994). 
However, considerable difficulty in integrating these elements within assessment procedures is still 
being experienced, as discussed in section 1.4.1.1.  
 
The IEM approach recommended by the committee established by the Council for the Environment 
was published in a series of documents in 1989 (Sowman et al., 1995). Changes to the proposed 
process were made later in 1992 in the light of experience gained through its practical application 
(Sowman et al., 1995) and a series of revised guideline documents was produced. IEM was never 
legislated, although it was generally adopted, formally or informally, by authorities, business and 
many environmental practitioners (Sowman et al., 1995).  
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IEM was criticised on a number of accounts. For example, Lloyd (1995: 333) stated that: “The 
whole IEM procedure has emerged as cumbersome, time-consuming, expensive and totally 
antithetical to the spirit of development and job creation. It could be a vehicle for environmental 
protection; it may not be a suitable vehicle for ensuring sustainable development”. Another critique 
focused on the institutional context and procedure for IEM, stating that: “Part of the problem in 
South Africa is the institutional context of EIA studies, which does not address the theoretical and 
procedural questions which have been acknowledged internationally. For example, many EIA 
studies adopt the IEM policy guidelines of the Council for the Environment, which endorse a 
simplistic positivist approach and are certainly inappropriate for social scientists” (Quinlan, 1993: 
106). 
 
EIA regulations were promulgated in 1997 in terms of the Environment Conservation Act (No. 73 of 
1989). These regulations related specifically to the environmental assessment of proposed 
development projects, excluding the assessment of policies, plans and programmes that IEM had 
included. Based on the experience gained in the implementation of these first EIA regulations, a 
revised set was published in 2006 in terms of NEMA. The definition of the environment currently 
guiding environmental assessment in South Africa has narrowed from the broad IEM definition, 
which included social, economic and biophysical aspects, to the definition in NEMA which centres 
on the natural environment and its physical and cultural properties that affect human health and 
well-being (Republic of South Africa, 1998).   
 
In South Africa, as in most countries, the practice of SEA emerged independently of EIA. Key 
concepts underpinning SEA were articulated in a Primer and Protocol, produced in 1996 and 1997 
respectively (Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), 1996; DEAT, 2004c). These 
documents aimed to inform the local debate and present the benefits of SEA, but did not include a 
specific approach, as there was little practical experience in this area at the time upon which to 
base this (Rossouw et al., 2000). Concurrent with the production of these documents, SEAs were 
first undertaken in practice (DEAT, 2004c). Based on this experience, DEAT published guidelines 
for SEA in South Africa in 2000 (DEAT, 2000). The approach adopted in these guidelines did not 
merely replicate international SEA procedures, but were adapted to the conditions of resource 
constraints experienced in this country. South Africa is now generally regarded as a leading 
developing country in terms of SEA practice (Retief et al., 2004).  
 
In 2007 the DEAT SEA guidelines were updated, based on further experience in implementing 
SEA in South Africa. Three alternative approaches to SEA are described, with the relevance of 
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each dependent on whether the assessment is commissioned before, during or after the 
development planning process (DEAT, 2007). A particular approach to SEA has not been 
legislated in South Africa; however, legal provision is made for the tool to be applied in several 
sectors including urban development and port planning.  
 
Retief et al. (2004) report that, between 1996 and 2003, 50 SEAs were conducted in South Africa. 
Most of these relate to development planning procedures and therefore address social, economic 
and biophysical issues. Of those that are sectoral SEAs, most pertain to the conservation and 
biodiversity sector; however, strategic assessments were also undertaken within the industrial, 
transport, port planning, energy, mining and economic sectors (Retief et al., 2004).  
 
A summary of the key stages in the evolution of environmental assessment in South Africa is 
provided in the table below.  
 
Table 1.2:   Key Stages in the Adoption of EA in South Africa  
 
Date/period Key milestone in the development of environmental assessment 
1982 The Environment Conservation Act (No. 100 of 1982) is promulgated. This 
Act contains limited provisions for the regulation of activities that have a 
negative impact on the environment. It is mainly concerned with 
governmental coordination of environmental concerns and the 
establishment of a Council to advise the Minister of Environment Affairs.  
1983 The Council for the Environment is established in terms of the Environment 
Conservation Act (No. 100 of 1982). 
1984 The Council for the Environment establishes a committee to make 
recommendations for the consideration of environmental issues in 
development approval processes. The approach recommended by this 
committee is described as Integrated Environmental Management (IEM).  
1989 The Environment Conservation Act (No. 73 of 1989) is promulgated. This 
Act provides for the regulation of activities that may have a negative impact 
on the environment and for environmental impact reports to be required. No 
specific regulations in this regard were passed for a number of years.  
Also in 1989, the Council for the Environment recommends a procedure for 
IEM. This procedure is developed through an extensive process of research 
and consultation.  It is adopted both formally and informally by businesses, 
authorities and professionals, but is not legislated.   
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Date/period Key milestone in the development of environmental assessment 
1992 The practical experience in implementing IEM is used to refine the 
procedure. The revised procedure and a series of guideline documents are 
published.  
1996 An SEA Primer is produced by the CSIR, highlighting the limitations of 
project-specific SEA and the need to integrate environmental issues into 
the strategic levels of decision-making (i.e. into policies, plans and 
programmes). Although a specific SEA process is not presented in the 
Primer, some characteristics of SEA are explained. SEA is undertaken in 
the country on a voluntary basis.  
1997 EIA regulations are promulgated in terms of the Environment Conservation 
Act (No. 73 of 1989). This Act introduces the process as a mandatory 
requirement for particular projects within certain listed environments.  
1998 The National Environmental Management Act (No.107 of 1998) (NEMA) is 
promulgated. This Act (Chapter 5, section 23(1)) provides for “… the 
application of appropriate environmental management tools in order to 
ensure the integrated environmental management of activities”. Although 
this statement refers to environmental management in general, the focus of 
the Act is on predicting the potential impacts of proposed activities. In so 
doing, NEMA places the emphasis on environmental assessment 
specifically, as this is the main environmental management tool used to 
make such predictions. 
2000 DEAT publishes the first Guidelines on SEA in South Africa. In addition, the 
Municipal Planning and Performance Regulations (Department of Provincial 
and Local Government, 2001) are published in terms of the Municipal 
Systems Act No. 32 of 2000. These Regulations (Chapter 2, section 2(4)(f)) 
require strategic assessment of the environmental impacts of Integrated 
Development Plans (IDPs).  The Regulations do not stipulate a specific 
procedure to be followed in these assessments.  
2006 EIA regulations are passed in terms of Chapter 5 of NEMA. These 
regulations replace those passed in 1997 in terms of the Environment 
Conservation Act (No. 73 of 1989).  
2007 Revised guidelines on SEA in South Africa are published based on 
experience gained in the application of this process in practice.  
(Fuggle, 1994; Sowman et al., 1995; CSIR, 1996; Barbour and Browlie, 2002; Rossouw et al., 2000; 
Department of Provincial and Local Government, 2001; DEAT, 2004c; 2006a). 
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1.4 Constraints to Effective Environmental Assessment in South Africa 
 
Currently, there are a number of persistent problems constraining the effectiveness of 
environmental assessment in South Africa. In the discussion below, I will present examples of 
those problems which, for reasons that will become evident later in the chapter, relate to the 
following three themes:  
▪ Difficulties in achieving inter-disciplinarity in environmental assessment; 
▪ Difficulties in undertaking stakeholder engagement; and 
▪ Difficulties in impact prediction and dealing with ‘uncertainty’.  
 
As far as possible, I have described the constraints from a South African practitioners’ perspective. 
As explained in the introduction to this thesis, I initially listed these issues as I perceive them, 
based on my years of working in the field.  I then undertook a series of interviews9 and a review of 
the ‘grey literature’ (e.g. IAIAsa annual conference proceedings since 1996), where such 
practitioners typically publish, in order to determine whether my views were generally shared by 
others. I have not described individual environmental assessment processes, as a review of the 
literature (e.g. Brownlie, Walmsley and Tarr, 2006), the interviews which I conducted and my own 
experience, indicates that there are consistent trends and recurring problems that can be identified 
based on existing knowledge.  
 
Although I provided, in section 1.3.1, a brief overview of the development of the field 
internationally, this was merely to provide the context for the description of the evolution of 
environmental assessment in South Africa (section 1.3.2) and the problems being experienced in 
the field in this country (section 1.4). Many of these problems are shared by those practising 
environmental assessment in other countries, however, that is not the focus of this thesis. 
Therefore, I have not included a review of international environmental assessment techniques and 
best practice in this chapter in any depth. Although some of these techniques are mentioned in 
Chapter 2, they are typically based on the same philosophical foundation as the field as a whole, 
and I wish to focus on revising that foundation, rather than proposing symptomatic solutions that do 
not address the roots of the myriad of constraints presented in the sections that follow. In instances 
                                            
9
  As described in the introduction to this thesis, these interviews were conducted in 2006 with selected 
environmental assessment practitioners, environmental researchers, government officials and members 
of NGOs. 
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where I have referred to the international literature and experience, it is primarily to provide a 
deeper understanding of the constraints to effective environmental assessment in South Africa.  
 
1.4.1 Difficulties achieving inter-disciplinarity in environmental assessment 
 
The difficulties currently experienced in crossing the divides between various disciplines and 
sectors constrain environmental assessment in a number of ways. For example, they limit the 
effective integration of various specialist inputs into the environmental assessment process. Also, 
the governmental review of EIAs is hampered by the structure of government departments that 
broadly reflects the divides between disciplines. In the section that follows, these particular 
problems will be discussed in more detail.   
 
1.4.1.1. Integration and inter-disciplinary work in environmental assessment 
One of the primary goals of environmental assessment is to promote sustainable development. In 
South Africa this concept is included in many pieces of legislation, such as NEMA, the 
Development Facilitation Act (No.67 of 1995), the Municipal Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000) and the 
National Water Act (No. 36 of 1998). There is much debate in the environmental arena on the 
meaning of sustainable development (e.g. Reid, 1995; Dresner, 2002); however, most definitions 
invariably call for the integration of social, economic and environmental priorities. Typically, the 
concept is depicted as three intersecting circles with the desirable point being in the middle where 
social, economic and biophysical concerns intersect.  
 
In South Africa, such integration of social, economic and biophysical concerns, is central to the 
philosophy and practice of IEM, in which the environment, as stated in section 1.3.2, is defined in 
its broadest sense to include “... biophysical, social and economic components and the 
connections within and between these components” (DEAT, 2004a: 9)10. An ‘integrated approach’ 
                                            
10
 Although the term ‘environment’ is used in its broadest sense, to include social, biological, physical, 
historical, economic, political and cultural aspects, in the context of IEM (Preston et al., 1994; DEAT, 
2004a), the NEMA (Definitions, section1, (xi)) defines the environment more narrowly stating that it “… 
means the surroundings within which humans exist and that are made up of:–  
i. the land, water and atmosphere of the earth;  
ii. micro-organisms, plant and animal life;  
iii. any part or combination of (i) and (ii) and the interrelationships between among and between them; 
and  
iv. the physical, chemical, aesthetic and cultural properties and conditions of the foregoing that 
influence human health and well-being” (Republic of South Africa, 1998).  
 Despite this more narrow definition, the EIA regulations still require the consideration of social, economic 
and environmental or ecological concerns when undertaking an environmental assessment.  
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is defined in DEAT’s document on IEM (2004a: 9) as one that acknowledges “… that all elements 
of the environment are linked and interrelated, and it must take into account the effects of 
decisions on all components of the environment and all people in the environment”. The preamble 
to NEMA (Republic of South Africa, 1998) states that “… the integration of social, economic and 
environmental factors in the planning, implementation and evaluation of decisions …” is required in 
order to achieve sustainable development, while the EIA regulations (DEAT, 2006a) require a 
description of the way in which “… the physical, biological, social, economic and cultural aspects of 
the environment may be affected by the proposed activity” (Chapter 3, section 32(2)(d)).  
 
Meeting this need for integration in environmental assessment requires that specialists from 
varying disciplines work together in an inter-disciplinary way. In the interviews that I conducted for 
this thesis, the respondents generally saw the value of specialist interaction, describing a range of 
related benefits. For example, they said that it assisted with identifying impacts, it provided a 
holistic understanding of the issues that were being discussed, it broadened their analysis, helped 
them think ‘outside the box’ and assisted in establishing ‘a bigger picture of things’. One 
interviewee stated it clearly by saying that you “… need to partner with other bits of the problem”. 
 
Despite the requirements in legislation and recognition of the importance of integration, putting it 
into effect is seriously constrained in the practice of environmental assessment in South Africa. For 
example, Greyling (2000: 158) states that there is “… a lack of integration within the technical 
dimension of EIA … ” and that in some instances “… an EIA project manager puts together the 
findings of specialist studies by way of ‘cut and paste’ in the Environmental Impact Report, ticking 
off the one study after the other, not integrating the findings of specialist studies with each other, 
and not using the findings as parcels of information to give shape to the bigger picture upon which 
decisions can be based” (Greyling, 2000: 159). The inadequate integration of specialist studies has 
been a persistent concern, with the problem already identified in the early 1990s. For example, 
Quinlan (1993) argues that the principle of drawing on a range of specialists in attempting to 
understand complex environmental processes is sound and that their combined input should 
provide a better understanding of the interconnectedness of the human and natural environment. 
However, Quinlan (1993: 107) concludes that: “The opportunity to describe the interconnectedness 
of these processes is lost … the moment the specialists begin to conduct their studies 
independently of each other. Logically, the specialists should integrate their work by working 
together, in order to learn from each other the different dimensions of these processes. This is 
rarely, if ever, carried out. As a result, the different specialist reports are not compatible, having 
been written within the confines and according to the dictates of each individual discipline”.  
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Shandler et al. (1999: 246, parenthesis added) attribute the failure of integration in EIA to a lack of 
training of environmental assessment practitioners, stating that “… few [environmental 
practitioners] have adequate skills to sufficiently integrate socio-economic considerations. Most 
environmental practitioners have received only training in the natural sciences, and therefore 
define sustainable development from a narrow biophysical perspective”.  
 
The participants in the interview process that I conducted, generally reported that it was “… a 
challenge working with other disciplines …” and making ‘connections and linkages’ between 
specialist reports. One interviewee called integration a ‘nice idea’ that had worked in only one or 
two environmental assessment reports that she has been exposed to, while in another 
interviewee’s opinion “… people are not good at integrating …” and “… economists and ecologists 
can’t talk to one another …” because their perspectives are so different.  
 
A lack of integration in environmental assessment is not only a problem in South Africa, but also 
internationally. This problem has serious consequences, as explained by Hulme and Taylor (2000: 
82) who state that: “Despite concerted efforts to integrate environmental, economic and social 
analyses … the majority of ‘integrated appraisals’ remained informed guesswork parading around 
as objective technical analysis. Often such work is as likely to damage the livelihoods of those that 
interventions seek to help as it is to benefit them”.  
 
Based on the interviews that I conducted, the main constraints to effective inter-disciplinary work in 
South Africa are the differences in the terminology and conceptual frameworks used in various 
disciplines. One of the main limitations to effective dialogue between specialists is the use of 
language and terminology that is specific to a particular discipline (i.e. jargon) or that has a 
particular meaning in that discipline which varies from its use elsewhere. As Norton (2005: 440) 
states in the context of environmental policy-making in the United States: “Disciplines, too often 
thinking of themselves as the main course, have insulated themselves by creating in-group jargons 
and techniques that make them inaccessible either by the public or by scientists in related fields”. 
One interviewee that I spoke to stated that “… we struggle to say things that mean the same thing 
to both sides”.  A particular concern within the environmental management arena, mentioned by 
several interviewees, is achieving effective dialogue between EIA practitioners and economists.  A 
typical means of addressing the difficulties in communicating across the disciplinary divides, 
mentioned by one scientist who was interviewed, is the use of an extensive glossary. A glossary 
alone, however, does not address the differences in conceptual frameworks that would influence 
the use of that terminology by the various specialists.  
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Several interviewees listed differences between the disciplines in their fundamental way of 
thinking, as a constraint to effective integration. This was articulated in various ways, including 
differences in conceptual frameworks, research paradigms, perspectives, worldviews and the way 
of framing problems. One interviewee summarised this by stating that we are “… looking at the 
problem through different lenses”. Due to the significance of this constraint to environmental 
assessment, some elaboration is necessary.  
 
The many differences in conceptual frameworks or worldviews that can influence the approach of a 
specialist to a particular problem, is illustrated in the debate between and within the natural and 
social sciences, relating to absolutisms and relativisms. This was alluded to by one of the 
interviewees who admitted to struggling to work with those that had “… a completely relativistic 
view of reality”. However, this issue cannot simply be divided into those that have a relativistic 
outlook and those that prefer an absolutist approach. Harré and Krausz (1996) explain the varieties 
of relativism and absolutism, illustrating that this is a nuanced, complicated discussion.  For the 
purposes of this illustration, the lines of contestation can be drawn between those who believe that 
there is one point of view from which the final truth of reality can be determined and those that 
believe that meaning, truth and value are relative to the particular cultural context under 
consideration (Harré and Krausz, 1996).  
 
In its variants, absolutism holds that there are beliefs that are true in all contexts and entities that 
exist for all persons (i.e. universalism); there are beliefs that are true and entities that exist 
independent of the views of any person or society (i.e. objectivism); and finally that there is a 
common set of basic statements that are valid for all enquiry and assessment and a common 
ontology from which all other existents are constructed (i.e. foundationalism) (Harré and Krausz, 
1996). The varieties of relativism identified by Harré and Krausz (1996) hold that: 
▪ Meaning is relative to the language used – you cannot translate words into another 
language without loosing meaning; 
▪ Existence is relative to the conceptual framework employed – what exists for a person 
depends on what they believe in;  
▪ Morality is relative to the society and epoch – what is considered right changes over 
time and between different cultures; and 
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▪ Aesthetic value is relative to cultures and epochs – one culture may not consider 
another's music beautiful and one generation's music may be considered ‘outdated’ 
by another.  
 
The debate between absolutism and relativism has practical implications for environmental 
assessment. As one interviewee observed, there is a tendency for many scientists to either favour 
an approach based mainly on case-studies and contextual information or to promote the 
development of deterministic generalised frameworks. Although this is a debate that occurs within 
the social sciences it is often a difference that also manifests broadly between the natural and the 
social sciences (Smith, 2005). To illustrate, Ziman (1987: 15) states that “... a description of the 
natural world in terms of particular facts would be quite unmanageable and quite useless. The 
essence of scientific knowledge is that it goes beyond natural individual items of information and 
encompasses them in general statements”. The natural scientist looks for ‘patterns of fact’ that 
would have to be considered in any general description of the world (Ziman, 1987). In an article 
entitled: Are the Social Sciences Really Inferior? Machlup (1961) argues that there are a greater 
number of variables to consider in the social sciences than in the natural sciences, which makes 
for more variation and less recurrence of exactly the same events. Although Machlup does not 
draw this conclusion directly, it can be inferred from his argument that such variation makes the 
development of general statements more difficult in the social sciences. The tension between 
absolutism and relativism is not going to be easily solved and, as Harré and Krausz (1996: 3) state: 
“The debate between relativists and absolutists is of great antiquity and seeming intractability. The 
literature on the subject is huge. The twists and turns of the argument are labyrinthine”. 
 
The natural and social sciences, in their traditional forms, have other differences that can constrain 
the effective integration of the knowledge produced in each sphere. Some involved in the study of 
social processes and relations argue that the object of their study is so different to the natural world 
that it requires a fundamentally different approach to the production of knowledge11. Smith (2005) 
describes the differences between the natural and the social sciences, from an idealist point of 
view (Table 1.3). 
 
                                            
11
 Idealists support this argument, while empiricists apply the scientific method of the natural sciences to the 
social sciences (Smith, 2005). 
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Table 1.3:   Differences between Natural and Social Science 
 from an Idealist View. 
 
Natural Science Social Science 
Examines inanimate nature and living 
organisms 
Examines human actions and practices  
Non-evaluative, positive Evaluative, normative 
Objective experience Subjective experience 
Closed system (small number of discrete 
variables) 
Open system (large number of variables 
that can only be defined loosely) 
Quantitative, numerical and measurable 
variables 
Qualitative, non-numerical variables 
Predictive power of explanations for 
identifying outcomes is very important  
Prediction limited to specifying patterns 
Prediction not the sole criterion for 
establishing usefulness of explanation  
(Smith, 2005) 
 
Although Smith’s description is a very broad generalization, it does provide an indication of typical 
differences between the traditional natural and social sciences that may be contributing to 
difficulties in inter-disciplinary work in environmental assessment, and therefore in the integration 
of the social, economic and biophysical aspects of such assessments. 
 
However, these differences, as well as those between disciplines within these sciences, are not 
confined to the conceptual and methodological spheres, but extend to the epistemological and 
ontological realms. For example, there are particular values that underlie a discipline and influence 
the interpretation of information within that discipline (e.g. the need to maintain and enhance the 
natural environment underpins environmental assessment). Smith (2005: xxi) goes so far as to 
state that: “Disciplinary discourses are effective to the extent that they provide a framework within 
which meanings can be regulated”.  
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In his address to the Second World Congress on Transdisciplinarity, Swilling (2005), illustrated this 
effectively, drawing on Manfred Max Neef's critique of the triple bottom line approach to 
sustainability. This approach, as indicated in the description of sustainable development in this 
section, involves reducing sustainability to the sum of three partly overlapping spheres, i.e. the 
economic, the social and the ecological (Swilling, 2005). Swilling points out that this is problematic 
as it leaves the, often conflicting, internal logic (which comprises the epistemological, ontological 
and methodological aspects) of each sphere intact, concluding that “… If sustainability means 
markets, plus welfare, plus conservationism, then we really are in trouble. Unfortunately, this is, 
with rare exceptions, the state of play (Swilling, 2005: 2)”.12  
 
One scientist that I interviewed, made the important point that for effective inter-disciplinary work to 
take place, specialists and practitioners need to be comfortable with the insights of those from 
other disciplines and that it takes time to build up such trust. The purpose of the preceding 
discussion is to illustrate the significant challenge that this involves, given the conceptual, 
methodological, epistemological and ontological differences that are inherent within the various 
specialist disciplines. 
 
1.4.1.2. Lack of cooperative governance 
The split between disciplines and sectors is generally echoed in governmental structures in South 
Africa, which typically focus on separately managing particular aspects of human activities (e.g. 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, Department of Education, Department of Agriculture). 
This compartmentalization of functions is almost a universal characteristic of governance, 
occurring internationally and within development cooperation (Brown, 2000). Brown (2000: 5) 
points out that: “Compartmentalisation in government ensures that the necessary disciplinary 
expertise and implementation skills are brought to bear on specific development activities. But it 
also restricts the range of perspectives and disciplinary skills that can contribute to the formulation 
of that particular development activity”.  The need to overcome fragmentation in addressing 
environmental issues is recognised within this country's legislation through the principle of 
cooperative governance.  
                                            
12
  On a smaller scale, one environmental assessment practitioner in the interviews I conducted gave an 
example of how the differences in values underpinning various specialist areas can seriously challenge 
the integrative task of an EIA practitioner. The example was from the EIA for the Eskom Wind Farm, in 
which the painting of the tips of the blades of the windmills became a controversial issue. The specialist 
that undertook the visual study recommended that the tips not be painted for aesthetic purposes, 
however, the bird specialist recommended that they are indeed painted so that they are clearly visible to 
birds. The resolution clearly required a value judgment that was outside the realm of scientific inquiry.   
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Cooperative governance is a critical part of South Africa's system of government, which, according 
to the Constitution (Act No. 108 of 1996), comprises national, provincial and local spheres that are 
distinctive, inter-dependent and interrelated (section 40 (1)) (Cullinan, 2003). The theme of 
cooperative governance within the environmental sphere is developed in NEMA (Cullinan, 2003). It 
is stated in the Title of NEMA that it is an Act “… to provide for co-operative environmental 
governance by establishing principles for decision-making on matters affecting the environment, 
institutions that will promote co-operative governance and procedures for co-ordinating 
environmental functions exercised by organs of state ...” This promotion of co-operative 
governance reflects the understanding expressed in the Preamble to NEMA that the integration of 
social, economic and environmental factors is required in planning and decision-making, if 
sustainable development is to be achieved. Cullinan (2003: 2) summarises the approach adopted 
in this Act by stating that: “Simply put, the ubiquitous and integrated nature of the environment 
means that governments' usual approach of dividing human activities into sectors and then 
allocating management responsibility for each sector to different government departments, does 
not work in relation to environmental matters”.  
 
Although the theme of cooperative governance is embedded in South African environmental 
legislation, it is rarely effectively translated into practice (Kotze, 2003). Often the reality is a 
fragmented system of environmental management, with unaligned processes, fragmentation 
between local, provincial and national spheres of government and between various line functions 
(Kotze, 2003).  One of the biggest frustrations expressed by government officials whom I 
interviewed was obtaining a response on environmental assessment applications from other 
government departments. This problem delays decision-making and compromises the 
effectiveness of the EIA process.  
 
Spinks et al. (2003) also identify a lack of cooperative governance as one of the key constraints to 
the EIA process, due to the series of authorizations that are required for a single development 
proposal. Govender and Parks (2003: 121) draw similar conclusions when describing the process 
of approval for a waterfront development in Cape Town, stating that: “Relevant authorities are not 
consulting with each other and are reviewing the various applications in isolation, not realizing the 
integrated nature of the decisions they are making. Significant time delays are being experienced 
due to the linear nature of decision-making and significance of each decision taken. This domino 
effect has cost, process and time implications”. 
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1.4.2 Difficulties in undertaking effective stakeholder engagement 
 
Du Pisani and Sandham (2006b: 718) report that public participation is a ‘particularly disappointing’ 
aspect of environmental assessment in South Africa. He states that there is usually very limited 
stakeholder response to invitations to participate and very few objections are normally raised to 
proposed projects. It is arguable that this disinterest is partly the result of several inadequacies that 
typify numerous public participation processes in this country. These inadequacies, which I 
identified through the review of the IAIAsa Conference proceedings and the interviews that I 
conducted, include, inter alia, the following: 
▪ The inadequate inclusion of stakeholders and their views in environmental 
assessment processes;  
▪ A lack of understanding of the purpose and value of stakeholder engagement in 
environmental assessment; and 
▪ A lack of on-going engagement. 
 
1.4.2.1. Inadequate inclusion of stakeholders and their views  
Ensuring that stakeholder views are effectively included in environmental assessment processes is 
a significant challenge. In the worst cases of environmental assessment, stakeholders are not 
provided with a response to the concerns that they raise as part of the process and are therefore 
unaware of how these issues are taken into account (if at all). It appears that the aim of the 
environmental practitioner in such instances is on fulfilling the legal requirements for stakeholder 
engagement, rather than ensuring that stakeholder views effectively inform the process. This can 
lead to a lack of motivation amongst stakeholders to participate. In many instances people are not 
effectively encouraged to participate. Also, they may not be informed of the details about the 
project and its receiving environment to the extent that they can effectively engage in the process. 
In the view of one interviewee, such processes are ‘more a containment exercise’, where the aim is 
to avoid conflict as much as possible.  
 
There appear to be particular stakeholder groups that are not effectively engaged. These include 
civil society, poor and vulnerable groups and future generations (Freeman, 2001; Naidu and Will, 
2003; World Bank, 2005; Du Pisani and Sandham, 2006b). A member of an NGO that I interviewed 
stated that there are no effective governmental mechanisms for engaging with civil society and that 
their concerns are not taken seriously. A similar view was expressed in an assessment of the 
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participation of civil society in environmental assessment in southern Africa that was undertaken by 
the Southern African Institute for Environmental Assessment (SAIEA) in 2003.  Respondents to a 
survey, which was conducted as part of this study, stated that civil society is not able to undertake 
their role in development planning, partly due to the lack of willingness of national government to 
involve them. The same study revealed that some government officials in South Africa are 
sceptical about the role of NGOs and believe that some of these organizations use the name of the 
public to achieve their own goals. A view expressed in the interviews that I conducted, was that the 
lack of importance placed on civil society concerns is due to their being value-based rather than 
legally and scientifically founded.  
 
The participation of the poor, vulnerable and disadvantaged in environmental assessment 
processes may be limited by more practical aspects, such as a lack of financial resources to afford 
the travel costs of attending public meetings or a lack of access to newspapers in which notices 
are published (Naidu and Will, 2003). Their participation can also be constrained by a limited 
understanding of the language in which the process is being presented or by the academic and 
scientific jargon that may be used (Freeman, 2001; Naidu and Will, 2003). Besides these practical 
and technical issues, Du Pisani and Sandham (2006a) note that some disadvantaged communities 
see the environmental agenda as an obstruction to wealth creation and in protest, do not therefore 
participate in environmental assessment processes.  
 
When poor and vulnerable groups are able to participate in stakeholder engagement processes, 
despite the constraints described above, their concerns are often not adequately understood 
(Freeman, 2001). Freeman (2001: 129) argues that this results from differences in the social and 
economic circumstances of the poor and those coordinating engagement processes, stating that: 
“It can be generally observed that while there is frequently a genuine effort by the facilitators of the 
process to accommodate the indigenous peoples of the area, it is often still painfully evident that 
the consultants and representatives of the developer lack real understanding as they generally 
come from privileged groups of society”.  
 
The result of the inadequate inclusion of poor and disadvantaged groups in environmental 
assessment is that more powerful stakeholders often disproportionately affect policy and other 
decision-making processes (World Bank, 2005). Measures are therefore needed to enable more 
vulnerable groups to include their views in the discussion. This challenge is particularly daunting in 
the South African context in which the country's characteristic diversity calls for innovative 
techniques to ensure that all have an equal opportunity to participate (Greyling, 1997). This 
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diversity is sketched by Greyling (1997: 94) when she states: “The people of this country refer to 
themselves as the ‘rainbow nation’ - eleven official languages, widely divergent ethnic and cultural 
groupings, megarich industries, utterly disadvantaged rural and urban communities, many people 
illiterate and without postal addresses, vastly different levels of education”.  
 
A final group of stakeholders whose interests are often not adequately considered in environmental 
assessment processes are future generations. A fundamental principle of sustainable development 
is the consideration of the needs of this group; however, as the World Bank (2005) observes, for 
many, these concerns are distant and difficult to link to present needs. This link is formed by 
children who are typically the most affected by environmental degradation in developing countries, 
particularly through its effects on human health13 (World Bank, 2005).  
 
1.4.2.2. Lack of understanding of the purpose and value of stakeholder engagement 
There is often a lack of understanding, by the consultant team, the developer and the stakeholders, 
of the purpose and value of stakeholder engagement in environmental assessment processes 
(Greyling, 2000). Greyling (2000) explains that such a lack of understanding is particularly evident 
among the consultant team when the technical EIA process is seen as separate from the 
stakeholder engagement procedure. This separation is apparent when, for example, the overall 
purpose of the EIA and the steps in the technical process are not jointly defined by the EIA 
manager and the public participation practitioner (Greyling, 2000). This often results in insufficient 
time and resources being allocated to stakeholder engagement (Greyling, 2000). This split can 
also lead to the EIA manager and sub-contracted specialists defining their terms of reference with 
inadequate consideration of the views of stakeholders, reflecting a lack of understanding of their 
role as participants in a wider process that is informed by both technical aspects and the priorities 
of a range of interested and affected parties (Greyling, 2000).  
 
Stakeholder engagement can also be misunderstood by practitioners, as a means of achieving 
consensus among the various interested and affected parties (DEAT, 2002c). Although this may in 
some instances be desirable, it is not the overall objective and can lead to certain stakeholders 
being unwilling to participate in the process, for fear of being pressurised into such a consensus 
(DEAT, 2002c). Another problem, which constrains the effectiveness of stakeholder engagement, 
                                            
13
  The World Bank (2005) use 2002 World Bank statistics, saying that over 90 percent of health effects are 
experienced by children under five years of age and diarrhea accounts for about a third of the total child 
deaths under age five in developing countries. 
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is the adoption of one-size-fits-all approaches to participation that do not adequately respond to the 
particular challenges of the stakeholders being engaged (DEAT, 2002c).   
 
A lack of understanding of the value and purpose of engaging with stakeholders in the 
environmental assessment process also exists, in some cases, among developers and technical 
specialists, who view the participatory process as an “… irritating regulatory add-on to EIA” 
(Greyling, 2000: 155). As a consequence, time, resources and attention are allocated to the 
process to meet minimum legal requirements (DEAT, 2002). Such an approach, which lacks a real 
commitment to ensuring that stakeholder views are properly considered, can lead to accusations of 
token engagement (DEAT, 2002). 
 
Problems also arise when the objectives of the EIA are not clear and stakeholders participate on 
the basis of their own agendas and expectations of the process, an issue mentioned several times 
in the interviews that I conducted. For example, an EIA process might be used to negotiate higher 
levels of compensation, or to provide a platform to pursue local debates (e.g. between authorities 
and local communities) that have little direct relevance to a proposed development. 
 
1.4.2.3. Lack of on-going engagement 
A lack of on-going stakeholder engagement was another concern that was raised during the 
interviews that I conducted. The environmental assessment process usually requires the 
environmental assessment and stakeholder engagement practitioners to engage with a community 
for a limited period of time (‘flash-in-the-pan’ involvement, as one interviewee called it). This limits 
the possibility of meaningful or a deep level of engagement occurring, in which trust is built over a 
period of time. One interviewee pointed out that, in some instances, longer-term involvement with a 
client and community is constrained by the requirements in legislation (i.e. the EIA regulations, 
Chapter 3, section 18(a)) for a consultant to be independent. The same interviewee expressed the 
view that “… independence should be more about the quality of work rather than the length of 
relationship with the client.”  
 
1.4.3 Difficulties in impact prediction  
 
There are numerous difficulties in predicting the impacts of a proposed development on the 
environment, which include dealing with uncertainty, social issues and cumulative impacts. I will 
discuss each of these in the sections that follow. 
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1.4.3.1. Addressing uncertainty 
Environmental assessment practitioners are required, according to best practice guidance (e.g. 
DEA, 1992), to provide an indication of the ‘degree of certainty’ that accompanies each of their 
impact predictions. This acknowledges the fact, recognized by most authors, that uncertainty is 
inherent in the process of environmental prediction (Tennøy et al., 2006). Such a requirement is 
partially included in South Africa’s EIA regulations (Chapter 3, section 32(2)(k)(iv)), in which an 
indication of “… the probability of the impact occurring …” must be provided (DEAT, 2006a).  This 
legal phrasing, however, appears to place more emphasis on an evaluation of the likelihood that an 
impact will occur, rather than on the evaluation of the assessors certainty of his/her statements. 
Nevertheless, this legal provision does provide some scope, albeit limited, for appreciating 
uncertainty in environmental assessments.    
 
Norton (2005: 101) states, however, that: “Perhaps no issue confounds environmental managers 
more than the ‘problem of uncertainty’ ”. This problem was highlighted in the context of southern 
Africa by Brownlie et al. (2006) who found, in a review of biodiversity issues and impact 
assessment in the region, that there was little consideration of uncertainty. There are several 
categorizations of uncertainty in impact assessment, however, it generally relates to the following 
(De Jongh, 1988; Norton, 2005):  the impacts that should be studied; the level of analysis required; 
the alternatives to be investigated; the significance of impacts; the right choice of analytical tools; 
technical measurements; related governmental decisions; modeling inputs and techniques; and 
making accurate impact predictions.  
 
Glasson et al. (1999) and Tennøy et al. (2006) point out that it is not only uncertainty that is a 
problem in impact prediction, but also the illusion of certainty that is sometimes portrayed in 
environmental assessment reports.  Glasson et al. (1999) state that Environmental Impact 
Statements (EISs) often appear more certain in their predictions than they should, while Tennøy et 
al. (2006: 52) make a similar point by arguing that “… EIA predictions are uncertain, but that 
decision-makers are not made aware of the prediction uncertainty. EIA predictions thus appear 
more certain than they are”.  
 
Many of the aspects of uncertainty listed above relate to subjective choices that have to be made 
within the EIA process (De Jongh, 1988). The fact that these aspects are categorised as 
‘uncertainties’, reflects the difficulties that are often experienced within environmental assessment 
processes, in dealing with its normative aspects. In particular, difficulties are experienced in 
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determining the significance of impacts (Preston et al., 1994). This point was re-iterated by an 
environmental assessment practitioner in the interviews that I conducted. Although determining 
significance is arguably the most important part of the environmental assessment process (Sadler, 
1996; Sippe, 1999), it is “… one aspect of EIA that has taxed experts globally” (DEAT, 2002d: 5). 
The subjective nature of determining impact significance is generally recognized within the 
environmental assessment community and as Sippe (1999: 75) states: “Environmental significance 
is an unashamedly anthropocentric concept. When applied in EIA decision-making, it uses 
judgements and values equally with, or to a greater extent than, science-based criteria and 
standards”. 
 
It is this subjectivity, however, that is often, or at least in part, identified as the cause of the 
problems experienced with EIA. For example, Spinks et al. (2003) identify, as an intrinsic 
weakness of the EIA process, the fact that despite attempts at objectivity, determining significance 
will always be a subjective exercise, influenced by factors such as societal norms. In addition, 
Preston et al. (1994: 759) describe significance as a ‘problem area’ in environmental assessment, 
commenting that: “To say that an impact will be significant is to suggest that it will have, or is likely 
to have, considerable influence or effect on some aspect of human well-being. But this is bound to 
be a subjective judgement: there are no objective measures which can be used to judge 
significance”. In guidance produced by DEAT (2002d), the difficulties in determining significance 
are also partly ascribed to normative factors, such as considering the ‘multiplicity of values’ of 
stakeholders involved in the environmental assessment procedure. Determining significance is a 
persistent problem that has also been a concern within the international environmental assessment 
arena for over a decade. Sadler (1996: 118), for example, stated that: “More than other 
components … the interpretation of significance is a contentious process”. He too ascribes this, at 
least in part, to the subjectivity of the task, stating that it involves both science and politics.  
 
1.4.3.2. Addressing social issues 
The current EIA regulations (DEAT, 2006a) require a description of the potential impacts of an 
activity, not only on the natural and economic components of the environment, but also on the 
social and cultural aspects (Chapter 3, section 32(2)(d)). SIA developed internationally as a means 
of addressing social impacts, either as an integral part of the EIA process or separately from it 
(Vanclay, 1999). The steps in undertaking an SIA are similar to those for undertaking an EIA, with 
the SIA addressing the impacts of a proposed project or policy on people, while other studies 
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within the EIA address the impacts of the project on various aspects of the natural environment 
(Vanclay, 1999).  
 
However, there are a number of challenges to dealing with social issues in environmental 
assessment, both within the international practice of SIA and in South Africa, where social impacts 
are usually identified as part of the overall EIA process. Du Pisani and Sandham (2006a), for 
example, state that in South Africa, empirical data suggest that social assessment is often 
neglected or treated as less important than other aspects of an EIA. Scott and Oelofse (2001) 
express similar views, arguing that social questions such as who gains and loses from a proposed 
development are not adequately addressed in current mainstream approaches to environmental 
assessment. Scott and Oelofse (2001) suggest a reason for this, stating that: “With the reliance on 
science and technology for assessing environmental impacts and creating solutions, social issues 
are side-lined as they are difficult to both conceptualise and measure”. Weaver et al. (1999) focus 
on poverty, arguing that environmental assessment does not effectively deal with this critical social 
issue.  They state that despite the need for development within South Africa, EIAs are strongly 
influenced by westernized concepts of the environment and therefore emphasise the protection of 
the natural environment, while neglecting social concerns.  
  
Other problems in addressing social issues in environmental assessment, described by Taylor et 
al. (1990) and Du Pisani and Sandham (2006b), include the following: 
▪ Applying the social sciences to impact assessment, since they do not have an applied 
tradition and certain concepts may not have been translated into terms that facilitate 
their easy application to an environmental assessment process; 
▪ Taking into account social issues that are not amenable to empirical measurement 
(e.g. the social and psychological costs of a change in lifestyle as the result of selling 
the family farm for an industrial development); 
▪ Accommodating the fact that unlike in the natural sciences, the objects under study 
(i.e. humans) can change their behaviour as a result of the study (e.g. they can 
change their reported concerns based on their impression of the purpose of the 
study); 
▪ Requirements for standardized investigation and reporting within environmental 
assessment processes can be problematic for SIA, as social assessment often deals 
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with that which is ‘non-standard’ and ‘unexpected’ (Du Pisani and Sandham, 2006b: 
716); 
▪ Gathering valid social science information, as people may not provide an accurate 
description of their lifestyles and concerns (e.g. TV viewing and alcohol consumption 
tend to be under-reported), or may not be totally aware of the issues that are affecting 
them; 
▪ Determining the social change that is specifically the result of the proposed project, 
plan or policy; 
▪ Identifying whether certain social impacts, such as a change in the character of a 
community, are positive or negative, as this depends on value judgements and some 
in the community may perceive such a change as positive, while others see it as 
negative; 
▪ There is a capacity shortage of social science skills within natural resource 
management agencies in South Africa, resulting in the social aspects of 
environmental assessments being evaluated by non-specialists; and 
▪ A lack of sensitivity to social processes and awareness of the importance of social 
assessment, among certain regulatory agencies, corporations, engineers, economists 
and planners, results in the need for such assessments being overlooked.  
 
1.4.3.3. Addressing cumulative impacts 
EIA procedures have traditionally focused on identifying the direct impacts of a development on the 
environment, which occur predominantly in the short-term (Binedell and Hounsome, 1998; Van der 
Heyden et al., 1998; DEAT, 2004d). These processes are therefore limited in their spatial and 
temporal context, focusing mainly on first-order cause-effect relationships (Binedell and 
Hounsome, 1998).The result is an inadequate consideration of the environmental effects caused 
by multiple perturbations, higher-order impacts, time-lags, broader spatial boundaries and indirect 
processes (i.e. cumulative effects14) (Binedell and Hounsome, 1998). This is a problem that is 
identified in the environmental assessment literature (e.g. Therivel et al., 1992; Preston et al., 
1994; Sadler and Verheem, 1996; Kjörven and Lindhjem, 2002; OECD, 2006) and which was 
emphasized in the interviews that I conducted.  
 
                                            
14
  In this section the terms cumulative effects and cumulative impacts, as well as cumulative effects 
assessment and cumulative impact assessment will be used interchangeably.  
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Cumulative impacts are defined in the South African EIA regulations (DEAT, 2006a) as “… the 
impact of an activity that in itself may not be significant but may become significant when added to 
the existing and potential impacts eventuating from similar or diverse activities or undertakings in 
the area” (Chapter 1, section 1(1)).  Although this definition addresses the spatial dimension of 
cumulative impacts, it omits the temporal aspects.  It should therefore be expanded to include 
cumulative impacts over time, as shown in the definitions provided by DEAT (2004d) and Preston 
et al. (1994), among many others.  
 
The environmental assessment community seeks to more effectively address cumulative impacts 
through the development of cumulative effects (or impact) assessment and through the use of SEA 
to apply environmental assessment to the more strategic decision-making levels (i.e. policies, 
plans and programmes) (Modak and Biswas, 1999; DEAT, 2004d; OECD, 2006). In defining 
cumulative impact assessment, Glasson et al. (2005) draw on the definition provided by the 
Commonwealth Environmental Protection Agency (CEPA, 1994; cited in Glasson, 2005: 326), who 
state that: “Cumulative impact assessment is predicting and assessing all other likely existing, past 
and reasonably foreseeable future effects on the environment arising from perturbations which are 
time-crowded; space-crowded; synergisms; indirect; or, constitute nibbling”. Glasson et al. (2005) 
use the Canadian Environmental Assessment Research Council’s (CEARC) definitions of the 
terms used in the CEPA definition, which are as follows:  
▪ Time-crowded perturbations are those that occur so close in time that the effects of 
one are not dissipated before the next occur;  
▪ Space-crowded perturbations are those that are located so close to one another that 
their impacts overlap;  
▪ Synergisms occur when different types of perturbations in a particular area overlap to 
form a new response by the ecological environment;  
▪ Indirect effects are those that are produced at spatial or temporal distance from the 
initial perturbation, or have an effect via a complex pathway of interactions; and  
▪ Nibbling occurs when a resource is eroded incrementally until it is used up or 
significantly changes. 
 
Good practice guidance, both internationally and locally (e.g. DEAT, 2004d; OECD, 2006) promote 
the consideration of cumulative effects through the use of cumulative effects assessment as an 
independent tool, or its explicit incorporation into SEA or EIA. Various approaches have been 
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developed for cumulative effects assessment, both within South Africa (e.g. DEAT, 2004d) and 
internationally (e.g. Modak and Biswas, 1999; Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, 
1999).  
 
SEA has the potential to address cumulative effects more effectively than site-specific EIA, 
because it relates to a larger area (e.g. a region or country) and deals with broader, more strategic 
issues that have implications beyond the short-term (e.g. transboundary pollution and the use of 
renewable energy within the energy sector as a whole). Presumably for these reasons the OECD 
(2006: 32) states that SEA “… inherently incorporates consideration of cumulative impacts”. Sadler 
and Verheem (1996: 153) state more directly that “… compared to project EIA, the scope of SEA is 
more appropriate to the time and space scales at which cumulative effects are expressed”. They 
caution, however, that cause-effect relationships are more indeterminate at the strategic levels of 
policies, plans and programmes, as many factors may influence their implementation and 
translation into specific projects (Sadler and Verheem, 1996).  
 
Despite developments in the theory of environmental assessment, the evaluation of the effects of 
development, beyond those that can be determined through direct cause-effect relationships, 
remains a serious and persistent challenge to practitioners worldwide (Spinks et al., 2003; Brownlie 
et al., 2006). Although Sadler identified the need to address cumulative effects in environmental 
assessment as a key challenge in 1996, there has not been an effective response to this challenge 
more than a decade later. Kjörven and Lindhjem (2002: 34), for example, state that most regional 
and sectoral environmental assessments undertaken by the World Bank, have “… by and large not 
succeeded in addressing cumulative impacts any better than project-specific EIAs do”. The 
situation is no better in southern Africa, as Brownlie et al. (2006: 3) conclude, stating, for example, 
that there is “… little if any consideration of indirect or cumulative effects on biodiversity or 
ecosystem services” in environmental assessment in the region. The conclusion of Spinks et al. 
(2003: 309) regarding the identification of cumulative impacts in South Africa mirrors that of the 
rest of the world, stating that EIAs “… have failed to come to terms with such impacts”.  
 
The importance of rising to the challenge of understanding and addressing the cumulative effects 
of development in South Africa is accentuated by the legal requirement in the EIA regulations to do 
so (Chapter 3, section 2(k)(i)). However, Binedell et al. (1998) point out that one of the reasons 
why cumulative effects are often not properly addressed in South African EIAs, is that there are 
difficulties in conceptualizing what it understood as being cumulative. The authors point out that, 
understanding cumulative effects, requires the development of ‘non-linear thought patterns’. They 
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list other problems related to methodologies, regulations, deficiencies in data, inappropriate spatial 
and temporal boundaries and inadequate specialist terms of reference. However, in my view, these 
problems are secondary and will not be addressed effectively until we are able to conceptualise 
cumulative interactions in the environment. 
 
1.5 Philosophical roots of the core constraints of EIA 
 
Many of the constraints to effective environmental assessment described above, have their roots, 
from a philosophical perspective, in the modern worldview that underlies this field (Audouin and 
Hattingh, 2008). The modernist roots of environmental assessment are well recognized and, as 
pointed out by Audouin and Hattingh (2008), such an argument or similar has been made by 
various authors both in South Africa (e.g. Shandler et al., 1999; Scott and Oelofse, 2001; Burns, 
2002; Oelofse et al., 2002) and internationally (e.g. Glasson et al., 2005 and Jay et al., 2007). Jay 
et al. (2007: 287 and 291), for example, agree with the trend to attribute the weaknesses of EIA in 
influencing planning and decision-making, to its ‘rationalist beginnings’ and ‘techno-rational 
approach’ that assumes value-free objectivity (Audouin and Hattingh, 2008). 
 
Many of the problems that I have described in this chapter appear to be practical issues that can 
be addressed individually through slightly altering the current EIA process or the way in which this 
process is conducted. However, this is rather like relieving the symptoms of a cold, instead of its 
causes (Audouin and Hattingh, 2008). I think that it is more effective to address the systematic 
roots of these problems as they emerge from the philosophical assumptions inherent in the modern 
worldview (Audouin and Hattingh, 2008).  
 
Modernism will be described in further detail in the Chapter 2. However, as a context for this 
chapter, there are three assumptions inherent in the modern view, which I will list here as 
philosophical roots of the problems described above; these are as follows (Capra, 1982; Pepper, 
1984; Magee, 2001; Rihani, 2002): 
▪ That technical, objective, natural science-based information and processes are 
separate from, and regarded as superior to, non-technical, subjective, and value-
based information and processes. This constrains, for example, inter-disciplinarity in 
environmental assessment, the effectiveness of stakeholder engagement, and the 
ability of environmental assessment practitioners to address the normative aspects of 
impact prediction; 
M o d e r n i s m ,  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  A s s e s s m e n t  a n d  t h e  S u s t a i n a b i l i t y  A r g u m e n t :   
M o v i n g  t o wa r d s  a  N e w A p p r o a c h  t o  P r o j e c t - b a s e d  D e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a   
 
 
 
 
Page 53 
▪ That a system can be understood by observing the behaviour of its parts. This has 
caused difficulties in predicting impacts, particularly social and cumulative ones; and 
▪ That all processes flow along linear, deterministic, predictable and orderly paths. This 
assumption has not only caused problems in the ability of environmental assessment 
practitioners to predict cumulative impacts, but also in their ability to deal with 
‘uncertainty’ in the environmental assessment endeavour.  
 
In the next chapter I will further analyse and explain the meaning and effects of these assumptions 
in the context of environmental assessment.  
 
1.6 Summary 
 
Despite the commitment of South Africa to the goals of sustainable development, most indicators 
show that insufficient progress has been made towards its attainment. A similar situation exists on 
a regional, continental and international scale. Environmental assessment is a key mechanism 
through which sustainable development can be promoted through appraisal of development 
projects; however, there are numerous persistent problems in its practice in South Africa and 
internationally. I have suggested in this chapter that the root of many of these problems can be 
attributed to the over-influence of modernism on the processes and methods of environmental 
assessment, an argument that has been made by several authors within the field. 
 
In this chapter I have described the evolution of environmental assessment from its origin in the 
United States, with the promulgation of NEPA, to its adoption by over 120 countries worldwide. I 
have described how there has been a proliferation of environmental assessment processes and 
methods and how these have expanded since the 1970s from an initial narrow focus on 
predominantly project impacts on the natural environment to include social and economic impacts.  
 
Most recently, environmental assessment has focused on sustainability appraisal and strategic 
level assessment in the form of SEA. Often, in a reversal of emphasis, the latter process focuses 
on the assessment of environmental constraints on policies, plans and programmes.  
 
In South Africa, the voluntary practice of environmental assessment gained momentum in the 
1980s, well before EIA legislation was promulgated.  These were framed within an approach, 
described as Integrated Environmental Management (IEM), which was tailored to the South African 
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context. IEM assumed a broad definition of the environment to include social, economic and 
biophysical aspects. The first EIA regulations were published in 1997 and revised in 2006, making 
EIA mandatory for certain classes of projects and specifying a more rigid assessment process than 
was previously practised through IEM.  
 
The development of SEA in South Africa followed similar lines to that of other countries, emerging 
as a separate process from EIA. An innovative approach, however, was adopted in South Africa 
from the outset which, as in the case of EIA, was designed to meet the particular needs of this 
country. The first national SEA guidelines were produced in 2000 and revised in 2007. Although 
several pieces of national legislation refer to SEA or to Strategic Impact Assessment, no specific 
procedure has been legislated.  
 
I have described several problems currently facing the practice of environmental assessment in 
South Africa that are symptomatic of its modernist underpinnings. The philosophical roots of these 
problems can be found in three main assumptions of modernism, namely:  that technical, objective, 
natural science-based information and processes are separate, and superior to, non-technical, 
subjective, and value-based information and processes; that an ecological or social system can be 
understood by observing the behaviour of its parts; and, that all system processes flow along 
linear, deterministic, predictable and orderly paths.  These assumptions have led to difficulties, for 
example, in predicting project impacts in the face of complex, non-linear and highly unpredictable 
conditions of coupled environmental and social systems. Difficulties have also been experienced 
with stakeholder engagement in environmental assessment, with incompatibilities revealed 
between the strongly objective basis of such assessment and the subjective and value-laden 
concerns of stakeholders. Inter-disciplinarity in environmental assessment and the integration of 
diverse epistemologies has proved difficult to achieve through EIA, limiting its effectiveness. 
 
To provide a greater understanding of the philosophical roots of the problems facing environmental 
assessment described in this chapter, I will next present an overview of the evolution and 
characteristics of modernism. In this chapter, I will also briefly describe the post-modern response 
to modernism, before showing the influence that these worldviews have on the environmental 
debate in general and on environmental assessment in particular. The discussion will also include 
a review of some of the core ideas of radical ecology, in order to begin setting the foundation for an 
alternative supporting philosophy for environmental assessment that challenges the modernist 
assumptions that I have described. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
MODERNISM, POST-MODERNISM AND THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL DEBATE 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, several constraints to effective environmental assessment were identified. 
Their causes were attributed to the modern worldview that underlies this field. One purpose of this 
chapter is to provide a more in-depth understanding of this worldview and its links to the current 
practice of environmental assessment. A second purpose is to identify an alternative philosophical 
stance to modernism, which can begin to provide a basis for a new conceptual approach to 
informing decision-making about the environmental15 aspects of development.  
 
I will begin this chapter with an overview of the modern worldview, followed by a description of the 
post-modernist response to its shortcomings. Thereafter, I will discuss the way in which these 
worldviews have influenced the environmental debate. Based on this discussion, I will identify a set 
of philosophical tenets which form the foundation for a conceptual approach to environmental 
assessment that challenges the assumptions of modernity. I will discuss this approach in Chapter 
4, after I have investigated the work of various leading researchers in Chapter 3.   
 
2.2 Modernism 
 
Modernism, the mainstream philosophical view that underlies Western culture, was developed in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Capra, 1982). The significant change in humanity’s 
perception of reality that occurred between 1500 and 1700 has therefore dominated Western 
culture for the last 300 years (Capra, 1982).  
 
Before 1500, a premodern religious worldview was dominant. In this view, reality was seen as a  
“… rich tapestry of interwoven levels reaching from matter to body to mind to soul to spirit”, with 
each level having its own type of associated knowledge (Wilber, 2001a: 6). This meant that there 
was a strong link between material and spiritual phenomena, between facts and values (Capra, 
1982). As Wilber (2001a) points out, the spheres of science and ethics were largely 
                                            
15
  As explained in the introduction to this thesis, the term ‘environment’ is used in a broad sense, to include 
social, biophysical and economic concerns.  
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undifferentiated. The ‘paradigm’ within which science operated was determined by Aristotle and the 
church, with Thomas Aquinas combining the ideas of these two authorities to form a framework 
that dominated scientific endeavour through the Middle Ages (Capra, 1982; Pepper, 1984). The 
focus of science during this period was on understanding the meaning and significance of things, 
rather than on prediction and control (Capra, 1982). 
 
In the sixteenth century the medieval worldview started to change radically and the spheres of 
science, art and morals/values split in what Baumann (1992: x) calls the ‘declaration of reason’s 
independence’. This enabled the development of science, art and morals on their own terms 
(Wilber, 2001a). In time, however, these spheres of learning and knowing separated to the point of 
dissociation, leading to severe constraints to their integration which became perceived as 
necessary and, therefore, harsh criticism of modernism by post-modern thinkers (Wilber, 2001a).  
 
In the meantime, the view of an ‘organic, living, spiritual’ universe, changed to a conception of the 
world as a machine (Capra, 1997: 19). The mechanistic view of the world was initiated by 
Descartes, with other key figures in the scientific revolution being Copernicus, Galileo, Newton and 
Bacon (Capra, 1997). This view became the mainstream philosophical orientation, which resulted 
in both positive and negative consequences. Modernism led, for example, to significant 
technological advances (including putting man on the moon), to liberal democracies, ideals of 
equality, freedom and justice and to modern medicine, physics, chemistry and biology (Wilber, 
2002). The immensely positive aspects of modernism therefore cannot be ignored in the criticisms 
that have subsequently arisen.  
 
These criticisms are a result, inter alia, of the view, initiated by Descartes, that the world consists of 
basically ‘two kinds of substances’ which are categorised separately, mind and matter (Magee, 
2001: 88). To Descartes, the material world was simply a machine that on its own had no life or 
purpose. As Baumann (1992) states, in the modern view it is only humans that provide the world 
with any meaning (Baumann, 1992).  The separation of mind and matter became known as the 
Cartesian division (Magee, 2001). This division has been accepted by scientists in the intervening 
centuries, as they have developed their theories either in the humanities, concentrating on the 
mind (i.e. on humans) or in the natural sciences, concentrating on matter (Capra, 1982). Current 
criticisms of modernism are also directed at its belief in unlimited progress that can be achieved 
through economic and technological growth and its view of life as a competitive struggle (Capra, 
1997). Post-modern thinkers have linked these modern views to the current commodification of life, 
the replacement of quality with quantity in our culture, the loss of value and meaning, the 
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fragmentation of the natural world, to rampant materialism and to environmental destruction 
(Capra, 1991; Wilber, 2001a).  
 
A key stage in the evolution of the practice of modern science occurred when Descartes 
persuaded people in the West that certain knowledge of the world was possible if the right method 
was followed (Magee, 2001). This method was to start with reliable facts, apply logic to those facts 
and “… not to let anything intervene that is in the very least degree susceptible to doubt, no matter 
how far-fetched that doubt may be”; following this process would provide ‘rock-hard, reliable 
knowledge’ (Magee, 2001: 88). As Baumann (1992: xiv) puts it “… the practice was about making 
the pronouncements adorned with the badges of reason, uncontested and uncontestable”.  Magee 
(2001: 88) points out that Descartes had the greatest impact in ‘selling’ science to the Western 
world, and on making the quest for certainty central to intellectual activity, with considerations of 
method the focus of that quest. 
 
The goal of modern science is to describe reality objectively, with no reference to the subjective 
observer (Capra, 1982). As a machine, the world functions according to completely determinate 
universal mechanical laws and can be explained using mathematics (Capra, 1982). The material 
world comprises discrete, inert parts (i.e. atoms) which form entities that, according to Newton’s 
first law of mechanics, “… remain at rest or in motion in a straight line unless acted on by an 
external force” (Merchant, 1990: 50). These entities are assumed to come into being or change 
when the parts are rearranged, through coming together or separating, in what Merchant (1990: 
50) calls “… the billiard-ball universe of mechanistic scientists”. The amount of energy or motion in 
the universe is considered to remain constant, but is redistributed among the entities that comprise 
the physical world, as atoms combine and separate (Merchant, 1990). In the modern worldview, 
reality is, therefore, perceived as a predictable machine that can be understood by examining its 
component parts (Merchant, 1990; Capra, 1997). The emphasis is not only on predictability, but 
also on certainty, orderliness and homogeneity (Baumann, 1992). Baumann (1992: xiii-xiv) 
explains that in contrast “... diversity looked more like chaos, scepticism like ineptitude, tolerance 
like subversion”.  
 
Modern science entails positivism, which is a philosophy that was articulated in the nineteenth 
century by Augste Comte and in the 1920s and 30s, by a group of philosophers referred to as the 
Vienna Circle (Pepper, 1984). Positivism holds that all knowledge is based on sense-experience 
and that different kinds of knowledge do not exist (Mauter, 2000). The first precursor to positivism 
was the founding father of empiricism, John Locke (cited in: Magee, 2001: 104), who stated that 
“… no man’s knowledge here can go beyond his experience” (Mauter, 2000; Magee, 2001).  In this 
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view “… all genuine inquiry is concerned with the description and explanation of empirical facts” 
(Mauter, 2000: 438). As a result positivism does not, for example, recognise major differences 
between the methods of the natural and the social sciences (Mauter, 2000). Any knowledge that 
cannot be tested against reality in an empirical manner (e.g. intuitive, emotional or spiritual 
knowledge) is not considered valid or meaningful. Judgements based on scientific reasoning are 
therefore considered superior to subjective judgements (Pepper, 1984). Scientific knowledge is 
considered all important, while values, ethics, morals, intuition and emotion are devalued.  
 
In scientific practice, this mechanistic view, with its Cartesian dualism and its emphasis on 
scientific knowledge, orderliness, predictability, homogeneity and certainty, led to the following 
fundamental assumptions, as I have outlined in Chapter 1 (Capra, 1982; Pepper, 1984; Magee, 
2001; Rihani, 2002): 
▪ That technical, objective, natural science-based information and processes are 
separate from, and superior to, non-technical, subjective, and value-based 
information and processes; 
▪ That a system can be understood by observing the behaviour of its parts; and 
▪ That all processes flow along linear, deterministic, predictable and orderly paths 
(given causes lead to known effects in all times and places). 
 
Modernism has had a significant influence on people’s attitudes towards the environment, as its 
mechanistic view has allowed for the exploitation of nature (Capra, 1982). Capra (1996: 20, 
parenthesis added) states that in terms of early modernism: “Animals were still [regarded as] 
machines, although they were much more complicated than mechanical clockworks, involving 
complex, chemical processes”. Nature, as falling into the category of matter, was not seen to have 
its own purpose and, therefore, the aim of science, according to Descartes and Bacon, was to 
dominate and control it (Capra, 1982).  
 
2.3 Post-modernism 
 
The inadequacy of Newtonian mechanics as the ultimate theory to describe and understand the 
world started to surface in the nineteenth century with developments in electrodynamics, 
philosophy and the life sciences (Capra, 1982; Heylighen et al., 2007).  Einstein’s work in physics 
led to relativity and quantum theories which resulted, for example, in profound changes in ideas 
around absolute space and time, elementary particles, the strictly causal nature of physical 
phenomena and the ability to objectively describe nature (Capra, 1982).  
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Heylighen et al. (2007) explain that systems theory, which was first developed by the biologist 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy in 1973, challenged the reductionism of modernism16.  Central to Von 
Bertalanffy’s theory is the view that living systems are essentially open, interacting with their 
environment through the intake of matter and energy. This interrelatedness with a broader 
environment implies that changes in living systems are more difficult to predict than those in closed 
mechanical systems, to which the principles of Newtonian science can be more effectively applied. 
However, systems theory was not the first to pose a challenge to reductionism as this had already 
been done by process philosophers such as Bergson, Teilhard and Smuts (Heylighen et al., 2007).  
 
Other developments that challenged modernist approaches to understanding the world include 
those in cybernetics and postmodern social science, which demonstrated the intrinsically 
subjective nature of knowledge (Heylighen et al., 2007). Also, developments in the life sciences 
concerning evolution, contradicted the view of the world as a machine, emerging fully-developed 
(Capra, 1982). The theory of evolution showed that regularity in a system emerges out of dynamic 
changes, interactions and conflicting forces (Heylighen et al., 2007). 
 
In reaction to these twentieth century developments in physics, philosophy and the life sciences, 
many post-modern approaches to understanding reality have developed. These include complexity 
theory, eco-philosophies and modes of planning that place a greater emphasis on the local 
context, social diversity and flexibility. Strong post-modern trends have therefore emerged in most 
fields of endeavour, such as environmental management, planning, anthropology, philosophy and 
physics. Capra (1997: 6) states that a ‘radical revision’, of the paradigm which has dominated our 
culture, is now occurring. He describes this change as one that shifts from the mechanistic 
worldview of Descartes and Newton to a more holistic and ecological view.  
 
In the section that follows, the post-modern reaction to modernity will be described. This is a 
difficult task as there is no coherent theory or single understanding of post-modernity (Best and 
Kellner, 2001). Instead the ideas and theories typically described as post-modern are diverse and 
often conflicting (Best and Kellner, 2001). Baumann (1992: vii-viii) states that post-modernism is 
mostly a ‘state of mind’ that often appears to be marked by its “… all-deriding, all-eroding, all-
dissolving destructiveness”. This is because post-modernism often seems like a critique that 
appears to find it ever more difficult to continue to be critical, because there is nothing left to be 
critical about (Baumann, 1992). However, Baumann (1992, ix) argues that post-modernist thinkers 
define this as a constructive destructiveness, which dismantles what modernism has passed for 
                                            
16
  Which, briefly stated, entails that a system can be understood by observing the behaviour of its parts. 
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truth, in a sort of ‘site-clearing operation’, in order to reveal truth in its ‘pristine state’.  In summary, 
Baumann (1992: x) states that: “All-in-all, postmodernity can be seen as restoring to the world what 
modernity, presumptuously, had taken away; as a re-enchantment of the world that modernity tried 
hard to dis-enchant”.  For example, post-modernist thinkers aim to heal the split between the 
powerful, wilful subject (i.e. humans) and the powerless, will-less object (i.e. nature), that leads to a 
(natural and man-made) world with no meaning in and of itself (Baumann, 1992).  
 
Post-modernism can therefore be characterised by the aspects of modernism that it negates, 
which include: meta-narratives or totalising discourses; positivism and the myth of the pre-given; 
the mechanistic and reductionistic view of the world and the dominance of the profit-motive 
(Drengson, 1980; Gare, 1995; Wilber, 2001a). I will discuss each of these aspects in the sections 
that follow.   
 
2.3.1 Negation of meta-narratives or totalising discourses 
 
Gare (1995) states that the most widely accepted characterisation of post-modernity is that offered 
by Lyotard – the ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’.  This incredulity is aimed at any discourse 
that appeals to some grand narrative (e.g. the creation of wealth) that governs all generation and 
use of knowledge. In particular, however, the post-modern critique is aimed at modernism’s belief 
in progress in areas such as knowledge, technology and the economy and the assumptions 
associated with this belief (Gare, 1995). Nisbet (1980: cited in: Gare, 1995: 5) identified at least 
five constant premises that can be identified with this idea of progress, namely: belief in the value 
of the past; conviction in the nobility (even superiority) of Western civilisation; acceptance of the 
worth of economic and technological growth; faith in reason and the kind of scientific and scholarly 
knowledge that can only come from reason and a belief in the intrinsic importance of life on this 
earth. It is perhaps because of post-modernism’s negation of these ideas that it is often criticised 
as nihilistic. Many post-modernist thinkers, however, do not propose an alternative set of ideals to 
replace those that they criticise as, unlike modernists, they oppose the right of any single belief 
system to dominate society (Baumann, 1992).   
 
The post-modern view of the world is therefore not subject to any type of grand plan and there is 
no reference to any particular ‘larger’ truth (Baumann, 1992). Rather the world is comprised of an 
indefinite number of agencies that generate meaning (e.g. the local community, a specific 
discipline, a social institution, a particular scientist or the peer group). Baumann (1992) notes that 
acceptance of these pluralities means first and foremost the surrender of the dominant position of 
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the Western world. Previously, the West was considered the most advanced, trend-setting form of 
global development; however, in the post-modern view it is one form among many.  
 
2.3.2 Negation of the myth of the pre-given and the subject-object divide 
 
Associated with this loss of belief in meta-narratives, is what Wilber (2001a: 117) terms, “… the 
enduring truth at the heart of the great postmodern movements”. This truth is that interpretation is 
an intrinsic feature of the universe, not something added to reality, and that every occasion has an 
interpretive element (Wilber, 2001a). The world is therefore not pre-given, but is in significant ways 
a construction based on the individual or collective’s perspective (Wilber, 2001a). In other words, 
as stated by Best and Kellner (2001), knowledge is socially constructed, rather than a purely 
objective mirroring of some external, independent reality. Such a view contradicts the modernist 
split of the world into subjective and objective components and its valuing of what it considers to be 
the exterior objective world, above the individual and collective’s interior, subjective reality (e.g. 
values, intuition, morals). Postmodernism goes further to say that the meaning which is given to a 
specific observation or event is context-dependent. As the number of contexts is limitless, a single 
perspective cannot be applied in all circumstances (Wilber, 2001a). This leads to the pluralism that 
typically characterises post-modern thinking.  
 
Wilber (2001a) argues, however, that post-modernism has gone to extremes in its recognition of 
subjectivity. It has in many ways denied the reality of the objective world, making the important 
features of the world that are subjective, the only features of the world. Wilber (2001a) calls for a 
balance, stating that the interpretive elements of reality should not replace objectivity, but rather 
situate it. He (Wilber, 2001a: 123) argues that “… a diamond will cut a piece of glass, no matter 
what meaning you give to ‘diamond’, ‘glass’ and ‘cut’ ”. On the other end of the spectrum, however, 
the objectivity that scientists often cling to leads to an idealised view of science that implies 
detachment and certainty (Pepper, 1984). This leads, for example, to a strong focus on technical 
feats while neglecting questions of whether they are ethically right or wrong (Pepper, 1984). 
Skolimowski (1992) raises a similar issue in his critique of the modern world’s divorce between 
knowledge and values.  
 
2.3.3 Negation of positivism  
 
The dissociations of modernity are not only between the subject and object, but also between the 
spheres of art, morals and science (Wilber, 2001a). Wilber (2001a) explains the latter process 
through reference to the ‘dignity’ and ‘disaster’ of modernity. The dignity of modernity is its 
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differentiation of art, morals and science, allowing each to develop at their own pace in their own 
way. However, the disaster of modernity occurs, when this differentiation goes too far and the 
areas of art, morals and science become dissociated. Mainly due to the successes that empirical 
science has in explaining the external world and in leading to discoveries, scientific rationality 
dominates the other two spheres (Wilber, 2001a). Positivism has become the prevailing view and 
all aspects of knowing, including those associated with the mind and spirit (e.g. the rational, trans-
rational, intuitive and contemplative), are reduced to empirical modes (Wilber, 2001a).  Wilber 
(2001a: 13) criticises this view calling it scientism17 and ‘scientific imperialism’ which ‘crowds out’ 
art and morals in any serious understanding of reality. Skolimowski (1992: 15) recognises the 
dominance of positivism, and its associated empiricism, in modern culture by stating that: “We all 
want to base our discourse and reasoning on fact and number, because such is the dogma of our 
present cosmology”; however, he argues against this, stating that empirical science does not allow 
for expressions of human meaning. Skolimowski (1992: 15) states that various attempts have been 
made to overcome the dominance of mechanistic rationality, but that “… the main imperatives of 
our cosmology are still holding us in their grip: to quantify, to objectify, to ‘thingify’ ”.  Perhaps the 
most succinct critique of positivism is provided in a sign which is reported to have hung in 
Einstein’s office which stated “… not everything that can be counted counts and not everything that 
counts can be counted” (Brainy Quote, 2008).  
 
2.3.4 Negation of the mechanistic view of the world 
 
The mechanistic view of the world and its assumptions of, inter alia, order, objectivity18, 
reductionism, uniformity, universality and predictability (Capra, 1982; Rihani, 2002), are typically 
rejected by post-modern thinkers. Drengson (1980), for example, states that the mechanistic view 
of the world and its methods of analysis have now reached their limits. Skolimowski (1992: 14) too 
argues that the mechanistic view “… provides a deficient code for reading nature. Hence our 
deficiency in interacting with nature”. More recently, Cilliers (2008a) explains that reductionism is 
inadequate for grasping the complex and interrelated nature of the world’s systems. Therefore, as 
stated by Best and Kellner (2001), instead of the traditional mechanistic ideas of causality, order, 
truth, mechanism and objectivity, post-modern theorists develop new discourses of 
indeterminancy, perspectivism, chaos and complexity, self-organisation and multi-cultural 
                                            
17
  The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Blackburn, 1996: 344) defines scientism as a: “Pejorative term for 
the belief that the methods of natural science, or the categories and things recognized in natural science, 
form the only proper elements in any philosophical or other enquiry. The classic statement of scientism is 
the physicist E. Rutherford’s saying ‘there is physics and there is stamp-collecting’ ”. 
18
  The post-modern negation of the view of knowledge as completely objective is addressed separately in 
section 2.3.2.  
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knowledge. In the post-modern view, the world is comprised of complex, dynamic, interrelated and 
holistic processes, rather than simple, static, discrete and atomistic ones (Best and Kellner, 2001).  
 
2.3.5 Negation of the dominance of the profit-motive 
 
Lux (2003), drawing on E.F. Schumacher’s phrase, ‘the failure of the modern experiment’, criticises 
the profit motive by stating that the ‘experiment’ which has failed, is the attempt by humans in the 
last 300 years or so (which is an exceedingly short period in relation to the length of human 
history), to live without motives and principles that are higher than the material or economic. Lux 
(2003) argues that the absence of such ‘higher’ motives and principles has led to the presence of 
the profit motive. Lux (2003: 1) explains further that since the profit motive means the continuous 
expansion of economic wealth, a society based on this motive “… must by necessity be a society 
committed to perpetual economic growth”. As Reid (1995) points out, such economic growth has 
been promoted by technological advance, which has created new possibilities for economic 
expansion and for increased consumption.  
 
One of the important critiques of this belief in continual economic expansion relates to its 
consequences for the environment. Reid (1995) for example, lists the idea of material progress, 
which has been closely associated with ideas of economic growth, as one of the key obstacles to 
achieving sustainable development. The power of technology to facilitate such growth has led to 
what O’Riordan (1981) calls ‘technocentrism’, which is currently the dominant set of attitudes to 
science and the environment. This attitude is one of instrumentalism, in which the environment is 
valued for its use as a resource for meeting human ‘needs’ or desires. As pointed out by Lux 
(2003), these needs are insatiable, and in the name of economic progress, ecological resources 
are being used at an increasing ecological cost (Reid, 1995).  
 
2.4 The Current Situation 
 
Currently we are in a transition between the modern and post-modern eras, with a mix of 
progressive and regressive, positive and negative aspects (Best and Kellner, 2001). Some argue 
that reductionism remains the ruling mentality of technoscience and Best and Kellner (2001) point 
out that although post-modern paradigms are emerging from the sciences, these are not yet clearly 
articulated as post-modern sciences which can be distinguished from the modern ones. Rather, 
post-modern ideas are emerging while the modern sciences remain dominant in the mainstream.  
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The view which I will adopt in this thesis correlates with that promoted by Best and Kellner (2001) 
in their book The Postmodern Adventure, in which modernity is not seen as all ‘bad’ and post-
modernism as all ‘good’. Each worldview is considered to have its own area of validity. In 
particular, the view of modernism and post-modernism that I support is that proposed by Wilber 
(2001a), who describes how all healthy growth processes proceed from fusion to differentiation to 
integration. However, if differentiation goes too far it leads to dissociation, resulting in 
fragmentation, alienation and repression. In other words, it’s not the modern differentiation of the 
spheres of art, values and science that is of concern, but rather their consequent dissociation from 
each other. The task at hand, the one that many post-modern theorists aim to achieve, is the 
integration of these spheres. 
 
2.5 Modernism, Post-modernism and the Environmental Debate 
 
The discussion so far has related broadly to the general philosophical elements of modernity and 
post-modernity, with no particular application of these concepts to a specific field. In this section, 
however, I will discuss the modern and post-modern movements in terms of their particular 
expression in the environmental debate. The purpose is to provide a better understanding of the 
link between the philosophical foundations of our culture and the way in which it has influenced the 
relationship between man and nature. The second purpose of the discussion that follows is to 
identify streams of thought that can begin to form the basis of an ethics for environmental 
assessment that challenges the modern, technocentric approach.  
 
There are several analytical frameworks that can be used to classify modern and post-modern 
environmental views, however I will base this discussion on O’Riordan’s (1981) classification along 
ideological lines which reflect the beliefs of environmentalists. This system, which is broadly 
divided into technocentric and ecocentric lines of thought, has been used in recognised texts, such 
as Pepper’s book entitled, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism (1984).  There are, however, 
some important points to note concerning the discussion that follows:  
▪ Pepper (1984) warns that in understanding the technocentric and ecocentric modes 
of thought, it is important to avoid the temptation to divide the world neatly into these 
two camps. This classification is therefore not intended to represent a simple 
dichotomy, but is provided as a general framework for orientation only. In many cases 
current environmental practice has elements of both techno- and eco-centrism (e.g. 
SEA). Also, O’Riordan (1995) points out that these modes of thought may change, 
even within a single individual, as circumstances alter and as we go through various 
stages in life.  
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▪ Although I have used O’Riordan’s (1981) general categories in this description, I have 
drawn from several other authors (e.g. Bookchin, 1982; Devall and Sessions, 1985; 
Benton, 1994; Zimmerman, 1994) to describe the differences between a 
technocentric and ecocentric approach, even though these authors may not have 
used this terminology. In this respect, I may have expanded, to some degree, the 
original meaning which O’Riordan (1981; 1995) intended to convey through the use of 
these categories. However, I have not contradicted his general idea that 
technocentrism tends towards a more ‘human-centred and manipulative mode’, while 
ecocentrism tends towards a more ‘earth-centred or nurturing mode’ (O’Riordan, 
1995: 12).   
▪ Put in the broad philosophical terms discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3 above, I have 
described modernist environmental thought under the heading ‘technocratic’ and 
provided examples of environmental philosophies that are, at least in part, in 
opposition to such thought as ‘ecocentric’. Zimmerman (1994) calls environmental 
philosophies that challenge the modernist attitude towards nature as ‘radical 
ecologies’, of which he identifies three forms: deep ecology, social ecology and eco-
feminism. All three of these forms of radical ecology display one or more 
characteristics of the ‘ecocentric’ approach described by O’Riordan (1981; 1995) and 
have, therefore, been used to describe this category.   
It is not only the ecocentric mode of thought, however, but also technocentrism, that 
is presented from the particular view of radical ecology, as it is mainly from this 
perspective that I wish to develop an alternative philosophical base for environmental 
assessment. The description that follows is, therefore, not an objective analysis of the 
two modes of thought, but rather a device (or ‘straw man’) that I have used to 
describe an alternative environmental view to the current mainstream perspective that 
is dominated by technocentrism.  
▪ I have not assumed consensus within the technocentric or ecocentric philosophies, 
despite this division into these two main categories. It is arguable that there is 
relatively close agreement among technocentric approaches, as they are all based on 
the modern meta-narrative of belief in economic and technological growth and faith in 
science and reason (Gare, 1995). However, ecocentric approaches display the typical 
post-modern scepticism towards metanarratives (Gare, 1995), proliferating into a 
variety of approaches, the protagonists of which, often harshly criticise one another. I 
have therefore included, in the description below, some examples of the differences 
within the ecocentric approach. 
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▪ I have described the technocentric and ecocentric ideologies according to the 
following themes: their understanding of the human-nature relationship, their way of 
knowing it and the way in which they believe people should organise themselves 
within it.  
▪ I have provided significantly more discussion on the radical ecocentric ecologies than 
on the technocentric approaches and on the understanding of the human-nature 
relationship than on the other two themes. The focus on ecocentrism is due to the 
second purpose of this discussion mentioned above, which is to identify ideas for the 
formulation of an ethics for environmental assessment that challenges the modern, 
technocentric worldview. The emphasis on understanding the man-nature relationship 
is primarily due to the focus which the ecocentric authors themselves place on this 
theme, rather than on the other two themes. 
▪ In many instances the discussion draws from, and expands, the descriptions in the 
summary table provided in Appendix B.  A earlier version of this table and certain 
parts of the main text presented below, were published in Audouin and Hattingh 
(2008).  
 
2.5.1 Understanding of the human-nature relationship 
 
2.5.1.1. Technocentric understanding of the human-nature relationship 
The technocentric mode of environmentalism has its roots in many aspects of modernism 
(O’Riordan, 1981). It is, therefore, based on Descartes’ fundamental division between the realm of 
mind and matter (Capra, 1982) in which the human mind aims to achieve control over matter (i.e. 
nature) (Benton, 1994). The natural environment is valued for its use to humans as a resource, 
rather than for the fact that it exists, independent of its usefulness to humans (i.e. its intrinsic value) 
(Reid, 1995). This instrumentalist approach to nature is supported by faith in the ability of 
technology to control natural processes and manage resources in a way that meets humanity’s 
needs and wants (Reid, 1995).  
 
Technocentrism is also based on a view of human well-being that is associated with growth, 
technological progress and economic expansion (Reid, 1995). Benton (1994) points out that this 
view is typically found in modern capitalist countries, state-socialist countries, as well as 
developing countries that are ‘modernizing’. If problems arise, it is assumed that they can be 
resolved through technological solutions, based on objective analyses and efficient management 
(Reid, 1995).   
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Many aspects of technocentrism have been criticised in the literature. For example, Reid (1995: 
130-131) criticises its bias towards objective, quantitative analysis and large technological 
solutions, stating that: “Rather than welcoming other approaches as complementary, it tends to 
disparage them, particularly if they include ‘subjective’ or nonquantitative assessments or advocate 
low-cost, low-tech solutions. This disparagement may extend to a reluctance to acknowledge the 
right of non-technologists to make significant contributions”. 
 
Deep ecologists and social ecologists each contrast their philosophies with various forms of 
technocentrism which they label differently. Naess, for example, contrasts his philosophy of deep 
ecology with what he calls ‘shallow ecology’ which displays many of the characteristics of 
technocentrism (Cooper, 2001: 212). Naess views shallow ecology as an anthropocentric view that 
calls for the protection of the environment merely because of the material benefits to human beings 
(Cooper, 2001). Natural resources are therefore valued, from a shallow ecological position, solely 
for their instrumental value (Eckersley, 1992). Naess criticises the mainstream notion of 
sustainable development as being rooted in this position (Cooper, 2001).  
 
Like Naess, Bookchin (1971: cited in: Biehl, 1997: 8) also compares his philosophy, in this case 
‘social ecology’, with a form of technocentrism, which he calls ‘environmentalism’. He views 
environmentalism as reformist ‘environmental tinkering’ that aims for technological solutions to 
ecological problems. He explains that the view of the natural world from the perspective of 
environmentalism is that of a ‘passive habitat’ that people use, and ascribes this instrumentalist 
approach particularly to urban planners, engineers, lawyers and socialists (Bookchin, 1971: cited 
in: Biehl, 1997: 8).   
 
Reid (1995), Naess (in: Cooper, 2001) and Bookchin (in: Biehl, 1997) criticise the technocentric 
lack of fundamental questioning of the core assumptions on which our society and our relationship 
to the natural environment is based. From a deep ecological perspective, it is argued that the 
mainstream shallow approach aims to maintain the status quo in the midst of environmental 
problems (Harding, 1997). The ‘greening’ of business, for example, is seen by deep ecologists to 
be undertaken solely because of the benefits to humans (Harding, 1997) and therefore does not 
challenge the instrumentalism inherent in the relationship between humans and the environment. 
Measures for pollution prevention and the protection of biodiversity are also seen to be 
implemented mainly for the medicinal, economic and climatic regulation benefits to humans 
(Harding, 1997). 
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Bookchin (1993) argues that the fundamental issues underlying environmental problems are not 
addressed in mainstream environmentalism. His emphasis, however, is on the social and 
economic conflicts that need to be resolved before ecological problems can be relieved. Quite 
provocatively, he states that environmentalists are “… trying to make a rotten society work by 
dressing it in green leaves and colourful flowers while ignoring the deep-seated roots of our 
ecological problems” (Bookchin, 1987: 2). 
 
2.5.1.2. Ecocentric understanding of the human-nature relationship 
An ecocentric ethics, as described by O’Riordan (1981), centres on the virtues of reverence, 
humility, responsibility and care. Where the technocentric approaches emphasise processes and 
techniques for the management of environmental resources, ecocentric approaches focus on the 
type of relationship that should exist between humans and nature and on questioning the social 
and economic values that underpin Western society.  
 
Ecocentrism has roots in the philosophies of the American nineteenth century romantic 
transcendentalists19, such as Thoreau (O’Riordan, 1981). The transcendentalists saw nature as 
carrying messages of higher and spiritual truth (Mautner, 2000) which could lead a human being to 
a new realisation of his own potential and his obligations to others and the natural environment 
(O’Riordan, 1981). This view of nature as imparting truth to man, is illustrated in Thoreau’s book 
Walden (1854) where he states: 
 
I went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately, to front only the essential 
facts of life, and see if I could not learn what it had to teach, and not, when I came to 
die, discover that I had not lived. I did not wish to live what was not life, living is so 
dear; nor did I wish to practise resignation, unless it was quite necessary. I wanted 
to live deep and suck out all the marrow of life …20  
 
In the twentieth century, various types of ecocentric environmental ethics emerged (such as Aldo 
Leopold’s ‘Land Ethic’, or Holmes Rolston’s ethic of natural value); however, I will focus on three 
main forms of radical ecology (i.e. deep ecology, social ecology and eco-feminism), as identified by 
Zimmerman (1994). I have chosen this focus because the radical ecologies provide the greatest 
                                            
19
  Transcendentalism is the “… name given to the rather heterogeneous outlooks of a number of thinkers 
and writers in New England (USA) whose work was influenced by the rise of romanticism in philosophy 
and poetry (Goethe, Novalis, Counsin, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Carlyle)” (Mauter, 2000). 
20
  Quote from the book Where I lived and What I lived For, which is an extract from Walden (1854) and was 
published by Penguin Books in 2005.   
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contrast to technocentric thought. In each form of radical ecology the fundamental worldview or 
philosophy that underlies mainstream Western society is identified as the core of the global 
environmental problem, albeit each through a different lens. The radical ecologies therefore 
oppose reform environmentalism (Zimmerman, 1994), and ask for a deeper questioning of the 
social, philosophical and psychological aspects that influence the environmental problématique. 
Despite these similarities, there is often vigorous debate in the literature between the three 
branches of radical ecology, and in the section which follows I will discuss some of the main 
themes that form the focus of this debate. These themes are as follows: the general cause of the 
environmental problématique; conceptualising the connections between the human and non-
human world; and the masculine and feminine in our approaches to environmental concerns. A 
summary of the main views expressed by each of the forms of radical ecology is presented in 
Appendix B.  
 
(i)  The general cause of the environmental problématique 
The various forms of ecocentrism view the cause of the global environmental problématique 
differently depending on the focus of their attention. The deep ecologists, for example, focus on the 
relationship between humanity’s worldview and nature, the social ecologists on the relationship 
between societal structures and the natural world, and the eco-feminists on the connections 
between the domination of women and the domination of nature (Warren, 1987; Zimmerman, 
1994; Harding, 1997;).  So, although all three types of radical ecology ascribe the global 
environmental crisis to some form of dominance, they do this in different ways.  Deep ecology 
argues against the general dominance of humans over nature, social ecology narrows this 
specifically to the dominance of powerful groups in society over others, while eco-feminism 
identifies a particular (i.e. patriarchal) conceptual framework dominant in Western society as the 
problem. These differences often lead to debate between the various radical ecologies. Salleh 
(1984) for example, argues that deep ecologists do not explicitly recognise the links between the 
domination of women and the domination of nature and the way in which these re-enforce each 
other. However, perhaps in response to such comments, Devall and Sessions (1985), from a deep 
ecological perspective, state that: “For thousands of years, Western culture has become 
increasingly obsessed with the idea of dominance: with dominance of humans over non-human 
nature, masculine over feminine, wealthy and powerful over poor, with the dominance of the West 
over non-Western cultures. Deep ecological consciousness allows us to see through these 
erroneous and dangerous illusions” (Devall and Sessions, 1985: cited in: VanDeVeer and Pierce, 
2003: 264).   
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The main argument of the deep ecologists, however, is that the environmental problématique is the 
consequence of the prevailing anthropocentric worldview or philosophy within techno-industrial 
societies in which people see themselves as separate from nature and superior to it, giving them 
the right to be ‘in charge’ of the natural environment (Devall and Sessions, 1985: cited in: 
VanDeVeer and Pierce, 2003: 265). Moreover, deep ecologists argue that the norms of 
technological modernity are inconsistent with the ultimate norms of various spiritual and 
philosophical traditions (Zimmerman, 1994). Deep ecology, like many of the world’s religions, 
describes spiritual development in terms of a process of self-realisation in which all life unfolds its 
innate potential over time (Devall and Sessions, 1985). In humans this involves an increasingly 
deeper and broader sense of self that expands from identifying with the personal ego that aims 
solely for the satisfaction of its own goals, to identifying with others such as family and friends, to 
identifying with the human race as a whole and finally to including the non-human world as part of 
the larger Self (Devall and Sessions, 1985). This overcomes the separation between humans and 
non-humans that leads to the degradation of the latter. Naess (1988) argues that the process of 
identification with others leads to greater compassion and empathy for them, which results in our 
sharing in their sufferings and joys, even through we may not know them personally (Naess, 1988). 
As Naess (1988: cited in: VanDeVeer and Pierce, 2003: 269) puts it, ‘we see ourselves in others’ 
and he therefore argues for the widening and broadening of our sense of self to include both the 
human and the non-human world, as no laws or moral rules are needed to make us care for that 
which we see as part of ourselves.  
 
Social ecologists, on the other hand, don’t focus on the human individual’s philosophy, but rather 
on societal organisation, attributing the world’s ecological problems to authoritarian and 
hierarchical social structures which enable powerful elites to suppress others, while exploiting the 
natural environment for their own gain (Zimmerman, 1994). They refer particularly to those social 
structures within capitalism and state socialism. Social ecologists argue that the mentality of 
domination that is inherent in such hierarchical structures is extended to the natural world and 
results in the human exploitation of the non-human world (Bookchin, 1987; Zimmerman, 1994).  
 
Social ecologists typically accuse deep ecologists of, among other things, underplaying the specific 
role of society in the environmental crisis (Bookchin, 1994). Bookchin (1994) argues that this lack 
of attention to the social causes of the problem exonerates society from their role in issues such as 
hunger, famine and epidemics, and enables the power elites to ideologically defend the extremes 
of wealth and poverty in the world. From a deep ecological perspective, Fox (1989) states that the 
problem of environmental destruction is too complex to narrow down to one particular cause, such 
as hierarchical social structures. Fox (1989: 15) argues that “… it is possible to conceive of a 
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society that is nonandrocentric, socioeconomically egalitarian, nonracist, and nonimperialistic with 
respect to other human societies – but whose members remain aggressively anthropocentric in 
collectively agreeing to exploit the environment for their own benefit”. 
 
I agree that environmental destruction cannot be reduced to a single cause, but this also applies to 
the deep ecologists themselves who place most of their attention on addressing the individual’s 
worldview. The debate appears to be between consideration of the collective’s role in the 
environmental problématique and that of the individual. The collective and the individual, however, 
are not totally separate entities and, therefore, these issues are intertwined. Bookchin himself 
demonstrates this interconnectedness in his description of the ‘organismic tradition’ within social 
philosophy, that focuses on the relationship between individuals and society (Des Jardins, 1993). 
In this tradition, a middle way is sought between those that believe that individuals are merely the 
products of society and those that believe that society is simply a collection of individuals (Des 
Jardins, 1993). This view is that a dialectical relationship exists between an organic society or 
community and the individuals of which it comprises, with “… humans creating their society while 
at the same time being created by it” (Des Jardins, 1993: 244). Social practices and values 
influence the individual, while the society itself is the result of human decisions and actions (Des 
Jardins, 1993). Based on this argument, the causes of environmental destruction occur on both the 
individual and collective level.  
 
This view is supported by the work of a contemporary North American philosopher, Ken Wilber, 
who describes any reality as comprising four main spheres: the individual exterior (e.g. matter); the 
individual interior (e.g. individual emotions); the collective exterior (e.g. institutions, laws, modes of 
production) and the collective interior (e.g. cultural values) (Wilber, 2001b; 2001c). While the 
interior dimensions are more subjective, the exterior ones are more objective. Wilber’s (2001b; 
2001c) argument is that any phenomenon or event has expression in all four of these spheres. 
This does not mean that we can reduce one for the other (e.g. only considering the perspective of 
the collective or the perspective of the individual; or considering solely the external or the interior 
world); but rather that we need to understand any problem or event in all its four dimensions. This 
is what Wilber (2001b; 2001c) calls an ‘Integral Approach’.  
 
(ii) The nature of the connections between the human and non-human world 
A dominant feature of ecocentrism is the belief in the connectedness of man and nature. This belief 
is part of deep ecology, social ecology and eco-feminism. Deep ecology stresses that objects are 
not isolated, but rather nodes in a web of interconnections (Harding, 1997). Therefore the 
degradation of the environment has an impact on human nature. Similarly, eco-feminists see 
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humans and non-humans as co-members of an ecological community and although the differences 
between them are recognised, eco-feminists emphasise that one is not superior to the other and 
therefore neither one has a right to dominate the other (Warren, 1987). Any view that humans are 
abstract individuals fully contained within their own consciousness is rejected by eco-feminists, in 
favour of a broader perspective, in which the very nature of human beings is influenced by, and 
connected to, their social and natural environments (Des Jardins, 1993). 
 
Bookchin (1987) describes the view from social ecology, which also stresses the inter-
connectedness of the human and non-human environment, but which is based on a concept of 
natural evolution. From this perspective, humans (or second nature), like other mammals, are seen 
to have evolved out of the non-human (or first nature). This non-linear, natural evolutionary 
process tends towards increasing complexity, subjectivity and flexibility (Bookchin, 1982). Humans, 
therefore, cannot separate themselves from this evolutionary process, as they evolved out of the 
development of the biological environment, despite the fact that they often threaten themselves 
and the natural world (Des Jardins, 1993). Bookchin explains that second nature is distinguished 
from first nature through its increased capacity for rationality, communication and culture (Des 
Jardins, 1993). The social ecologists state that humans should be supportive and protective of the 
needs of nature and an ethics of complementarity should exist in our relationship to nature and 
between and within social institutions (Bookchin, 1993).  
 
Although the radical ecologies agree on the interconnectedness of humans and nature, differences 
emerge around the idea of biocentric equality, particularly between the deep ecologists and the 
social ecologists. Devall and Sessions (1985: cited in: VanDeVeer and Pierce, 2003: 264) explain 
that the “… intuition of biocentric equality is that all things in the biosphere have an equal right to 
live and blossom and to reach their own individual forms of unfolding and self-realization …”.  As 
all human and non-human entities are part of an inter-connected whole, they are all seen, from a 
deep ecologist perspective, to be equal in intrinsic worth and, therefore, to deserve respect in their 
own right as part of this whole. Deep ecologists, therefore, believe that it is not necessary to create 
a hierarchy in which humans are at the pinnacle (Devall and Sessions, 1985). 
 
Bookchin, however, displays strongly his polemic style of writing when criticising deep ecology’s 
principle of biocentric equality. For example, when he categorises deep ecologists as ‘mystical 
ecologists’ and states that: “Anthropocentrism, the quasi-theological notion that the world exists for 
human use, is derided by mystical ecologists in favour of the equally quasi-theological notion of 
biocentricity, namely, that all life-forms are morally inter-changeable with one another in terms of 
their ‘intrinsic worth’ ” (Bookchin, 1994: cited in: VanDeVeer and Pierce, 2003: 274). He states 
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elsewhere that biocentric democracy is meaningless and humans cannot be ‘put on a par with 
beetles’ (Bookchin, 1993: 5). Bookchin believes that biocentric equality denies the uniqueness of 
humans, devaluing their capacity for rationality and intellectuality (Bookchin, 1993; Des Jardins, 
1993).  
 
I would certainly agree with Bookchin’s views, if biocentric equality did indeed deny the differences 
between the human and non-human environment, ignoring human beings’ increased capacity for 
consciousness and rationality. However, I don’t see this to be the case in the arguments put 
forward by deep ecology’s founding members, such as Naess, Devall and Sessions. The concept 
of biocentric equality develops from the idea of holism in which man and nature are equal as co-
members of an interconnected system (Des Jardins, 1993). Devall and Sessions (1985: cited in: 
VanDeVeer and Pierce, 2003: 265), for example, state that the basic intuition of biocentric equality 
“… is that all organisms and entities in the ecosphere, as parts of the interrelated whole, are equal 
in intrinsic worth” (italics added). Interestingly, Bookchin (1993: 5) himself, states elsewhere that 
“… the human and the non-human can be seen as aspects of an evolutionary continuum, and the 
emergence of the human can be located in the evolution of the non-human, without advancing 
naïve claims that one is either ‘superior to’ or ‘made for’ the other”.   
 
It should also be remembered that the principle of biocentric equality was developed in response to 
the instrumentalism of technocentric approaches which provide nature with value only in relation to 
its use to humans. From this view, it can be argued that that an instrumentalist perspective is not 
problematic as serious degradation of the environment can always be shown to be detrimental to 
human beings. This may be technically correct; however, I argue that the principle of biocentric 
equality is more a normative concept than a technical one. If we are to address our global 
environmental problems, we require an environmental ethics that engenders a deep respect and 
love for the natural environment. Striving towards a worldview that places more emphasis on the 
value of the environment to exist in itself (i.e. intrinsic value), than on its value mainly as a resource 
for human development is, in my view, a more effective way of promoting such a deep respect for 
the natural world. This does not mean that humans should not use the natural environment to meet 
their basic needs. Indeed, the principles of deep ecology, when stating that humans have no right 
to reduce the diversity of life forms, include the exception of satisfying vital needs (Devall and 
Sessions, 1985).  
 
(iii) The masculine and feminine in our approaches to environmental concerns 
The differences between masculine and feminine approaches to environmental concerns and the 
dominance of the masculine in mainstream western culture are brought to the fore by the eco-
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feminists. The ‘way of thinking’ or patriarchal conceptual framework that they argue is a root cause 
of environmental problems comprises three philosophical moves: firstly a range of dualisms (i.e. 
separations between, for example, man and nature and the masculine and feminine) are 
conceived; then, rather than viewing these dualisms as complementary they are seen as opposing 
one another, with one side of each split being viewed as superior to the other (Warren (1990) calls 
this the creation of ‘value dualisms’); and finally, oppression or subordination of the less valued 
side of the dualism is justified through a ‘logic of domination’ (Warren, 1990).  As it is a patriarchal 
conceptual framework, more value is placed on what is traditionally viewed as masculine, rather 
than that which is associated with the feminine. Maleness is connected to the sphere of rationality, 
the mind, spirit and culture, which is contrasted to the spheres of femaleness, emotions, the body, 
passions, nature, the non-human world, matter and experience (Warren, 1990; Zimmerman, 1994). 
In summary, men/humans are considered different and superior to women/nature (Warren, 1987). 
Chuengsatiansup (2003: 13) observes that the worldview of modern science emphasises 
objectivity and “… the separation of the knower and the known, [however] a more feminine way of 
knowing is through relatedness and sympathy”. 
 
There are many different types of eco-feminism that are inexorably linked to a variety of feminist 
approaches (e.g. liberal feminists, Marxist feminists, social feminists and radical feminists) (Des 
Jardins, 1993). However, in this discussion I will focus on the more recent developments in 
feminism and eco-feminism, which are associated with the so-called ‘third wave’ of feminism. 
Feminism’s first wave (i.e. liberal feminism) called for equality for women in a culture in which 
masculine traits dominate (Des Jardins, 1993). Plumwood, however, argues that this would only 
result in women being required to adopt these traits, only to be seen as equal to men if they 
become masculine (Des Jardins, 1993).  Plumwood’s critique of feminism’s second wave (radical 
feminism) is that its call for a reversal of roles, in which a distinctive female point of view is 
particularly celebrated, reinforces the very dualistic way of thinking (e.g. between the masculine 
and feminine) that has resulted in the domination of humans over nature in the first place (Des 
Jardins, 1993).  
 
The ‘third wave’, found mostly in the writings of Plumwood and Warren, however, identifies an 
alternative to the first two waves (Des Jardins, 1993). In Karen Warren’s (1987) transformative 
feminism, the traditional ideas concerning feminism as a movement to end women’s oppression 
are expanded to recognising the connections between all systems of oppression (e.g. sexism, 
racism, classism and the human domination of nature). The liberation of women is therefore tied to 
the eradication of all forms of oppression (Warren, 1987). Central to transformative feminism is 
overcoming the dualisms that support the patriarchical framework prevalent in society, including 
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those between the masculine and feminine (Des Jardins, 1993).  Diversity and differences in the 
experiences of women are recognised and a central place is made for values such as care, 
friendship and trust (Warren, 1987).  
 
Eco-feminism then contributes insights to this transformative feminism, on the links between the 
domination of women and the domination of nature (Warren, 1987). Warren (1990, cited in 
VanDeVeer and Pierce, 2003: 284), for example, argues that among the many varieties of 
ecofeminism, they all agree that “… the logic of domination has functioned historically within 
patriarchy to sustain and justify the twin dominations of women and nature”. Since all feminists, not 
merely ecofeminists, oppose patriarchy, Warren (1990) concludes that all feminists must oppose 
the logic of domination which appears in many other contexts. Therefore, eradicating the logic of 
domination is part of any feminist critique, albeit a critique of patriarchy, imperialism or racism 
(Warren, 1990). Eco-feminists, however, specifically focus on the action of the logic of domination 
with regards to nature and argue that this logic, which is “… used to justify the domination of 
humans by gender, racial or ethnic, or class status is also used to justify the domination of nature” 
(Warren, 1990: cited in: VanDeVeer and Pierce, 2003: 285). 
 
In my view, the eco-feminist critique has played a critical role in bringing to consciousness a very 
particular ‘way of thinking’ (i.e. the logic of domination) that has influenced many of the relations 
between the masculine and feminine in mainstream Western society.  It is important that feminism 
and eco-feminism, with its links to how the logic of domination between the genders has influenced 
our relations to nature, continue with this important task. However, it is also important that the 
understanding that eco-feminism has provided enriches other philosophies and, in turn, is enriched 
by them. It can be argued that this is what has been happening in the debate between the deep 
ecologists and the eco-feminists in the literature (e.g. in the Environmental Ethics journal21); 
however, from my reading, this debate seems to have focused either on the differences between 
the two theories, or on trying to find common ground between them as they stand at the moment.  I 
have chosen, therefore, to investigate the expansion of eco-feminist ideas, in the light of the 
conclusion presented in the previous section, from a focus on the role of societal groups (e.g. 
gender groupings) in the environmental problématique, to include the role of the individual. This 
expands the reach of eco-feminist ideas and makes the boundaries between this stream of radical 
ecology and that of deep ecology more porous.  
 
                                            
21
 Specific examples include Salleh, 1984 and 1992, and Fox, 1989.  
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I will use a few insights from psychology to assist in applying the eco-feminist critique to the 
individual. Without going into much detail, Jung’s work on the anima and animus can be used to 
show how each individual has, within them, both feminine and masculine qualities (Jung, 1921; 
1990). The anima, which is found in men and the animus, which is found in women, are part of the 
ancient unconscious instinctual trends that are in the psyche of modern human beings. Von Franz 
(1990: 177) explains that the anima is a “… personification of all feminine psychological tendencies 
in a man’s psyche, such as vague feelings and moods, prophetic hunches, receptiveness to the 
irrational, capacity for personal love, feeling for nature, and – last but not least, his relation to the 
unconscious”.  The animus, on the other hand, is the male personification in a woman (Von Franz, 
1990). As Jung (1951: cited in: Storr 1983: 111) states: “Woman is compensated by a masculine 
element and therefore her unconscious has, so to speak, a masculine imprint”. Both the anima and 
animus have positive, as well as negative aspects. In general, the anima is associated more 
closely with connectedness and relationship than the animus, while the animus is associated more 
closely with discrimination and cognition than the anima (Jung, 1951). So, while men may 
generally place more emphasis on discrimination and cognition and women on relationship (Jung, 
1951), each gender has characteristics of both within their psyche, even though the effects of the 
anima or animus may be unconscious. The ‘unconsciousness’ of opposite gender characteristics 
does not preclude them from having a powerful effect on an individual. For example, Von Franz 
(1990: 189) states that “… even in a woman who is outwardly very feminine the animus can be an 
equally hard, inexorable power” (italics added).  Equally, a man can be strongly affected by 
characteristics of the anima.  
 
I have introduced this brief description of the animus and anima to extend the debate concerning 
the ‘logic of domination’ between social groups to the role that this logic plays within an individual, 
male or female, either consciously or unconsciously. This approach is not excluded from the 
discussions in the literature as the male and female dimensions within every individual are 
recognised by several authors in the field, such as Salleh (1984), Warren (1987) and Zimmerman 
(1994). However, in my view, the role of patriarchal ways of thinking in environmental destruction, 
as they manifest in females, as well as males, requires more attention.  
 
Arguably, one of the most insightful discussions in this regard is presented by Warren (1987).  
Although Salleh (1984) seems to indirectly and partially recognise the anima and animus in each 
individual, Warren provides an articulate and more in-depth response. Salleh (1984: 345) states 
that “… the deep ecology movement will not truly happen until men are brave enough to rediscover 
and to love the woman inside themselves”. The implication is that men project their feminine 
characteristics on women and nature, characteristics that they consider to be inferior. Warren 
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(1987), however, rightly asks that if men project unwanted traits onto women and nature, what are 
women projecting onto men? Warren (1987: 41) enquires further: “Do women split off from 
themselves and project onto men violence, aggressiveness, selfishness, greed, anger, hostility, 
death hating, nature fearing, individuality, and responsibility?” I think that these are important 
questions if eco-feminism is to address a patriarchal way of thinking that Warren (1987) and others 
argue affects both men and women. Extending the focus of the debate beyond the genders to this 
‘way of thinking’ is important if eco-feminism is not to be judged as “… injecting exclusively 
‘women’s questions’ into Green politics”, but is to become the ‘broad epistemological challenge’ to 
mainstream Western society that Salleh (1992: 215) and others argue that it is.  
 
The boundaries between the eco-feminists and the deep ecologists can be further softened and 
the application of eco-feminist insights to the individual deepened, through examining the eco-
feminist critique of deep ecology in more detail. The eco-feminists direct much of their criticism in 
the philosophical literature (e.g. Salleh, 1984 and Plumwood, 1991) towards the deep ecologists, 
who they argue are unaware of the masculine bias in their theory (Zimmerman, 1994).  Salleh 
(1992), for example, states that: “As far as deep ecology goes, we do not question the ultimate 
intentions of the project, and especially its aim to break down the ontological dualism of humanity 
versus nature. Nevertheless, the movement’s unconscious androcentrism continues to be a very 
real obstacle to that ‘self-realisation’, as they call it” (Salleh, 1992: 214). 
 
The eco-feminist view is that deep ecology’s notion of self-realization reflects a Western male’s 
sense of ‘self’ rather than being a universal ideal (Zimmerman, 1994). Plumwood sees the process 
of self-realisation described by the deep ecologists as a masculinist system that involves a long 
process of abstraction and disconnection until finally the individual identifies with nature 
(Zimmerman, 1994).  She sees this process as relying on rationalism with an atomistic view of the 
self rather than a relational one (Zimmerman, 1994). Plumwood interprets the process of self-
realisation, as described by the deep ecologists, as an extension and enlargement of the personal 
ego and states that it “…does not question the structures of possessive egoism and self-interest; 
rather it tries to allow for a wider set of interests by an expansion of self” (Plumwood, 1991: 14). 
She views the expanded-self that emerges as one in which the “… distinctiveness and 
independence of the other [including nature]” is not recognised in the undifferentiated wholeness 
that results (Plumwood 1991: 15, parenthesis added). She argues that this ‘obliteration of all 
distinction’ does not provide a basis for a ‘kind’ environmental ethics, as this view of humans “… as 
metaphysically unified with the cosmic whole will be equally true whatever relation humans stand in 
with nature – the situation of exploitation of nature exemplifies such unity equally well as a 
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conserver situation and the human self is just as indistinguishable from the bulldozer and Coca-
Cola bottle as the rocks or rain forest” (Plumwood, 1991: 13).  
 
Plumwood views the Self that the deep ecologists speak of, as one which leaves behind personal 
interests in support of a depersonalised, detached, impartial, disembodied and abstract state of 
pure reason (Plumwood, 1991; Zimmerman, 1994). She sees this as enabling an approach to 
justice based on universal rules inspired by rationality, rather than virtue-based concepts such as 
care, respect, reverence and sensitivity (Plumwood, 1993). Although she acknowledges that the 
rational approach to justice (as she understands the deep ecologists) has some value and should 
not be abandoned, she states morality should also be grounded in particularised personal relations 
to others, which brings the intellectual aspects together with the emotional, sensuous and bodily 
ones (Plumwood, 1993). In other words, Plumwood argues that the rational approach to justice 
ignores the particularized, feeling-orientated ethics of care that many women describe and which 
emerges from a relational, rather than atomistic, idea of selfhood (Zimmerman, 1994). Salleh, in 
turn, (1984: 340) argues that the deep ecology movement “… overlooks the point that if women’s 
lived experience were recognised as meaningful and were given legitimation in our culture, it could 
provide an immediate ‘living’ social basis for the alternative consciousness which the deep 
ecologist is trying to formulate and introduce as an abstract ethical construct”.  
 
It appears from his writings that Bookchin (1982), from a social ecology perspective, is also at 
great pains to distance the ‘wholeness’ that he refers to, from that which he believes the deep 
ecologists aim for, in their concept of self-realisation.  Using his typical polemic style, Bookchin 
(1982: cited in: Biehl, 1997: 33) supports a ‘wholeness’ (described by Gutkind, 1962) that is not a 
“… spectral oneness that yields cosmic dissolution in structureless nirvana”, but is rather a “… 
richly articulated structure with a history and internal logic of its own”. Although he does not 
explicitly state this, I assume the ‘structureless nirvana’ to be how Bookchin (1994) understands 
the deep ecological perspective on holism, as he has associated deep ecologists, in his article 
entitled Will Ecology Become ‘The Dismal Science’, with ‘mysticism’ and regularly criticises them 
on this account.  
 
In my view, Plumwood and Bookchin’s critique of the deep ecology’s notion of ‘wholeness’ and 
Plumwood’s understanding of Naess’ concept of self-realisation, is a misreading of the work of 
Arne Naess. These critiques, however, do raise an important issue. If the deep ecologists are to be 
understood, a more thorough explanation of what the notions of ‘self-realisation’ and ‘wholeness’ 
entail, is needed. Although these notions are not typically included in mainstream environmental 
debate, it does point to the psychological and spiritual development that is required within human 
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individuals, for the global environmental crisis to be fully addressed (Wilber, 2000). Such concepts 
show us that it is not only external, material changes (e.g. the reduction of pollution emissions) that 
are required, but also internal, non-material ones (e.g. an increase in the individual’s awareness of 
the interconnectedness of man and nature) (Wilber, 2000). I will attempt a slightly more expanded 
description of how I interpret the deep ecologists’ notion of self-realisation, using the work of Wilber 
(2000), in order to show how I believe Pumwood and Bookchin have misunderstood the views of 
Naess. Wilber’s description of human cognitive development critically draws primarily on the 
research of Jean Piaget.  
 
Broadly, Wilber (2000) describes typical human development as passing through three stages: the 
egocentric, sociocentric and worldcentric. Each of these stages can in turn be sub-divided; 
however, for the purposes of this discussion, I will deal with them in terms of their general 
characteristics.  The egocentric stage, which typifies infancy and early childhood, is characterised, 
inter alia, by ‘participation mystique’ and a sense that the world centres on oneself (egocentrism). 
Stein (1998: 179) explains that ‘participation mystique’ is a term used by the anthropologist Levy-
Bruhl to refer to “… an identification between an individual’s consciousness and the surrounding 
world, without awareness that one is in this state; consciousness and the object with which one is 
identified are mysteriously the same thing. There is an absence of awareness of difference 
between oneself and one’s perceptions on the one hand and the object in question on the other”. 
Stein (1998) goes on to explain that to some extent many people remain in a state of participation 
mystique all their lives, for example, when they experience feelings regarding their cars. When the 
car develops a problem, they may become sick or get a stomach ache.  
 
‘Participation mystique’, therefore involves an unconscious connection to the world around us and 
the infant experiences this in a number of ways (Stein, 1998). For example, s/he initially finds it 
hard to distinguish between the subject (him- or herself) and the object (the world outside). The 
child considers the other as an extension of him- or herself. As development occurs, however, the 
child is slowly able to distinguish between the self and the material world, but mental images 
remain fused and confused with external objects (Wilber, 2000).  Wilber (2000) explains that these 
material objects are endowed with consciousness by the child, and s/he begins to give them 
commands, such as to follow when s/he walks. The object is then seen to obey out of its own will. 
With the influence of egocentrism, the winds and clouds, for example, are seen to be made for 
humans alone and they take notice of people. Initially, the perspectives of others are considered 
false, merely because the child’s own point of view predominates. However, as development 
proceeds further, the child begins to realise that others don’t necessarily think as s/he does and 
s/he begins to respond to control and verification (Wilber, 2000). Egocentrism begins to gradually 
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decline as the child realises that his/her thoughts do not govern the world. During this stage, the 
child also begins to slowly differentiate its feelings from that of others, particularly that of its mother. 
However, at this stage of development, a child is not easily able to put themselves in another’s 
shoes and understand their perspective (Wilber, 2000). 
 
Participation mystique means that this stage is, at least initially, characterised by a strong unity 
between the infant and its world (Stein, 1998). Although this may appear to be a holistic view, it is 
important to note that at this stage, wholes and parts within reality are collapsed or confused with 
one another (Wilber, 2000). The parts are not differentiated from each other, but are fused 
together. Stein (1998: 179-180) summarises this point when he says that the “… first stage of 
consciousness anticipates the final stage: ultimate unification of the parts into a whole. At the 
beginning, however, it is unconscious wholeness, whereas at the end the sense of wholeness is 
conscious”. 
 
During the second stage of cognitive development, described by Wilber (2000), there is a widening 
of the self beyond egocentrism. The most significant change at this sociocentric stage is the ability 
of the individual to ‘take the role of the other’ (Wilber, 2000: 233). This is not just a realisation that 
others have a different perspective, but it is the capacity to “… mentally reconstruct that 
perspective, to put oneself in the other’s shoes” (Wilber, 2000: 233). The child now learns his or 
her role in relation to others in society and becomes strongly embedded in the norms, rules and 
dogma’s within that society. For this reason this stage can also be referred to as the ‘conventional’ 
stage, where the previous stage was ‘pre-conventional’ and the next is ‘post-conventional’.  
 
Being a member of a particular culture or society becomes important at the sociocentric stage, and 
an individual is accepted as a member of that group if s/he embraces its belief systems. Wilber 
(2000) points out that although, during this phase, there is a lessening of egocentrism, where the 
self is the centre of reality, this is replaced with ethnocentrism where one’s group, nation, culture or 
race becomes the centre. He goes on to point out that: “In this structure, there is no way a global or 
planetary culture can even be conceived unless it involves the imposing of one’s particular 
mythology on all peoples: which is what we saw with the mythic imperialism of the great empires, 
from the Greek and Roman to the Khans and Sargons to the Incas and Aztecs” (Wilber, 2000: 
235).  
 
Wilber (2000) describes the final stage of development as ‘worldcentrism’, where an individual is 
no longer bound to a particular society, race or culture, but is “… operating in the space of 
universal pluralism and global grasp”.  Sociocentrism and ethnocentrism therefore begin to 
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decrease. At this stage the individual can understand the perspective, not only of his/her social 
group, but also of other groups. This stage is therefore non-ethnocentric and even less egocentric 
than the previous phases as the self is able to include more aspects of reality as deserving 
respect. Wilber (2000) explains that the worldcentric phase involves developing the capacity to 
distance oneself from egocentric or ethnocentric entrenchment and consider what would be fair for 
all peoples, not only ones own social group.   
 
The individual is thrown back onto his/her own inner resources, as s/he can no longer merely 
follow the rules of society without question (Wilber, 2000). Wilber explains that this stage is highly 
reflexive, recognising a range of perspectives, and the relationships between them. Societal rules 
are evaluated according to more universal principles (e.g. equality) that are not culture-specific, but 
are part of multiculturalism. These universal principles are not concrete moral laws, but general 
statements that promote, for example, justice, mercy and compassion.  As mentioned above, this 
phase is post-conformist in that it often involves a resistance to a particular society’s norms; for 
example, Ghandi versus cultural imperialism and Martin Luther King Jr. versus racial discrimination 
(Wilber, 2000).  
 
Wilber (2000) goes further to explain that the worldcentric stage is also characterised by an 
awareness of the relationship between objects, or parts of a system, in a ‘wholeness’ that is not a 
merely a fusion of everything. Rather, parts and wholes are seen as discrete from one another, but 
in mutual relationship. Their nature is determined, not only by their own particular characteristics, 
but also by their relationships with other parts and wholes.  Wilber (2000: 241-242) states that this 
stage is the “… first truly ecological mode of awareness in the sense of grasping mutual 
interrelationships”.  Anthropocentrism declines as humans are rightfully seen as one set of wholes 
(e.g. social groups) which are part of other wholes (e.g. ecological systems), with no part, or whole, 
being essentially superior to others.   
 
From the discussion of cognitive development above, it can be seen that Plumwood’s critique of 
the Self described by the deep ecologists, in which she argues that an individual could confuse 
his/her needs with those of a rainforests’, reflects an understanding of that ‘Self’ at the egocentric 
state of unconscious fusion, rather than at the worldcentric stage in which wholeness is 
consciously perceived as including both differentiated objects and relationships between these. If 
the deep ecologists were indeed describing a state that correlates with this egocentric stage of 
development, I would certainly agree with Plumwood’s criticisms, as such a state would be a 
regression in an individual’s development.  
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I think, however, that it is the ‘conscious wholeness’ of the worldcentric stage that the deep 
ecologists refer to, rather than the ‘unconscious wholeness’ of egocentrism, as Naess expressly 
argues that he is not referring to a widening of the personal, narrow ego when speaking about the 
Self. For example, he writes that “… if people equate self-realisation with narrow ego fulfilment, 
they seriously underestimate themselves” (Naess, 1988: cited in: VandeVeer, 2003: 272).  Naess 
(1988: cited in: VanDeVeer and Pierce, 2003: 270) explains that he is influenced by the 
metaphysics of Gandhi who stated that: “What I want to achieve – what I have been striving and 
pining to achieve these thirty years – is self realisation, to see God face to face, to attain Moksha 
(Liberation). I live and move and have my being in pursuit of that goal. All that I do by way of 
speaking and writing, and all my ventures in the political field, are directed to this same end”. 
Naess (1988: cited in: VanDeVeer and Pierce, 2003: 270) then points out that: “This sounds 
individualistic to the Western mind, a common misunderstanding. If the self Gandhi is speaking 
about were the ego or the ‘narrow’ self … of egocentric interest, of narrow ego gratifications, why 
then work for the poor?” The deep ecologist Warwick Fox (1989), also explicitly distances himself 
from the purely personal basis for identification that characterises egocentrism. He states that 
solely identifying with ‘my family’, ‘my self’ and ‘my ethnic grouping’ is “… more like the cause of 
possessiveness, war and ecological destruction than the solutions to these seemingly intractable 
problems” (Fox, 1989: 12).  
 
It is at the worldcentric stage of development that the relational perspective which the ecofeminists 
call for is truly possible, as the individual is able to see beyond his/her own ego needs and 
perspectives and recognise, appreciate and care for those of others. The process of self-
realisation, as described by Wilber (2000), is therefore not one which results in a Self that is 
disconnected and disembodied. Wilber explains that each stage of development transcends, but 
also includes, the previous stages. Therefore the worldcentric stage includes the personal, but it is 
“… personal plus, not personal minus” (Wilber, 2000: 289). Fox (1989) explains, using an analogy 
of a tree, that the Self is identified with the tree in its entirety and not exclusively with a particular 
leaf (my personal self), or twig (my family), or branch (my community) of the tree.  
 
I recognise that these points do not address all the eco-feminist’s concerns with deep ecology’s 
notion of self-realisation. That would require a much longer, broader and deeper debate. However, 
I think that the idea, supported by the western psychologist Carl Jung, that the psychological 
development of human beings is ongoing, despite the fact that physical growth ends at about the 
age of twenty (Stein, 1998), is relevant to environmental philosophy. This is particularly the case 
since the concept of sustainable development is a global principle that requires individuals to have 
the capacity to appreciate perspectives beyond their own. It is also a concept that requires an 
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individual to consciously hold the differences and linkages between the human and non-human 
environment in awareness. Wilber (2000: 541) points out that the evidence that the Earth is in 
‘desperate trouble’ is overwhelming. We do not have a shortage of data. The problem is that “… 
most people just don’t care … the real problem is not exterior. The real problem is interior. The real 
problem is how to get people to internally transform from egocentric to sociocentric to worldcentric 
consciousness, which is the only stance that can freely, even eagerly, embrace global solutions” 
(Wilber, 2000: 541). 
 
In terms of the eco-feminist critique, such internal development could possibly assist in overcoming 
an individual’s patriarchal conceptual framework, as s/he increasingly becomes less uncritically 
embedded in mainstream society’s norms and values. Eco-feminism, on the other hand, provides 
deep ecologists with an idea of the specific attitudes that need to be brought to awareness and 
questioned in the process of self-realisation, due to the detrimental effect that they have on an 
individual’s relation to the natural world, and collectively on the relationship between society and 
the environment.  
 
2.5.2 Mode of knowing the environment or gaining knowledge of it 
 
2.5.2.1. Technocentric mode of gaining knowledge of the environment 
There is a strong reliance on scientific credibility, modelling and prediction in technocentric 
approaches to the environment (O’Riordan, 1981). The type of knowledge which characterises 
technocentrism is rational, ‘value-free’ science, which supports managerial techniques such as 
‘objective’ appraisals, including cost-benefit analysis (O’Riordan, 1981). Although there are several 
variants of technocentrism, Benton (1994) points out that they all tend to support the idea of 
scientific knowledge as a means of controlling nature to serve human purposes, by means of 
technological innovation. The ‘technological optimist’ version of technocentrism supports the idea 
that technological innovation has a limitless ability to master nature and overcome the constraints 
that arise in achieving this (Benton, 1994). Although the limits of scientific knowledge are 
increasingly being recognised, the assumption still exists that if science could decrease technical 
uncertainty then social consensus would follow as a result (Wynne, 1994).  
 
Benton (1994) however, points out that there are a myriad of environmental problems for which a 
technological solution is not in sight. He also argues that focusing on technological solutions to 
environmental problems, results in the neglect of issues such as inequalities in power and resource 
distribution, which lead to the suffering of many poor communities as a result of environmental 
destruction. Benton (1994) points out that, in these cases, the problem is not a lack of technology, 
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despite the view of technological optimists that poverty can be decreased through economic 
growth that is stimulated by technological innovation (Benton, 1994).  
 
Stakeholder engagement is limited in the technocentric approach, with faith being placed mainly in 
scientific experts. Public opinion is sought primarily as an indication of the strength of feeling 
concerning particular issues, rather than as a means to obtain advice on methods and techniques 
(O’Riordan, 1981).  
 
2.5.2.2. Ecocentric mode of gaining knowledge of the environment 
One of the most fundamental ways in which the ecocentric approach to knowledge differs from the 
technocentric, is in its explicit consideration of subjective factors. Where technocentric approaches 
draw heavily on what is seen as ‘objective’ science, eco-feminists and social ecologists, for 
example, emphasise the need to consider subjective factors, such as the dominant values within 
Western society and the impact of social hierarchy (Bookchin, 1982; Zimmerman, 1994). The 
ecocentric approach to knowledge is therefore not static and totally objective, but constantly 
evolving, changing over time and subjective. This is confirmed by various points made by the 
radical ecologists. Warren (1990: 291), for example, states expressly that “… ecofeminism makes 
no attempt to provide an ‘objective’ point of view”.  She explains that ecofeminism is a social 
ecology which recognises that the related dominations of women and of nature are rooted in 
contextual factors such historical and socioeconomic circumstances, as well as the dominant 
conceptual framework within the Western world.  
 
As the eco-feminists argue that it is currently a patriarchal conceptual framework that dominates 
the generation of scientific knowledge, they see such knowledge as strongly aligned with what is 
associated with the masculine, such as the mind and rationality (Warren, 1990; Zimmerman, 
1994).  They argue that this undervalues and marginalises what is traditionally associated with the 
feminine, such as emotions, experience and the non-human world.  
 
From both a deep ecological and eco-feminist perspective, the world cannot be understood – and 
decisions made about how we should act – using facts and logic alone (Harding, 1997). The deep 
ecologists, however, do not propose an alternative approach to scientific knowledge, but argue 
instead for the development of ecological wisdom or consciousness within individuals (Harding, 
1997).  Indeed, Devall and Sessions (1985, cited in VanDeVeer and Pierce, 2003: 263-264) are 
explicit in their inclusion within their philosophy of what is traditionally considered non-scientific, 
stating that “… deep ecology goes beyond the so-called factual scientific level to the level of self 
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and Earth wisdom. Deep ecology goes beyond a limited piecemeal shallow approach to 
environmental problems and attempts to articulate a comprehensive religious and philosophical 
worldview”. Therefore, in developing their ethics, deep ecologists draw on a variety of sources 
including the science of ecology, leading Western philosophers, Asian religions and the practices 
of primal peoples, among others (Zimmerman, 1994).  
 
Developing the ecological consciousness the deep ecologists speak of does not require the 
accumulation of scientific knowledge, but the expansion of the self, as described above, from 
identification only with the ego and its values, needs and preferences, to identification with the non-
human environment. Devall and Sessions (1985) argue that this spiritual growth is best achieved 
through a meditative process and way of life that includes a deep questioning of the basic 
assumptions on which our life is based. They state that an ecological consciousness has been 
cultivated by many individuals within the context of various spiritual traditions, such as Christianity, 
Buddhism and Taoism. The process of deep questioning promoted by Devall and Sessions (1985) 
is described in further detail in the section that follows.  
 
The deep ecologists also place an emphasis on promoting deep ecological experience within the 
individual, which they argue frequently leads a person along an ecological path and to deep 
ecological wisdom (Harding, 1997). The example often used is that of Aldo Leopold’s encounter 
with a wolf, which triggered a re-orientation in his attitude towards nature (Harding 1997). In short, 
Leopold was a wildlife manager who adhered to the belief that humans were superior to nature, 
viewing the natural environment as constituting ‘resources’ that needed to be ‘managed’ (Des 
Jardins, 1993; Harding, 1997). Out walking with friends one morning, Leopold shot a female wolf, 
together with a number of her puppies. As he watched the wolf die he saw a fierce green fire in her 
eyes. This experience brought to him, in that moment, to a deep respect for nature, which he felt 
had “… its own life, its own history, and its own trajectory into the future. He experienced the 
ecosystem as a great being, dignified and valuable in itself” (Harding, 1997: 2). This changed 
Leopold’s ‘managerialist’ view, that humans have the right to control the rest of the natural 
environment, to one in which humans are a part of that environment and as such should aim to 
preserve its integrity and beauty (Harding, 1999).  
 
Where the deep ecologists focus on the type of experience required for cultivating an ecocentric 
environmental ethics within individuals, the eco-feminists focus on the type of knowledge, which 
include feminine ways of knowing, that society needs to gain a more inclusive understanding of the 
environment. They too call for an expansion of knowledge beyond that based on facts and logic, 
emphasising the need to include story-telling, myths and first-person narratives (Warren, 1990). 
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These knowledge forms, they argue, are important ways of giving expression to people’s lived and 
felt experiences, as well as to a variety of ethical attitudes that are often overlooked within 
mainstream Western environmentalism (Warren, 1990).    
 
As eco-feminists promote diversity in knowledge and understanding, they resist the idea that there 
is a single, ‘correct’ environmental ethics (Des Jardins, 1993). Warren’s (1987: 18) ‘transformative 
feminism’, for example, aims to provide “… a central theoretical place for the diversity of women’s 
experiences, even if this means abandoning the project of attempting to formulate one overarching 
feminist theory or one women’s voice”. Despite this acceptance of diversity in environmental ethics, 
the purpose of eco-feminism in Warren’s transformative feminism seems to be more singular. In 
general terms this purpose, as expressed by Warren (1987), is to promote an understanding of the 
connections between patriarchal conceptual frameworks and all forms of oppression and to 
challenge the logic of domination in such conceptual frameworks, thereby ending such oppression.  
 
As all radical ecocentric approaches emphasise the connectedness between man and nature, they 
all lend themselves to an understanding of the social and ecological environment as an interrelated 
‘social-ecological system’22, to borrow a term from the Resilience Alliance (2006). Bookchin (1982: 
cited in: Biehl, 1997: 32) criticises reductionist approaches to knowledge stating that: “We can no 
longer afford to remain captive to the tendency of the more traditional sciences to dissect 
phenomena and examine their fragments. We must combine them, relate them, and see them in 
their totality as well as their specificity. In response to these needs we have formulated a discipline 
unique to our age: social ecology”.  Bookchin (1982) quotes E.A. Gutkind who states that the goal 
of social ecology is wholeness, which does not mean merely adding together numerous, randomly 
collected details and interpreting these subjectively. Rather social ecology, states Bookchin (1982: 
cited in: Biehl, 1997: 33), is a science that deals with interrelated social and ecological 
relationships in communities and ecosystems. This science seeks to “… unravel the forms and 
patterns of interrelationships that give intelligibility to a community, be it natural or social” 
(Bookchin, 1982: cited in: Biehl, 1997: 33).   
 
As described above, there are various interpretations of what the radical ecologists mean when 
they refer to the concept of ‘wholeness’. If however, we adopt the approach that a ‘whole’ 
comprises parts that are discrete from one another, but are in mutual relationship (Wilber, 2000), 
                                            
22
  Berkes and Folke started to use this term in 1998, in order to show that the division between the social 
and ecological environment is artificial (Resilience Alliance, 2006). This term has also been used in the 
environmental assessment field, for example, in the emerging ISA process which was briefly described in 
Chapter 1 of this thesis.  
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then we can begin conceptualising such ‘wholes’. Bookchin (1982) provides a starting point in his 
understanding of ecological wholeness, as he points in the direction of systems and complexity 
theory – notions that are very useful in describing how parts and wholes in a system, and the 
relationships between them, can be understood. Bookchin (1982: cited in: Biehl, 1997: 35), for 
example, describes the ecological environment as “… a complex, richly textured, and perpetually 
changing natural kaleidoscope of life forms …” the integrity of which depends not on simplicity and 
homogeneity, but on variety and complexity. He describes ecological wholeness as ‘unity in 
diversity’ and the general direction of natural evolution as one towards increasing complexity 
(Bookchin, 1982: cited in: Biehl, 1997: 34).   
 
Theory and practice is emerging around so-called ‘systems thinking’ and complexity theory, in 
which the metaphor used to understand the world is not one of a machine that can be understood 
by analysing its separate parts, but of systems that cannot be reduced to the sum of their parts 
(Cilliers, 1998). This view “… transcends current disciplinary and conceptual boundaries and will 
be pursued with new institutions” (Capra, 1982: 285). Systems and complexity theory is described 
in further detail in Chapter 3.  
 
There are several implications of the dynamic, systemic and complex nature of human-nature 
relationships for our attitude to knowledge and many of these will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
Perhaps most importantly, however, as Bookchin (1982: 35) points out, again referring mainly to 
ecological systems, is that: “To assume that science commands this vast nexus of organic and 
inorganic interrelationships in all its details is worse than arrogance: it is sheer stupidity”. How 
much more difficult it would be to manage or control the interrelationships between that ‘vast 
nexus’ and the social environment.  
 
2.5.3 Mode of organising ourselves within the environment 
 
2.5.3.1. Technocentric mode of organising ourselves within the environment 
Benton (1994) explains that there are several variants of technocentrism. He discusses two 
particular modes: the ‘cornucopian’ or ‘technological optimist’ mode, and the ‘managerialist’ mode. 
In the technological optimist version, mastery of nature is sought for two reasons: as protection 
against disasters such as floods, drought and disease; and to ensure that nature becomes an ever-
increasing reservoir for meeting human desires. In the managerialist mode, which arose largely as 
a result of a critique of the cornucopian mode, the natural limits to meeting increasing human 
demands are acknowledged, while control and regulation is used to prevent these limits from being 
exceeded or to reverse the situation where this has already occurred (Benton, 1994).  
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Benton (1994) criticises the managerialist mode of technological determinism on a number of 
accounts. The first is that this approach can include decreased economic growth or even zero-
growth; however, it does not consider fundamentally different lines of social, cultural and economic 
change. In addition, the managerialist approach, according to Benton (1994), has not considered in 
nearly sufficient depth, the social, legal and political underpinnings of environmental management 
and regulation itself. Strategies for sustainability tend to aim for a balance between the carrying 
capacity of the natural environment and human demands, without adequate socially-informed 
consideration of the institutional setting that would require the maintenance of this balance. The 
institutional arrangements required are often fundamentally different to those which are in place. 
Finally, this mode, although it developed in response to the environmental consequences of the 
technological optimist approach, itself adopts the mode of scientific rationalism (Benton, 1994).  
 
Benton (1994) uses the example of the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 1974), to 
illustrate the managerial approach and goes so far as to say that the Club of Rome initiated this 
variant of the technocratic perspective. Limits to Growth was based on a ‘world model’ that was 
developed to investigate five major trends of global concern, namely: accelerating industrialization, 
rapid population growth, widespread malnutrition, depletion of non-renewable resources, and a 
deteriorating environment (Meadows et al., 1974). The authors used very general variables in the 
model, as they were only interested in broad patterns in the changes of variables in the system 
(e.g. population or pollution levels). For example, they considered “… only one general population, 
a population that statistically reflects the average characteristics of the global population” 
(Meadows et al., 1974: 93). They also included only one class of pollutants. This approach has 
distinct characteristics of modernity in its aim to reduce the environmental problem into quantifiable 
variables and therefore its dependence on scientific rationality. Also, Benton (1994) argues, the 
approach adopts a high degree of confidence and reliance on technology in its use of computer 
modelling; however, the causes of the environmental crisis identified in the report, include an 
unquestioning over-reliance on technology. The main conclusions of the report are shown in 
Box 2.1.  
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Box 2.1:  Limits to Growth – Main Conclusions 
 
 
The main conclusions of the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth report, which was based 
on the outcomes of a world modelling exercise, were: 
 
1. If the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food 
production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on 
this planet will be reached sometime within the next one hundred years. The 
most probable result will be a rather sudden and uncontrollable decline in both 
population and industrial capacity. 
 
2. It is possible to alter these growth trends and to establish a condition of 
ecological and economic stability that is sustainable far into the future. The state 
of global equilibrium could be designed so that the basic material needs of each 
person on earth are satisfied and each person has an equal opportunity to 
realize his individual human potential.          
 
If the world’s people decide to strive for this second outcome rather than the first, the 
sooner they begin working to attain it, the greater will be their chances of success. 
(Meadows et al., 1974: 23-24) 
 
The report includes a critique of ‘technological optimists’ saying that (Meadows et al., 1974: 145): 
The hopes of the technological optimists centre on the ability of technology to remove or to 
extend the limits to growth on population and capital. We have shown that in the world 
model that application of technology to apparent problems of resource depletion or pollution 
or food shortage has no impact on the essential problem, which is exponential growth in a 
finite and complex system. 
 
The authors of Limits to Growth state that they are not anti-technology, explaining that: “We would 
deplore an unreasoned rejection of the benefit of technology as strongly as we argue here against 
an unreasoned acceptance of them” (Meadows et al., 1974: 154). Their proposal is that society 
should consider the social and physical side-effects of development before it is implemented; the 
social changes that would be necessary before the development could be implemented properly; 
and that if the proposed development successfully removes some natural limits to growth, what 
limits will be reached and will these be preferable to society?   
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The primary proposal made in Limits to Growth to achieve the second outcome listed in Box 2.1, is 
for the world to move to a situation of non-growth or constant population and capital. This they call 
a state of ‘equilibrium’. The minimum requirements for a state of global equilibrium are listed in the 
report as follows (Meadows et al., 1974: 173-174): 
▪ The capital plant and the population are constant in size. The birth rate equals the 
death rate and the capital investment rate equals the depreciation rate; 
▪ All input and output rates – birth, death, investment, and depreciation – are kept to a 
minimum, and 
▪ The levels of capital and population and the ratio of the two are set in accordance 
with the values of the society. They may be deliberately revised and slowly adjusted 
as the advance of technology creates new options.  
 
Although it is recognised in Limits to Growth that a change is required in the social-economic 
environment and a decrease in economic growth is needed, to the point of zero-growth, these 
changes are not investigated in any depth and the reader is therefore not left with any serious 
challenge to the current industrial paradigm.  
 
The current mode of environmental assessment has strong affinities with the technocentric 
approach to environmentalism. This is evident, for example, in the reductionist division of the 
environment into separate parts for analysis. This presents considerable difficulties in integration, 
as described in Chapter 1. Current practice of mainstream environmental assessment is also 
typically characterised by a division between the observer (the scientists and environmental 
assessment practitioner) and the observed (the environment or community). This again leads to 
difficulties in integration, in this instance, between the subjective elements (e.g. values of the 
community) and the more objective ones (e.g. the technical environmental assessment process 
and the observations of scientists). However, there are several ecocentric elements in more recent 
developments in the environmental assessment field, such SEA and Sustainability Assessment. 
SEA in South Africa, for example, includes stakeholder ‘visioning’ at the outset of the process, as 
well as the identification of sustainability objectives, which are largely based on stakeholder views 
(DEAT, 2000). The current mode of EIA will be explained in more detail in Chapter 3. This will be 
done in response to ideas proposed by several researchers in overcoming the constraints of 
modernism in their various fields.  
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2.5.3.2. Ecocentric mode of organising ourselves within the environment 
All the radical ecologies propose a questioning of the fundamental assumptions of technocentrism, 
particularly its instrumentalist view of nature (Zimmerman, 1994). As philosophies, their emphasis 
is on changing the way people think, rather than proposing detailed strategies for action, although 
such strategies are included in some of their recommendations. The deep ecologists aim to 
change the way individual human beings perceive themselves and their relation to the 
environment, social ecologists ask us to question the hierarchical structures that exist within 
Western society and its economic system, and eco-feminists bring to our awareness the patriarchal 
conceptual framework which they argue dominates Western society and negatively affects our 
relationship to the natural environment.  
 
In terms of management, which forms the basis for technocentric action, Bookchin (1982) suggests 
that we take a different perspective. He does not propose that we abandon the idea of 
environmental management totally, but supports an approach similar to that of steering a boat 
through currents, rather than commanding those currents. He states that: “What ecology, both 
natural and social, can hope to teach us is how to find the current and understand the direction of 
the stream” (Bookchin, 1982: cited in: Biehl, 1997: 35). More specifically, Bookchin (1982: cited in: 
Biehl, 1997: 35) suggests that, based on the fact that we cannot assume to understand social and 
ecological systems in all their complexity, and therefore cannot command such systems, we ‘work 
with nature’ accommodating a high degree of spontaneity and unpredictability.  
 
Eco-feminism also shifts the emphasis away from the domination, control and management of 
nature, towards an approach that reflects a more equal relationship between man and nature and 
which is based on the ideals of caring, responsibility, love and trust (Des Jardins, 1993). It relates 
primarily to notions of justice and arguing for an ‘ethics of care’ to guide such notions, rather than 
traditional ethical concepts based on moral laws, rights and duties. Such concepts, argue the eco-
feminists, “… presuppose a world in which interests conflict, in which the demands of justice 
restrict and limit human freedom, in which morality battles egoism” (Des Jardins, 1993: 252). Des 
Jardins (1993) points out that the ethics of care moves beyond merely the application of universal 
rules to specific problems in order to make decisions. This perspective focuses on understanding 
the nature of specific relationships and applying an ‘ethics of virtue’ based on these relationships. 
General principles are replaced, where appropriate, by virtue-based concepts such as respect, 
gratitude, sensitivity, friendship and care (Plumwood, 1993). Such a virtue-based ethics, argues 
Plumwood (1993), allows for particularity and the recognition of contextual factors that arise from 
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particular relationships. The virtues required (e.g. care) are based on the commitments of particular 
relationships or identities (Plumwood, 1993).  
 
As mentioned in section 2.5.1, the eco-feminist perspective, is not one which totally rejects 
universal, abstract principles in ethical debate, but rather one that argues for a central place to be 
provided for contextual factors and for traditionally marginalised values such as care, appropriate 
trust, diversity and reciprocal relationships (Warren, 1987; Zimmerman, 1987; Des Jardins, 1993). 
For example, as noted by Zimmerman (1987: 35), Carol Gilligan suggests that a “… morality of 
compassion based on the feminine sense of relatedness is complementary with the morality of 
justice based on the masculine sense of separateness”. Zimmerman (1987) argues that if 
interrelatedness is overemphasised, feminists are at risk of leaving no space for a conception of 
people as individuals and for making moral choices when people’s views conflict with one another.  
 
Although not discussed by the eco-feminists, in the context of environmental assessment and 
decision-making, it can be argued that this perspective calls for the contextualisation of universal 
principles and laws relating, for example, to sustainable development. This requires an 
understanding of the particular relationships within the social-ecological system and the virtues that 
should be promoted as a result of those relationships.    
 
Among the deep ecologists, Session and Naess, come closest to bridging philosophy and 
proposals for policy, in their development of eight basic principles, called the Deep Ecology 
Platform (DEP). They suggest that others formulate their own particular versions of deep ecology 
based on the DEP, which is presented in Box 2.2. Naess used the DEP to develop his process for 
deep questioning at four levels (Harding, 1997), which is also presented in Box 2.2. This process is 
important as it provides an example of how such questioning, which is central to deep ecology, 
may be undertaken.  
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Box 2.2:  Deep Ecology Principles and System for Deep Questioning 
 
The Deep Ecology Platform (DEP) 
 Human and non-human life has value in itself, independent of the usefulness of the 
non-human world for humans; 
 Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realisation of these values and 
are also values in themselves; 
 Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital 
needs;  
 The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a decrease of the 
human populations. For non-human life to flourish, such a decrease is needed;   
 Present human interference in the non-human world is excessive and rapidly 
getting worse;  
 Policies must therefore be changed in a way that deeply affects basic economic, 
technological, and ideological structures and results in a significantly different state 
of affairs;  
 An ideological change is needed from increasingly aiming for a higher standard of 
living to appreciating life quality. There will be an awareness of the difference 
between big and great; and 
 Those who support these points have an obligation to try to implement the changes 
needed, either directly or indirectly.  
(Adapted from: Devall and Sessions, 1985: cited in: VanDeVeer and Pierce, 2003: 266) 
 
Four-level system for deep questioning 
Level 1:  Uncovering a person’s ultimate norm from which all actions result. This norm will 
always belong to the philosophical or religious domain. For example, Arne Naess’ ultimate 
norm is self-realisation. These norms are not absolute truths but hypotheses from which 
other norms, for example the minimisation of ecological footprints, are derived.  
Level 2: Questioning based on the views that form part of the Deep Ecology Platform (see 
principles above). These views can be adapted to the relevant context.  The Deep Ecology 
Platform was developed as a set of principles that could be accepted by deep ecology 
supporters irrespective of their ultimate norm.  
Level 3: Exploration of ones own situation and the broad options available for action based 
on the norms identified in levels 1 and 2.  This level includes the identification of broad 
policies.  
Level 4: Specific ways to implement the general policies and action identified in level 3. For 
example, documenting extinction of species and/or focusing on the alleviation of poverty.  
(Harding, 1997)  
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In terms of how society should be organised in order to promote an ecocentric relationship with 
nature, Bookchin focuses his attention on the external social changes that are needed to enable 
freedom from dominance. In particular, Bookchin (1995: in: Biehl, 1997) proposes that the ideal of 
freedom is manifested through a form of social organisation called ‘libertarian municipalism’. This 
proposal is based on his argument that: “The recovery and development of politics must … take its 
point of departure from the citizen and his or her immediate environment beyond the familial and 
private arenas of life. There can be no politics without community” (Bookchin, 1995: cited in: Biehl, 
1997: 175). Bookchin (1995) goes further to argue that the basic unit of political life is the 
municipality, from which all other aspects of social and political life, such as citizenship, 
interdependence and confederation, emerge. He also states that it is on this level that people can 
begin to gain an understanding of political processes that involve more than just voting. Bookchin 
(1995) therefore proposes that maximum democracy can be attained through the formation of 
assemblies on the local municipal scale.  Governance within these assemblies would take place 
according to the principles of full participation, freedom from external control, decentralised 
decision-making and the avoidance of any form of domination. Initially these assemblies would 
represent a single neighbourhood or several neighbourhoods, forming confederations with 
adjacent municipal assemblies.  Such confederations would deal with problems that affect an 
entire region. Power, however, would flow from the bottom-up as opposed to the top-down, as is 
typically the case in nation-states (Bookchin 1995). 
 
Deep ecologists also promote small-scale, decentralised communities, rather than large urban 
centres (Cooper, 2001). However, their concept of social organisation is akin to bioregionalism, 
which emphasises small-scale, self-sufficient communities, a concept that Bookchin distances 
himself from in a number of ways (Bookchin, 1995; Cooper, 2001).  For example, Bookchin’s 
assemblies are formed according to politically defined communities and boundaries, rather than 
ecologically defined ones. Also, he rejects bioregionalism’s concept of self-sufficiency in favour of 
the formation of socially and economically interdependent but autonomous communities (Bookchin, 
1995).   
 
2.6 Key philosophical tenets for an approach to environmental assessment that 
addresses its current modernist constraints 
 
Based on the discussion above, I have identified several key philosophical tenets on which to build 
an alternative conceptual approach to environmental assessment. An additional tenet will be added 
in Chapter 4, in the light of Sen’s ideas presented in Chapter 3. For now, however, these tenets are 
as follows:  
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▪ Humans and nature are seen as part of an interrelated social-ecological system in 
which neither dominates the other, but in which their differences are acknowledged. 
The connection between the well-being of humans and nature is therefore 
recognised; 
▪ The link between a person’s philosophy or conceptual framework and the way in 
which they practically interact with others and the environment is recognised and 
considered an important factor in improving the sustainability of social-ecological 
systems. Attitudes and structures of domination between social groups are seen to be 
detrimental to a social-ecological system as a whole; 
▪ All life is considered part of an evolutionary process in which it unfolds its inherent 
potential. In human beings, this process of self-realisation involves an increasingly 
wider sense of self that moves from an ecocentric to a sociocentric to a worldcentric 
orientation; 
▪ Nature is valued for its existence beyond its use to humans, and therefore certain 
activities are prohibited irrespective of their benefits to people; 
▪ Diversity, both human and natural, is valued as a pre-requisite to the sustainability of 
a social-ecological system.  An attitude of inclusion is adopted in which opposites are 
not seen as being in competition with one another, but as being complementary; and 
▪ Decision-making regarding social-ecological systems is guided by an ‘ethics of care’ 
in which a central place is provided for contextual factors, as well as general 
principles.  
 
2.7 Summary 
 
In this chapter I have discussed the philosophical worldview of modernism, which underpins the 
field of environmental assessment. The discussion reveals the essential characteristics of this 
worldview, aimed at explaining many of the problems currently experienced in this field. 
 
Modernism, which was developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is characterised by a 
mechanistic view of the world, which leads to assumptions of order, reductionism, predictability and 
determinism. The inadequacies of this view in describing reality started to emerge in the nineteenth 
century with developments in electrodynamics, philosophy and the life sciences. In response to 
these inadequacies, post-modern ideas appeared in fields as diverse as philosophy, physics, 
urban planning and anthropology.  
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The shift from modernism to post-modernism is articulated as a change from a mechanistic 
worldview to a more holistic and ecological view. There is no single theory of post-modernism; 
however, there are a number of overriding characteristics that I have summarised in this chapter. 
These characteristics include the post-modern negation of a number of elements of the modern 
worldview, including the following: meta-narratives, the myth of the pre-given and the subject-
object divide, positivism, the reductionistic view of the world and the dominance of the profit-
motive.  
 
Western society would seem to be in a transition between the modern and post-modern eras, 
sustained by elements of both worldviews. The position adopted in this thesis is not one that 
regards modern as ‘bad’ or post-modern as ‘good’ (or vice versa). It is argued, rather, that divisions 
have formed between the worldviews, to the point that there is a dissociation, for example, 
between values and science, which compromises the potential of environmental assessment.  
 
In this chapter, I have also discussed the application of modernism and post-modernism to the 
environmental debate through reference to ecocentric and technocentric perspectives. These 
perspectives are also used to structure a discussion of the following three themes: understanding 
the man-nature relationship; the mode of gaining knowledge of the man-nature relationship; and 
the mode of human organisation within nature. The purpose of this discussion is to describe post-
modern environmental approaches and to identify related streams of thought that can assist in 
developing the beginnings of an alternate, potentially more effective, environmental philosophy for 
environmental assessment.  
 
The technocentric mode of environmentalism, on which environmental assessment is primarily 
based, has its roots in modernity. In this mode, human well-being is associated with growth, 
technological progress and economic expansion. Nature is viewed as a source of resources to 
support such growth and expansion. Although some versions of technocentrism recognise the 
natural limits to growth, fundamentally different forms of economic and social development to those 
of the mainstream are typically not investigated. The type of knowledge that characterises 
technocentrism is rational, ‘value-free’ science, which supports the ‘management’ of the 
environment using ‘objective’ appraisals such as environmental assessment. Generally, scientific 
knowledge is considered a means of controlling nature, through technological innovation, for the 
benefit of human beings. Although the limits of scientific knowledge are increasingly recognised, 
the assumption still exists that if enough knowledge could be attained to reduce scientific and 
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technical uncertainty, then social consensus would be attained regarding, for example, the actions 
to be taken to advance sustainable development – this, based on the ‘truth’ revealed by science.  
 
The ecocentric mode of environmentalism, discussed in this chapter, focuses on three streams of 
radical environmental philosophy, namely: deep ecology, social ecology and eco-feminism. 
Although these philosophies all oppose technocentrism in some way, there are considerable 
differences in their foundational principles, some of which are highlighted in the discussion. 
Flowing from this discussion, I describe a number of philosophical tenets that could underpin 
environmental assessment and thereby enhance its effectiveness. 
 
In the next chapter, I will investigate the work of three leading researchers that have, in some form, 
recognised the constraints of modernism and addressed certain aspects of these constraints in 
their research. These researchers are from the domains of the social sciences, economics and 
complexity theory. They each challenge the boundaries of their disciplines, particularly the division 
between science and values that is inherent in modernity. I employ some of the ideas gleaned from 
this investigation in the development of a conceptual approach to environmental assessment that 
moves beyond the limiting or restrictive assumptions of modernism.  
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CHAPTER 3. 
ADDRESSING THE CONSTRAINTS OF  
MODERNISM IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: 
IDEAS FROM OTHER DOMAINS 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I will investigate the work of three leading researchers (i.e. Bent Flyvbjerg, Amartya 
Sen and Paul Cilliers)23 as it pertains to the assumptions of modernism described in Chapters 1 
and 2. My purpose is to identify streams of thought which can inform the development of a 
conceptual approach to environmental assessment that addresses the problems described in 
Chapter 1. I have described the criteria which I used to identify the leading researchers in the 
introduction to this thesis. 
 
I will present the way in which each researcher describes some aspect of modernism that limits the 
effectiveness of their field. Although the researchers may not have expressed the issues they 
discuss using the term ‘modernism’, I will show in each case how their work is linked to a critique of 
this worldview.  Thereafter, I will discuss the proposals that each researcher makes to overcome 
the constraints of modernism and review the current practice of environmental assessment in light 
of their ideas.  
 
I recognise that a single author cannot represent the diverse range of perspectives that typically 
exist within a particular area of interest.  However, that is not the purpose of the discussion that 
follows. Nor is it the purpose to present a philosophical treatise on each of the three researchers’ 
positions, in relation to the views of others.  Rather, this investigation is an exploration of the work 
of Flyvbjerg, Sen and Cilliers in particular, in order to learn from the way in which they are 
practically dealing with similar philosophical constraints, and to apply this learning, where relevant 
and useful, in the development of an alternative conceptual approach to environmental 
assessment.  
 
                                            
23
  The criteria used to identify the researchers are listed in Chapter 1, section 1.4.  
M o d e r n i s m ,  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  A s s e s s m e n t  a n d  t h e  S u s t a i n a b i l i t y  A r g u m e n t :   
M o v i n g  t o wa r d s  a  N e w A p p r o a c h  t o  P r o j e c t - b a s e d  D e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a   
 
 
 
 
Page 99 
3.2 Enhancing the role of social science in planning and environmental 
assessment 
 
In this section, I will concentrate on the work of Bent Flyvbjerg, who is a Professor of Planning at 
the Department of Development and Planning at the Aalborg University, Denmark. Flyvbjerg has a 
concurrent position as chair in Infrastructure, Policy and Planning at Delft University of Technology 
in The Netherlands (Aalborg University, 2008). He has published on a range of topics such as 
megaprojects, the social sciences and rationality and power. Flyvbjerg has two decades of 
practical experience as a policy and planning adviser for over forty public and private 
organisations, including the United Nations, the European Union and the Government of Denmark. 
He received the Danish National Science Council Distinguished Research Scholarship and, in 
2002, was knighted for his professional achievements by Queen Margrethe II of Denmark (Aalborg 
University, 2008).  
 
Although Flyvbjerg has published extensively, I have focused on his main proposals for an 
alternative role for social science within research and development planning processes, as 
summarised in his book entitled Making Social Science Matter (2001) and in his papers (2002 and 
2004), and on what he calls phronétic planning research. Flyvbjerg’s conclusions, particularly 
regarding the influence of rationality and power on political and planning processes, are largely 
based on an empirical study which he conducted in the town of Aalborg in Denmark (Flyvberg, 
2001). I do not describe this study in any detail, but focus on the main study conclusions that 
highlight modernism’s subjective/objective divide in the planning context, and on his proposals for 
balancing instrumental and value-rationality, which are particularly applicable to environmental 
assessment.  
 
3.2.1 Description of the problem 
 
Flyvbjerg (2001) argues for a re-evaluation of the nature and role of the social sciences in 
understanding human action and in planning for human development. In this regard, he 
emphasises the need for an improved balance between value and instrumental rationality, which I 
will suggest, has important implications for environmental assessment.  
 
In his book, Making Social Science Matter (2001), Flyvbjerg shows how the social sciences limit 
their own effectiveness through their attempts to emulate the ‘modern scientific ideal’ as expressed 
in the natural sciences. These attempts, he explains, are a result of the dominance of the scientific 
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ideal following the Enlightenment, to the extent that this ideal has almost become the only 
legitimate view of science.  
 
The emphasis on objectivity and the devaluation of values and ethics that is inherent to modernism 
is echoed in Flyvbjerg’s (2001) description of the narrowing of modern society’s concept of 
rationality to a largely instrumental one. In this view, the focus is on the means to achieve particular 
ends, rather than on the ends themselves. These means are viewed as tools which are not strictly 
true or false, but are judged in terms of their usefulness in making predictions and moving from one 
set of data to another (Mautner, 2000). ‘Truth’ is either rejected in favour of usefulness or identified 
with it (Mauter, 2000). The result is that deliberation on the diverse range of contextual values (or 
value-rationality, as Flyvbjerg describes it) is marginalised.  
 
Flyvbjerg (2001) goes further to argue that society’s capacity for value deliberation is being eroded 
as instrumental or means-rationality becomes dominant. He points out that Max Weber was the 
first to analyse the social consequences of this trend, which include the alienation and erosion of 
traditional values. However, since that time other philosophers, such as Foucoult and Habermas, 
have shown that the emphasis on instrumental rationality, to the detriment of value-rationality, has 
continued. Today, the results of this trend extend beyond the social domain, to the current 
environmental problems that threaten mankind, making the need to balance instrumental rationality 
with value-rationality all the more important.  
 
Flyvberg (2001) implies in his argument that the current emphasis on the ‘modern scientific ideal’, 
predictive theory and instrumentalism within the social sciences leads to a reliance on theory and 
rules. This, he says, relegates the social sciences to an administrative role, the details of which are 
determined by whichever instrumental rationality prevails (e.g. whichever process or technology is 
being used), and whichever power relations happen to be dominant. Such a role is “… a ‘headless’ 
form of ad hoc social engineering no longer given credence by a superstructure of social-science 
theory” (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 167). Flyvbjerg points out that: “This kind of practical social-science 
activity does not require advanced graduate or post-graduate specialized institutions of higher 
learning. The type of social engineering we are speaking of here primarily demands midlevel 
generalists with an all-round Master’s or Bachelor’s degree: people who are flexible enough to 
administer and execute the kinds of measures dictated by whatever is considered instrumental at a 
given moment” (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 167). When describing ways forward for the social sciences, 
Flyvbjerg calls this scenario ‘science as usual’, meaning by this a focus on instrumentalism, 
objectivity and the devaluation of values and ethics.  
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3.2.2 Improving the balance between instrumental and value-rationality 
 
Flyvberg (2001) addresses the problems he describes through three main steps:  
▪ Expanding the range of knowledge forms that are recognised;  
▪ Proposing an appropriate place for the social sciences within this range; and  
▪ Describing the implications of this placement for the practice of social science 
research. 
 
Flyvbjerg (2001) aims to expand the range of knowledge forms that are currently recognised by 
going back to a time before the emphasis on rationality and the scientific ideal. Here he draws on 
the work of Aristotle in demonstrating the range of ‘intellectual virtues’ that exist, which include and 
go beyond empirical science. Aristotle divided these virtues into three categories as shown in 
Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1:   Aristotle’s Categorisation of Intellectual Virtues  
 
Intellectual Virtue Description 
Epistémic science Corresponds to the ideal of modern natural science; 
Based on analytical rationality; 
Universal knowledge consistent in time and space;; 
Invariable, context-independent; and 
Aims to know why. 
Techné Involves application of technical knowledge; 
Uses instrumental rationality to achieve a conscious goal; 
Pragmatic, concrete, context-dependent knowledge; 
Craft/art geared towards production; and 
Aims to know how. 
Phronésis Emphasises practical, context-dependent knowledge and ethics (what is variable) 
over theoretical formulae and universal truths; 
Can be translated into ‘prudence’, ‘practical common sense’ or ‘practical wisdom’; 
Involves a sense of the ethically practical rather than type of science; 
Requires experience; 
Involves knowing how to respond to a particular circumstance in a way that 
cannot be reduced to knowledge of general truths; 
Action-orientated and the kind of intellectual activity most relevant to praxis; 
Involves analyses and interpretations of the status of values in society aimed at 
praxis; and 
Aims to know how and why. 
(Flyvbjerg, 2001) 
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Flyvbjerg (2001) argues that despite their importance, modern science has neglected the concrete, 
practical and ethical dimensions of knowledge. His main proposal for social science therefore, is 
that it focuses on phronétic research, analysing the status of values and interests in society and on 
social commentary and action. The value of the social sciences, he argues, is not in their role as 
epistémé, where the natural sciences are strong, but in their role as phronésis, where the natural 
sciences are weakest. Flyvbjerg (2001) states that such phronétic research should focus on four 
questions: 
1. Where are we going? 
2. Is this desirable? 
3. What should be done? 
4. Who gains and who loses and by what mechanisms of power?  
 
Flyvbjerg (2001) is careful to state that these questions should be asked realising that a unified 
‘we’ and final answers do not exist. He stresses that “… no one is experienced enough and wise 
enough to give complete answers to the four questions, whatever such answers would be. 
Experience and wisdom of that kind should not be expected from social scientists, who are, on 
average, no more astute or ethical than anybody else” (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 61). What should be 
expected are attempts by phronétic social scientists to develop partial answers that are an input 
into “… ongoing social dialogue about the problems and risks we face and how things may be 
done differently” (Flyvberg, 2001: 61). This focus on phronésis does not exclude, in Flyvbjerg’s 
view, the use of the social sciences as techné in addressing socio-cultural and administrative 
problems.  
 
Flyvbjerg (2001; 2004) proposes various methodological guidelines for what he calls a ‘reformed 
social science’.  He does this by identifying the characteristics of phronétic research and in the 
section that follows I have evaluated current environmental assessment theory and practice in the 
light of these characteristics.  
 
3.2.3 An evaluation of current environmental assessment theory and practice according to 
Flyvbjerg’s proposals for a reformed social science  
 
It can be argued that environmental assessment is not purely a social science or purely a research 
exercise and therefore that the evaluation that follows is inappropriate. However, Flyvbjerg (2004) 
himself has discussed his proposals in the context of development planning, which is closely 
related to environmental assessment and is also not purely a social science or research 
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endeavour. Within this context, Flyvbjerg (2004) calls his approach ‘phronétic planning research’. 
Most importantly, I have used Flyvbjerg’s proposals as a ‘springboard’ for developing ideas for an 
alternative conceptual approach to environmental assessment at the project-level.  
 
Flyvbjerg’s (2001; 2004) proposals for phronétic research are summarised in italics at the 
beginning of each section that follows. 
 
3.2.3.1. Focus on values 
Phronetic researchers focus on values addressing, for example, the four questions listed above; 
i.e.  Where are we going? Is this desirable? What should be done? Who gains and who loses and 
by what mechanisms of power? Relativism, which says that one set of values is as good as 
another, and foundationalism, which says that a set of rational and universal values exist, should 
both be avoided through the development of a situational ethics. The point of departure for such an 
ethics is the particular social and historical context that is being studied and the shared view of a 
specific reference group. 
 
Consistent with Flyvbjerg’s (2001) critique of instrumentalism within the social sciences, the 
environmental assessment community has also placed an over-emphasis on procedural aspects, 
to the detriment of substantive concerns (Cashmore, 2004). As such, Flyvbjerg’s (2001) statement 
that instrumentalism relegates the social sciences to an administrative role can equally be applied 
to EIA. In my experience, more time is spent in meetings and conferences around environmental 
assessment, discussing the nuances of the process, and how these can be correctly implemented, 
than on understanding what makes development sustainable within various contexts.  
 
Despite this emphasis on instrumental rationality in environmental assessment, there are 
numerous value-based decisions that are made either explicitly or implicitly by environmental 
assessment practitioners and stakeholders throughout the process. Such normative issues include, 
for example: determining who gains and who loses as a result of a proposed development and by 
what mechanisms of power; the potential impacts that should be considered in the study; and the 
significance of these impacts (De Jongh, 1988; Flyvbjerg, 2001). In addition, Richardson (2005: 
359, parenthesis added) states that “EA [Environmental Assessment] is being used by actors in the 
real world to mediate and contest value differences and conflicts, and EA practitioners are 
engaged in the daily business of mediating values, consciously and ethically or not, yet the EA 
community seems divided on whether this is happening, appropriate, or desirable”.  
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The overall objective of environmental assessment is to promote sustainable development, which 
has been broadly defined in the literature, but which will always be a contested concept as its 
precise meaning depends on the values of those defining it. The current lack of attention to value-
based issues is not only reflected in the emphasis on tools and procedures within the theoretical 
environmental assessment debate (even when addressing normative issues such as determining 
the significance of impacts), but also in the difficulties that are experienced in practice in 
undertaking effective stakeholder engagement and in adequately addressing social concerns, as 
described in Chapter 1. 
 
There are positive trends towards addressing normative issues in environmental assessment, as 
stated by Richardson (2005: 349): “Within the EIA literature there is growing awareness of the 
central importance of values in EA”. In addition, ethical issues are increasingly becoming central to 
the practice of SEA and sustainability assessment. The SEA Guidelines for South Africa (DEAT, 
2007), for example, require stakeholders to develop a vision and sustainability objectives, which 
are based on the values of those that are participating. However, in my view, there is still much 
work to be done in understanding how conflicting values and worldviews can be elicited, 
constructively debated and incorporated into environmental decision-making. Richardson (2005) 
states, for example, that “… there are very different positions emerging over what, precisely, 
should be done …” about the importance of values in environmental assessment. Richardson 
(2005: 359) also states that “… there is a tendency for EA to concentrate on the provision of public 
participation as the key to working with difference and conflict. However, …in the fine grain of EA 
work, value conflicts are present throughout EA: they are played out in the making of professional 
judgements, in the taken for granted ways of doing things, and in the political considerations of 
participation in EA, there remains a need to address how values are put at stake in the everyday 
actions and practices of EA practitioners and planners”.  
 
The question of how to address normative issues in EIA, will be addressed in various forms 
throughout this chapter and the next; however, for now I wish to propose that EIA is seen as a 
phronétic exercise, as defined by Flyvbjerg (2001; 2004), rather than an epistémic science or form 
of techné. This is because it concerns the question of ‘what ought’ to be done, planned or 
approved, which, as Max-Neef (2005), states is an ethical question. As a form of phronésis, it 
would draw on epistémic science and techné, but would not conform to the traditional view, echoed 
in the interviews that I conducted, that environmental assessment is mostly an ‘objective’ process 
that merely provides predominantly scientific information into the political decision-making process. 
This view is confirmed in Hill (2004) who identifies the information processing model as the most 
common view of environmental assessment. From this perspective (which is discussed in section 
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3.4.3.5 of this chapter) the main purpose of environmental assessment is to inform decisions and a 
strict separation of facts and values is often maintained (Cashmore, 2004). Significant use is made 
of natural science methods, with limited application of the social sciences (Cashmore, 2004).  
 
Environmental assessment has other characteristics which place it mainly in the domain of 
phronésis, rather than epistémic science or techné, including its emphasis on practical, context-
dependent knowledge and its orientation towards praxis. For these reasons, as suggested by 
Flyvbjerg in the spheres of planning and social science, I think that environmental assessment 
should become a form of  phronésis, which draws heavily on technological and scientific 
knowledge, but which places the need to understand context-specific sustainability values and the 
influence that these should have on decision-making, at the forefront.  
 
3.2.3.2. Placing power at the centre of analysis 
Power is placed at the centre of analysis as rationality without power is irrelevant. Analysis of 
power helps to avoid the idealism that often characterises ethical thinking. 
 
It is rare, if ever, that a thorough understanding is gained of power relations and the consequences 
of such relations on, for example, the focus of the EIA, the way in which the significance of impacts 
is judged and the effectiveness with which the recommendations of the assessment are likely to be 
implemented. Although issues of governance are often addressed, these are usually limited to 
concerns around capacity building, institutional structures and cooperation between various 
sectors or spheres of government. Environmental assessments also do not usually include an 
evaluation of the worldviews, values and ideas that, due to prevailing power relations, drive 
activities within a social-ecological system and will have the strongest influence on the direction of 
future developments.  
 
Power-relations are, however, critical to an environmental assessment process as they influence, 
inter alia, the way in which impacts will affect various stakeholders. South African best practice 
guidelines require a description of the main stakeholders who are likely to be affected by the 
impacts of a development and the way in which these impacts are likely to be distributed among 
these stakeholders (DEAT, 2004b). However, as argued by Scott and Oelofse (2001) social 
questions, such as those concerning who gains and who loses from a particular development are 
often not adequately addressed.  
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Power relations are also important considerations for the effective implementation of the 
recommendations in an environmental assessment. Such assessments are usually approved by an 
environmental department; however, they typically contain recommendations that also affect many 
other governmental departments. The extent to which such recommendations are implemented, is 
therefore affected, inter alia, by the influence that the environmental department has on other 
departments.   
 
Hill (2004), in building environmental assessment theory, also draws on the work of Flyvbjerg and 
argues that particular attention should be paid to power relations during the scoping stage of EIA. 
He recommends that social specialists are commissioned, during the assessment stage, to 
undertake a ‘social probe’, which includes an analysis of values, interests and power structures 
and imbalances (Hill, 2004: 225). Hill (2004: 226) also states that: “EA professionals can undertake 
their duties with an awareness of power and can draw on existing strategies for counteracting 
misinformation and enhancing participation. Assessors can check factual statements, 
communicate information in a way that is comprehensible to lay persons, marshal dissenting 
expertise in review, and draw attention to alternatives that dominant interests might suppress”. 
 
3.2.3.3. Getting close to reality 
Phronétic researchers get close to reality and the group being studied, making their research 
relevant.  They remain close to that group throughout the research process and deliberately 
expose themselves to their positive and negative reactions. Although they become part of what is 
being studied, including local power relations, they retain the freedom to problematise and be 
critical of what they see and acknowledge the way in which local power relations may have 
influenced their research.  
 
A key requirement of the current system for EIA in South Africa and of such systems 
internationally, is that the environmental practitioner should be as objective as possible.  This 
constrains his/her ability to become immersed in the context in the way in which a phronétic 
researcher might. Typically, environmental assessment practitioners adopt a stance that is more 
closely aligned with the idea of ‘an observer looking in’ than with being part of what is studied, as 
Flyvbjerg (2001; 2004) suggests. This is influenced both by the perceived need to be objective and 
by the fact that they are usually outside consultants employed to undertake a project within a 
particular time and budget. They then move on to other projects in other areas. 
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It can be said that Flyvbjerg’s proposal concerning ‘getting close to reality’ relates mainly to the 
conventional research context, rather than informing decision-making (as in EIA) which, some will 
argue, ‘should be objective’. However, there are numerous value-based decisions that are made 
by environmental assessment practitioners, explicitly or implicitly, throughout the process24. 
Therefore, it is arguable whether environmental assessment can be, in reality, as ‘objective’ as it 
claims to be, or that is required by law. Engaging more directly and explicitly with such normative 
debates, as discussed in section 3.2.3.1 above, would, in my view, make the process more 
transparent and accountable. Such engagement would require practitioners to ‘get close to reality’ 
and expose themselves to the positive and negative reactions within the community to a proposed 
development, beyond merely speaking to those who participate in stakeholder engagement 
exercises.  
 
More fundamentally, I think that the environmental assessment process as a whole, should be re-
conceptualised as a subjective argument that focuses on whether or not a proposed development 
should be approved or not, and if so, under what conditions. This is consistent with the 
recommendation in section 3.2.3.1 that environmental assessment should become a form of 
phronésis that is supported by epistémic science and techné. Lawrence (2007) includes ‘reasoned 
argumentation’ among those approaches that he proposes for use in determining significance in 
environmental assessment. He states that this approach is “… evident in all EIA documents, 
despite a propensity to cloak subjective reasoning in ‘objective’ scientific and technical language 
(Lawrence, 2007: 745)”. Lawrence (2007: 745) argues that reasoned argumentation is already “… 
present in EIA documents in the document structure, in the values applied to evaluate alternative 
choices and impacts, and in how relevant inputs are linked, synthesized and summarised in 
support of interpretations and conclusions”. Such an approach is therefore not foreign to 
environmental assessment; however, I propose that it is made far more explicit, to the extent that 
the purpose of the whole environmental study is to develop an argument on whether the 
development should go ahead or not, and what conditions should be applied.  
 
This proposal is generally congruent with the approach advanced by Elling (2008) in his discussion 
on environmental assessment as a reflexive arrangement. In Elling’s approach the intention is to 
develop reflexivity among the various stakeholders that are traditionally involved in an 
environmental assessment. The positive and negative impacts of a proposed development on the 
environment are identified through a series of dialogues between the developer, the administration 
and the citizens. The aim of these discussions is to reach, as far as possible, a mutual 
                                            
24
  These decisions are examined further in the discussion on complexity in section 3.4. 
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understanding on what the impacts are, and to what extent they are acceptable. The outcome of 
the mediated dialogue is the actual assessment. This assessment is considered to be a political 
process, which exposes stakeholder interests and values, despite being founded on scientific and 
technical information. Although the assessment report itself does not recommend a particular 
decision to the politicians, Ellling (2008:237) states that it is “… something they should relate to 
politically, and draw upon to set political priorities and make a political choice.” In the report, the 
outcome of the reflexive dialogue is described, including the process that was followed, the likely 
environmental advantages and disadvantages (identified by the participants) of the proposed 
development, the possible conflicts concerning environmental values and interests, the 
stakeholders that are involved in these conflicts and the means by which environmental goals 
many be achieved (Elling, 2008).     
 
The argumentation approach that I propose, although broadly similar to Elling’s (2008), displays a 
number of differences. For example, it draws more directly on a number of knowledge generation 
techniques (of which dialogue is one), depending on the question being addressed25. In addition, I 
propose that the environmental assessment, which should involve all stakeholders including the 
authorities, does indeed advise the political decision-makers whether the development should be 
approved or not. In this context, it is particularly important that, as Flyvbjerg (2001; 2004) 
recommends, the practitioners and specialists are exposed directly and extensively to the social-
ecological system and retain the ability to be critical of what they see. Although this approach is 
contrary to traditional environmental assessment, the current South African EIA Regulations 
(DEAT, 2006a: Chapter 3, section 32(1)(m)) take a step in this direction, as they include a 
requirement that the practitioner provide such an opinion on whether the proposed development 
should go ahead, despite other requirements for objectivity (e.g. that the consultant be totally 
‘independent’).  
 
3.2.3.4. Focusing on practice before discourse, studying cases and context and emphasising detail  
In phronétic research an emphasis is placed on daily practices, rather than discourse or theory. No 
practice is seen as more valuable than another and each is understood for itself and in relation to 
its context (e.g. historical, social and political). ‘Little things’ are emphasised in descriptions that do 
not marginalise the detail in order to focus on understanding the general trends. Rather, 
importance is given to detail, illustration, background and qualifications, which opposes current 
trends to focus on ‘important problems’ and the ‘big questions’. Knowledge of particular 
circumstances, gained through case studies (experienced or narrated) precedents and concrete 
                                            
25
 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.  
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examples are emphasised. This is not a ‘mindless return to empiricism’ but a way of gaining more 
insight into differences, conflict and power relations and developing ideas that can inform planning 
beyond theory and generalisation.  
 
The focus on case studies and examples does not exclude attempts at generalisations. However, 
history has shown that human action cannot be reduced to rules unconnected to interpretation. 
Such interpretation is influenced by the particular context being considered. Practice therefore 
cannot be derived from theories and first principles. It is always dependent on context-specific 
judgement and situational ethics. This judgement enables “… an infinite number of ‘moves’ to be 
made, adapted to the infinite number of possible situations, which no rule-maker, however complex 
the rule, can foresee” (Flyvbjerg, 2004: 298). In each circumstance the researcher must decide 
what contextual elements are relevant to the problem being addressed.  
 
Environmental assessment processes are not traditional research projects, but are mainly 
orientated towards informing a governmental decision, and therefore focus on real, rather than 
theoretical, proposals, strategies and recommendations for action26. Nevertheless, environmental 
assessment procedures do marginalise detail, as they typically focus on general trends and 
significant issues that are identified through scoping processes. This focus means that an 
environmental assessment would not usually contain detailed descriptions of case studies or 
particular examples. The emphasis in an EIA is on the synthesis and integration of information and 
assessment to inform a decision, rather than on elucidating the particular characteristics of a case 
study. Although there may be more scope within an SEA to include such descriptions, depending 
on the type of SEA that is undertaken, the focus is again on identifying general trends and 
strategies for action.  
 
Although this approach may simplify and focus the assessment in circumstances where financial 
and human resources are limited, complexity theory (which will be discussed in section 3.4) points 
out that it is possible that ‘small’ issues may have significant impacts, the magnitude of which is not 
easy to identify or predict (Cilliers, 2000a). The focus on general trends and what appear to be 
significant issues, as raised in stakeholder engagement processes, also makes it difficult to 
capture tacit knowledge, practices that are not clearly described in documentation, informal 
practices (e.g. informal lines of communication in an organisation or community), or activities which 
                                            
26
  In this respect, environmental assessment is closer to Mode 2 science, which is application-orientated, 
rather than to Mode 1 science, which, among other characteristics, is theoretical or experimental 
(Nowotny et al., 2003). It is, however, debateable whether environmental assessment processes, which 
respond to development applications with the purpose of informing governmental decision-making, are in 
essence scientific research processes and therefore whether this categorization is relevant in this context.  
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are constantly changing according to irregular patterns. These practices, however, are an integral 
part of a social-ecological system. For these reasons, it is important that the environmental 
assessment process does not, by definition, ignore details or only focus on general trends.  
 
3.2.3.5. The inclusion of narratives 
In attempting to understand the practices mentioned above, phronétic researchers focus on the 
question of ‘How?’ as well as ‘Why?’ This enables an understanding of the way in which practices 
are undertaken, as well as the question of why they are done. Narrative analysis provides a way of 
gaining this understanding. Also, narrative analysis can assist in identifying what action is to be 
taken, as it provides an understanding of history (stories of which the action would be a part). 
Narrative inquiries into planning don’t begin from theory, but from an interest in a particular 
phenomenon. Stories then provide descriptions and interpretations of that phenomenon from the 
perspectives of participants, stakeholders and others. Stories also help us to envision alternative 
futures, which is useful to planning.  
 
Narratives have been used in strategic environmental processes in the development of alternative 
scenario’s of possible futures (e.g. the Southern African Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
(SAfMA)) (Scholes and Biggs, 2004). Certain forms of SEA (e.g. DEAT, 2000) also include 
visioning and the identification of alternative future scenarios for the environment.  Here there is 
scope for the inclusion of narratives. However, within the current mode of EIA, the use of narratives 
is constrained by a number of factors including the following:  
▪ Despite the identification of alternative development options in EIA, the process does 
not include the envisioning of alternative future states for the social-ecological 
system. The focus is on minimising negative potential impacts on the environment 
and enhancing the positive ones, rather than on promoting a particular vision of the 
environment, development and the relation between the two.  
▪ The emphasis in EIA is on general trends and what are perceived to be significant 
issues raised by stakeholders and specialists. This means that a specialist, similar to 
the environmental practitioner, is more likely to focus on the synthesis and integration 
of information, rather than on identifying the differences in experiences and 
interpretation, that narratives are particularly effective in illuminating.  
▪ The division of specialist studies into socio-economic or biophysical categories means 
that the specialist is focused on identifying impacts within his/her specialist area. As a 
narrative would usually pertain to a number of issues relevant to the project, the 
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specialist is more likely to use specialist survey and analysis techniques, rather than 
narratives to obtain information. Although each specialist is normally asked by the 
environmental assessment practitioner, to draw linkages to the work of other 
specialists involved in the assessment, and inter-disciplinary workshops are often 
held, the integration task often chiefly falls onto the environmental practitioner once 
the specialist studies are complete. 
▪ Best practice guidelines (e.g. DEAT, 2002c) often call for a combination of techniques 
for information collection (e.g. field surveys and interviews) that could include 
obtaining narratives from individuals in local communities. However, the overall 
environmental assessment report is orientated towards providing the decision-maker 
with an evaluation of the impacts of the proposed development, according to a pre-
determined structure. In South Africa this structure includes an evaluation of the 
nature of the impact, its extent and duration, the probability of it occurring, the degree 
to which it can be reversed, the degree to which it may cause the irreplaceable loss of 
resources and the degree to which it can be mitigated (NEMA, Chapter 3, section 
32(k)). In the process of describing the issues identified in terms of the potential 
impacts of a proposed development, narrative detail is likely to be lost in current, 
standard form EIAs.  
▪ The specialist normally has a limited budget within which to undertake the study, and 
therefore is constrained in terms of the amount of time s/he can spend with the 
community speaking to individuals. This re-enforces the focus on general trends, 
rather than on the details that typically comprise the content of a narrative.  
 
The inclusion of narratives in environmental assessment processes is, however, particularly 
important if these processes are to be accepted as a form of phronésis, as suggested in 
section 3.2.3.1. If environmental assessment is also re-conceptualised as an argument (section 
3.2.3.3), which does not require all information to be reduced to a form of epistémé or presented in 
a standard ‘objective’ format, then the incorporation of such narratives into the process should be 
made easier27.  
 
                                            
27
  Narratives are central to the emerging ISA approach which, as described in Chapter 1, pertains to 
sustainability assessment at the policy-level of decision-making. In the proposed ISA process, described 
by Weaver and Rotmans (2008), the impact of alternative policies on sustainability objectives are 
evaluated in narrative form.  
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3.2.3.6. Moving beyond agency and structure 
The phronétic researcher focuses on both actors and structures and the relationship between 
them. Actors are analysed in relation to the organisations of which they are a part; and 
organisations are analysed in terms of their actors. Understanding is therefore gained both from 
‘within’ and ‘without’.  
 
Environmental assessment processes usually include an investigation of the institutional 
arrangements for the monitoring and/or management of impacts of a proposed development 
(DEAT, 2004b). This is one of the minimum requirements of an EIA in South Africa, in terms of 
NEMA. In addition, best practice in SEA internationally includes an analysis of institutional 
arrangements and the identification of institutional failures that should be addressed (OECD, 
2006). However, emphasis is usually placed on understanding the structures from ‘without’ (e.g. 
what institutions exist, their capacity, structure and functions and whether mechanisms for 
coordination exist). Less attention is generally paid, in much best practice guidance and in 
regulations, to the need to understand those structures from ‘within’ (e.g. the actors, the power 
relations between structures, the relationships between institutions or departments within an 
institution, the effectiveness with which various structures operate, the quality of coordination 
achieved through structures set up for this purpose, the core values of institutions and conflicts 
between these values).   
 
3.2.3.7. Dialoguing with a range of stakeholders 
Phronésis is dialogical in that it includes, and is itself included, in the dialogue between a range of 
stakeholders on a particular issue or within a particular area. No one view (including the work of 
the researchers) claims to be the ultimate and final authority. The aim is to provide input into 
‘ongoing dialogue’ and practice in relation to planning, for example, within a particular context of 
power. The aim is not to generate “... ultimate, unequivocally verified knowledge about the nature 
of planning” (Flyvbjerg, 2004: 301). Phronétic research does not therefore see itself as having a 
privileged position from which the final truth can be determined, but rather a perspective on the 
issue or plan. Objectivity is not research without interest, but rather the use of a variety of 
perspectives and interpretations. 
 
Environmental assessment processes currently include dialogue between numerous stakeholders. 
EIAs are also a part of the political dialogue concerning whether a development or plan should be 
approved or not and under what conditions. However, this political decision-making does not take 
the form of an ‘ongoing’ dialogue, as it is orientated towards a single decision at a particular time. 
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Although appeals can be made against the decision, once the development has been approved 
and has commenced, the decision is rarely reversible.  
 
EIAs in South Africa are rarely considered a ‘perspective’ on a particular development, despite the 
value-laden nature of the process and the principle of sustainable development. Rather, if 
approved, they are seen as an objective description of the potential impacts of that development. If 
environmental assessment is undertaken as a form of phronésis, in which its normative dimension 
is not only acknowledged, but forms the centre of the study, and environmental practitioners 
provide an opinion on whether the development should go ahead or not, as required by the EIA 
regulations (2006a), then their role as a ‘perspective’ in a broader debate is made more explicit. 
This is a role that I believe they have been performing in any event, but without sufficient 
recognition due to the emphasis on trying to achieve objectivity.  
 
3.3 A view from Economics 
 
Amartya Sen, an Indian economist and philosopher, is Lamont University Professor at Harvard 
University. He has published extensively and received the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1988 
(Wikipedia, 2008). Sen is a trustee for Economists for Peace and Security and won the Bharat 
Ratna, India’s highest civilian award, in 1999 (Wikipedia, 2008). 
 
In this section, I have focused the discussion on Sen’s argument concerning the subject/object 
divide within economics and the resultant marginalisation of issues concerning values and ethics in 
this field. I will describe his conception of development that aims to overcome this problem, as well 
as the implications of this argument for the concept of sustainable development internationally and 
in South Africa. This has particular relevance for the field of environmental assessment in this 
country, which currently promotes the mainstream concept of sustainable development as its 
overall purpose.   
 
3.3.1 Description of the problem 
 
Fundamental to Sen’s (1988a) work is his view that there has been a significant distancing 
between economics and ethics that has impoverished both disciplines. He stated in his closing 
address to an International Meeting on Ethics and Development that: “Many people are reluctant to 
‘mix’ ethics with economics, and will refuse to get into ‘ethics and development’ – the theme of the 
conference - in the same way that they would turn down an invitation to drink and drive” (Sen, 
2000: 5). In this section, I will describe Sen’s ethical critique of mainstream economics, with 
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particular reference to his understanding of human behaviour and how people make choices, as 
well as his critique, from an ethical perspective, of alternative development approaches.  
 
Sen (1988a: 7) argues that positive economics has ‘shunned’ normative analysis and ignored a 
variety of ethical questions that affect human behaviour. He makes this argument with reference 
inter alia to the narrow interpretation, within traditional economics, of what motivates people to 
make certain choices. This interpretation is based on the idea that humans behave in a rational 
way. Such rationality is, in turn, characterised very narrowly, as it assumes internal consistency of 
choice and the maximisation of self-interest (Sen, 1988a). This means that rational choices are 
assumed to have a consistency about them that can be explained without reference to factors 
external to that choice and that they are made in a way which maximises the interests and goals of 
the person making the choice. Sen (1988a) argues against these assumptions of modern 
economics on three accounts. 
 
First, he says that there are obvious problems with assuming that people act in a rational way, as 
we all get confused, make mistakes and so on. He puts this graphically when he states that: “The 
world certainly has its share of Hamlets, Macbeths, Lears and Othellos. The coolly rational types 
may fill our textbooks, but the world is richer“ (Sen, 1988a: 11). Secondly, he addresses the criteria 
of internal consistency of choice by arguing, inter alia, that a person who consistently chooses the 
opposite of what would enable him/her to achieve his or her goals cannot be seen as rational. 
Although rationality may require some consistency, this cannot be enough to characterise a 
rational choice. Also, the idea of purely internal consistency is not sound as such consistency can 
only be observed in terms of someone’s interpretation of the choice made and in terms some factor 
(e.g. motivation, value system, goals), both of which are external to that choice (Sen, 1988a). 
Finally, Sen questions why it should be considered rational to pursue one’s own self-interest to the 
exclusion of everything else. He says that “… to argue that anything other than maximising self-
interest must be irrational seems altogether extraordinary” (Sen, 1988a: 15). He goes further to say 
that this ‘self-interested’ view of rationality denies the influence of ethics in decision-making. It 
shows the neglect of the normative dimension, particularly ethics, within mainstream economics 
today.  
 
Sen (1988a; 1999; 2000) argues that Adam Smith’s writings have been misinterpreted to imply that 
self-interested behaviour is all that influences decision-making. He says that this narrow 
interpretation of Smith is based on a single sentence written by the eighteenth century economist, 
which states that: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their 
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humanity but to their self-love …” (Smith, 1776: cited in: Sen, 2000: 2). Sen argues that, although 
Smith said that self-love is required as a motivation for exchange, such exchange depends on the 
negotiation of a contract and the successful implementation of that contract (Sen, 2000). These 
factors in turn depend on behavioural ethics that facilitate fair agreements between parties, ensure 
that promises are kept and that the contracts are respected (Sen, 2000). He acknowledges that it 
is easy to argue that self-interested individuals often have a strong motivation to behave morally to 
meet what he calls the ‘demands of enlightened self-interest’ and what Smith called ‘prudence’. 
However, he points out that this is not, according to Adam Smith all that is needed in terms of 
behavioural ethics within economic exchange. Smith also included virtues such as ‘sympathy’, 
‘generosity’ and ‘public spiritedness’, which go beyond not only narrow self-seeking, but also 
beyond enlightened self-interest (Sen, 2000).  
 
In summary, Sen (1988a; 2000) argues that although rational behaviour includes self-interest 
maximisation, characterising rationality solely in terms of this (as is typically done within 
mainstream economics) excludes, or narrows, the ethical domain within this field, by not 
acknowledging the range of non-self-interested values and goals that we may wish to, and do, 
promote. The importance of this argument is the space it provides within mainstream economics 
for the consideration of values beyond self-interest. This space is critical if the values of 
environmental sustainability and the consideration of the interests of future generations are to be 
considered in the mainstream economic sphere. Sen (1999: 270) summarises this point when he 
says: “If personal advantage is narrowly defined then there is little room for considerations such as 
ethics, justice or the interest of future generations. These will then have little role in our choices 
and actions”.   
 
Sen (1988a) also argues that the distancing of ethics and economics has resulted in a weakening 
of welfare economics. He points out that in classical economics there was no clear distinction 
between welfare economics and other forms of economics; however, as the distance between 
ethics and economics has grown, welfare economics has been marginalised “… into an arbitrarily 
narrow box, separated from the rest of economics“ (Sen, 1988a: 28). Welfare economics, like other 
forms of mainstream economics, is based on the assumption that individuals are motivated by self-
interest, but it also extends to the social sphere and therefore includes the assumption that social 
decisions can be evaluated according to some measure of utility28 (Sen, 1988a). Traditionally the 
desirability of a particular situation or decision was evaluated according to the sum total of 
individual utilities created. Sen (1988a) argues that this is a very narrow analysis, which is 
                                            
28
  The term ‘utility’ can be interpreted in different ways; however, it generally refers to a person’s well-being, 
happiness and/or desire-fulfillment (Sen, 1987; Goodstein, 2008).  
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narrowed further by the exclusion of comparisons of utility between individuals.  He explains that 
such inter-personal comparisons were rejected as they were seen to be ‘ethical’29 and ‘normative’. 
 
The only ethical criteria then for economic decision-making that remained in welfare economics 
was the Pareto Principle, which is sometimes called economic efficiency (Sen, 1988a). This 
principle is defined as follows: “A social state is described as Pareto optimal if and only if no-one’s 
utility can be raised without reducing the utility of someone else” (Sen, 1988a: 31). Sen also 
criticises the narrowness of this principle due, inter alia, to its focus on utility and its neglect of 
distributional issues (for example, a situation where the utility of a wealthy person was raised to the 
detriment of a poor person would still be Pareto optimal). In summary, Sen (1988a) criticises a 
strong focus on utility on the following grounds:  
▪ A person’s success cannot be determined solely based on their own well-being, as 
they may value causes or goals that do not affect them personally.  
Sen argues that human behaviour can be seen not only in terms of an individual’s 
well-being, but also their agency. The latter concept includes a person’s ability to form 
goals, make commitments and follow particular values. If self-interest is the only 
motivation that is recognised, then an individual’s agency has to be seen as geared 
only towards their personal goals. However, if the “… straightjacket of self-motivation” 
is removed, then one can see how agency can be geared towards aims that are not, 
or not entirely, for the benefit of a person’s own well-being (Sen, 1988a: 41). Sen 
uses the example of fighting for the independence of a country. Once this is achieved 
one may be happy, but that happiness is not the only achievement of the fight, or 
even the main one. The main achievement is that of independence, of which personal 
happiness is a part. Sen recognises that the two concepts of agency and well-being 
are not entirely separate and that one can be happier for achieving something for 
others, but argues against the assumption that underpins utilitarianism, that human 
behaviour is exclusively geared towards self-interested goals.  
▪ The interpretation of well-being, as happiness and desire-fulfilment, is inadequate.  
Sen explains that the definition of well-being as utility is particularly problematic when 
making interpersonal comparisons. He uses the example of variations in life 
conditions to illustrate this. A person who has experienced a life of deprivation may be 
                                            
29
  Sen (1988a) comments that he is not sure why inter-personal comparisons were deemed ‘normative’ and 
‘ethical’. He says that although he would find the point hard to defend, it can be argued that such 
comparisons are meaningless. This argument would say that it is nonsense to compare the happiness of 
person A with that of person B. However he (1988a: 31) says: “I guess it is a reflection of the way ethics 
tends to be viewed by economists that statements suspected of being ‘meaningless’ or ‘nonsensical’ are 
promptly taken to be ‘ethical’ ”. 
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able to suppress suffering to a greater degree than those who were raised in more 
affluent conditions. The poorer person may be able to endure adverse circumstances 
for survival, but as Sen (1988a: 45-46) says, “… it would be ethically deeply mistaken 
to attach a correspondingly small value to the loss of their well-being because of this 
survival strategy”. While happiness is certainly an important achievement it is an 
inadequate measure of a person’s well-being. 
▪ The interpretation of well-being in terms of achievement is inadequate. 
The utilitarian concept of well-being focuses on what a person is able to achieve in 
terms of happiness and desire-fulfilment. Sen states, however, that well-being can be 
more comprehensively represented by a person’s freedom, as well as what s/he 
achieves on the basis of that freedom. Freedom should be valued not only for what it 
allows a person to achieve, but also on its own terms (i.e. the intrinsic value of 
freedom should be recognised). Sen argues that the options and alternatives open to 
an individual are as important as what that individual ends up achieving. Having only 
one option available is not the same as having many options, even if the same action 
is taken in both cases. Sen (1988a: 61) applies the concept of freedom to both a 
person’s well-being and agency aspects, thereby identifying four categories of 
relevant information: ‘well-being achievement’; ‘well-being freedom’; ‘agency 
achievement’ and ‘agency freedom’. 
 
In summary, Sen argues that welfare economics has been weakened due to the marginalisation of 
ethical considerations within mainstream economics. This weakening has taken the form of 
confining welfare economics to the narrow box of self-interest and the Pareto principle, which is 
based on the concept of utilities. This concept is limited due to its exclusion of the agency aspect of 
human beings, as well as its definition of well-being in terms of happiness and achievement. 
Defining well-being in this way does not recognise variances in people’s life conditions that affect 
the actual degrees of happiness experienced. In addition, through focusing on the happiness 
achieved, it does not acknowledge the intrinsic value of a person’s freedom, or ability, to achieve 
such happiness, irrespective of whether s/he does so or not. 
 
Sen (1988a) then expands the ethical information-base required concerning human behaviour and 
motivation in the economic sphere, from a limited one focused on self-interest, to a broader one 
that includes a person’s agency function. This includes, but is not limited to, goals that are not of 
direct personal benefit. He expands the concept of human well-being in a way that recognises the 
intrinsic worth of an individual’s freedom to choose. These ideas are central to the development 
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ethics that Sen proposes, which is particularly relevant to this discussion, as it has profound 
implications for the concept of sustainable development and consequently for the sphere of 
environmental assessment. 
 
Before discussing this ethics, however, I will provide an overview of Sen and Nussbaum’s30  
critique of various existing development approaches.  Sen begins by explaining his view of the 
concept of development as value-laden, in that it represents our idea of what counts as good social 
change (Crocker, 1991). Measures such as growth in gross national product (GNP) or increases in 
personal incomes, he sees as important, but limited. Such measures are, in Sen’s view, a means 
for human well-being or quality of life, rather than ends in themselves (Crocker, 1991; Sen, 1999). 
Sen and Nussbaum’s description and critique of these and other development approaches, as 
discussed by Crocker (1991) are summarised in Table 3.2. In this table, the terms ‘functionings’ 
and ‘capabilities’ are used in the critique of different development theories. These terms are 
explained in the next section 
. 
                                            
30
  In the late 1980s Sen developed a dialogue with Martha Nussbaum and undertook work with her which 
was affiliated to the World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), a branch of the 
United Nations University (Crocker, 1991). Nussbaum is a classics scholar and Artistotelian ethicist.  
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Table 3.2:   Sen’s Critique of Alternative Development Approaches   
 
Commodity Approach Welfarist (Utilitarian) Approach Basic Needs Approach (BNA) 
 
Description 
Crude Commodity Approach 
Certain goods are identified as 
intrinsically good or ethically basic. 
Measures of development include GNP, 
per capita income, and economic growth 
(in goods and services).  
Rawls’ Liberalism 
This approach includes a list of social 
primary goods that Rawls’ believes 
rational individuals want, irrespective of 
their particular goals. This list, which is 
central to his theory of ‘justness as 
fairness’ and is based on his concept of 
socially cooperating moral people in a 
democracy, includes, for example: rights 
and liberties, freedom of movement, 
income, and self-respect. This list 
assists in determining what an 
individual’s legitimate claims are and 
allows for inter-personal comparisons of 
wealth.  
 
 
 
Utilitarianism has three central concepts:  
Consequentialism: the ‘rightness’ of 
actions (including, for example, rules, acts 
and policies) should be judged entirely by 
the resulting state of affairs.  
Welfarism: the ‘goodness’ of various 
states of affairs should be judged solely 
by the set of individual utilities in each 
state of affairs.  
Sum-ranking: the ‘goodness’ of a set of 
individual utilities must be judged by their 
sum total.  
 
Social and economic development is 
interpreted in terms of increasing human 
well-being, which is dependant on 
meeting certain basic needs.  Streeten 
et al. (1981) said that the objective of 
development is to provide opportunities 
for the full physical, mental and social 
development of human beings.  
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Commodity Approach Welfarist (Utilitarian) Approach Basic Needs Approach (BNA) 
 
Advantages 
Based on the correct assumption that 
development does not occur without 
material goods and services.  
The measure used of access to 
commodities, can be a proxy for, or 
evidence of, the existence of human 
functionings.  
 
Rawls’ approach does not make 
commodities an end in themselves, but 
recognises them as an indispensable 
means for realizing democratic ideals. 
He moves beyond a commodity-centred 
approach and begins to focus on people.  
Welfarism goes further than the 
commodities approach in that it interprets 
well-being and development not only in 
terms of the accumulation of goods, but 
as a feature of humans themselves (i.e. 
changes in their mental states towards 
happiness and/or desire-fulfilment).  
Goes beyond a focus on goods and 
services, as well as beyond the welfarist 
focus on utilities (i.e. happiness and 
desire-fulfilment).  
It draws attention to the type of life that a 
person is able to achieve. 
Points of critique 
This approach confuses ends with 
means. Goods and services are valued 
in themselves (intrinsically), rather than 
for what they assist human beings in 
achieving. The focus should be on the 
life we lead and not on increasing 
commodities.  
The focus on goods rather than people 
misses the differences in what people 
are able to achieve with the same 
Rawls’ approach would be a good way 
of making inter-personal comparisons if 
people were quite similar. However, due 
to our many differences in, for example, 
gender, age and natural abilities, we 
each do not have the same ability to 
build freedom into our lives. Therefore 
even if equality exists between people in 
holding the primary social goods that 
Rawls lists, inequality can exist in the 
actual freedoms enjoyed in reality. 
Welfarism judges actions and makes 
comparisons based exclusively on the 
resultant mental states of humans (e.g. 
happiness and desire fulfilment) and 
ignores the ‘agency aspect’ of a person. 
Humans are not only beings that 
experience things, but also doers and 
evaluators. Both the agency and well-
being dimensions of a person need to be 
considered.  
The BNA lacks an adequate theoretical 
foundation, as it fails to clearly define 
what is meant by ‘needs’. A clear 
justification of needs as more than 
commodities, utilities or rights is not 
provided.  
The BNA sometimes reverts to the 
commodity approach. Basic needs are 
often defined, in reality, in terms of 
certain goods (e.g. food, hospital beds). 
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Commodity Approach Welfarist (Utilitarian) Approach Basic Needs Approach (BNA) 
 
bundle of goods. Due to variations in life 
conditions, the same commodity may not 
increase one person’s well-being to the 
same extent as another’s. For example, 
a disabled person may not be able to 
achieve the same functioning as an 
able-bodied person, despite having the 
same bundle of goods. 
Hunger for goods can lead people to 
being excessively competitive and 
arrogant; and to a “… mercenary attitude 
towards other good things” (Nussbaum, 
1990: cited in: Crocker, 1991: 113).  
More is not always better.  
Inequalities can be identified and 
addressed, if we don’t focus on a list of 
goods, but rather what influences, both 
positively and negatively, an equal 
conversion between people of goods 
into capabilities.  
 
Welfarism defines the well-being of a 
person in terms of the concept of utility, 
which is usually defined as happiness or 
desire fulfilment. This definition of human 
well-being is too narrow. Although being 
happy is very important, it is inadequate 
as a sole criteria for well-being. One 
reason is that it does not take into 
account inter-personal variations in life 
conditions. For example, a person may be 
able to adapt to a life of deprivation 
through survival mechanisms that they 
have, but it is not ethical to put a small 
value on any loss of their well-being as a 
result.  
“The human need for food as tended to 
be replaced by the food needed” 
(Crocker, 1991: 124). 
The BNA emphasises the minimum 
(basic needs) which makes it relevant 
mostly to low income communities and 
poorer countries. The focus should not 
only be on the number of poor people, 
but also on the inequalities between 
people and nations.  
Meeting needs is a relatively passive 
concept, which is appropriate to 
development aid to dependents (e.g. 
children, the ill and disabled), but less so 
to able, motivated and responsible 
adults. 
(summarised from Crocker, 1991) 
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3.3.2 Sen’s Development Ethics 
 
In Sen’s view international and national development should focus on promoting and enhancing 
valuable human functionings and capabilities (Sen, 1988b; Crocker, 1991). The concepts of 
functionings and capabilities and the freedom and justice aspects of Sen’s development ethics are 
explained in the sections that follow.   
 
3.3.2.1. Functionings and capabilities 
Sen’s development ethic is based on the two core concepts of functionings and capabilities (Sen, 
1988b; Crocker, 1991). He argues that a developed society enables people to be, live and act in 
certain ways that are considered valuable (Crocker, 1991). These ways of being and doing he calls 
‘functionings’, which can range from being adequately nourished and free from disease, to being 
able to participate in the community and having self-respect (Crocker, 1991; Sen, 1999). What a 
person is currently being and doing are his/her functionings, whereas what s/he is capable of being 
and doing (or is free to be and do) Sen calls his/her capabilities (Sen, 1984). Sen (1984: 317) 
summarises this when he states that: “Functionings are … personal features; they tell us what a 
person is doing. Capability to function reflects what a person can do”. Capabilities tell us something 
about the person in relation to a good (Sen, 1984). For example, having some rice provides me 
with certain nutritional requirements and therefore the capability to function in a particular way. The 
utilitarian approach, however, would be to focus on the fact that the rice (a good) creates utility 
(happiness or desire fulfilment) through its consumption, leaving out the important fact that it also 
provides a person with the capability of meeting their nutritional requirements (Sen, 1984).  
 
Crocker (1991) points out that the concepts of functionings and capabilities provide Sen with the 
ability to evaluate human well-being based on the “… straightforward fact that how well a person is 
must be a matter of what kind of life he or she is living – what the person is succeeding in being 
and doing” (Sen, 1985: cited in: Crocker, 1991: 130). This goes beyond the commodity approach’s 
focus on the accumulation of goods, or welfarism’s evaluation of merely the mental states of 
happiness and desire fulfilment. Crocker (1991: 130) also points out that the notion of functionings 
allows Sen to incorporate the concepts of ‘well-being achievement’ and ‘agency achievement’. 
Well-being achievements relate to accomplishing ones own personal goals, while agency 
achievements relate to the functioning of ‘choosing’, which could involve choosing to promote 
one’s own concerns, but could also include choosing to promote the goals and values of others 
(Crocker, 1991). Robeyns (2005), in explaining the difference between Sen’s well-being and 
agency concepts, says that if well-being includes actions which are not beneficial to the agent 
herself then the focus is on overall agency.  
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From Sen’s (1999: 87) perspective, poverty is therefore seen, as “… the deprivation of basic 
capabilities rather than merely as lowness of incomes, which is the standard criterion of poverty”. 
Development should therefore focus, in his view, on expanding valuable functionings and 
capabilities and not solely on increasing income levels (Crocker, 1991; Sen, 1999). Sen (1999) 
does not underestimate the problem of insufficient income as he acknowledges that it can be the 
principle factor in capability deprivation. However, he argues that his approach focuses on aspects 
that are intrinsically important to the human being, while income is instrumentally important (i.e. a 
means of achieving a good life). In addition, there are factors that influence capability deprivation 
other than low income, such as poor nutrition. Finally, Sen (1999) argues that the impact of a low 
income has a variable impact on different families and groups and it is therefore better to focus on 
the actual functionings and capabilities that they achieve.   
 
Sen (1988b) uses the example of Kerala in India to illustrate how real income and opulence may 
differ substantially from levels of functionings and capabilities. In statistical ratings, Kerala always 
features as one of the poorest states in India in terms of GNP per head. However, Sen points out 
that in terms of other important factors such as longevity and education, Kerala does better than 
any other Indian state. Evaluating Kerala in terms of functionings and capabilities would place it 
closer to the high end, than the low end of the scale (Sen, 1988b).  
 
3.3.2.2. Capabilities as positive freedom 
Sen (1999: 86) views his capabilities approach as a ‘freedom-based perspective’ as capabilities 
are the freedom an individual has to achieve alternative functionings, or to live the life that s/he has 
reason to value. Freedom, Sen argues, always adds intrinsic value to the actual functionings 
chosen, as it is better to have chosen a way of life than to have been forced into it (Sen, 1988b; 
Crocker, 1991). As an example, Sen (1999) contrasts an affluent person that is fasting with a 
destitute person that has no choice but to starve. The affluent person may achieve the same level 
of functioning in terms of nourishment as the destitute one, but the former has different capabilities 
to the latter and s/he has the freedom to choose to increase his/her level of nourishment in a way 
that the destitute person does not. 
 
Sen also distinguishes between positive and negative freedoms. Negative freedoms he defines as 
the absence of restraints imposed by others (e.g. governmental organisations) on an individual’s 
freedom (Sen, 1998b; Crocker, 1991). He argues, however, that this is a limited view as you can 
be free from external interference (negative freedom) and still be ‘unfree’ to live the life you choose 
due to the absence of valuable options (Crocker, 1991). He therefore introduces the concept of 
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positive freedom, which is the ability to live the life that one values (Crocker, 1991), not only 
because of the absence of restraints imposed by others, but also because of the existence of 
valuable options.  Sen goes further to distinguish between the concepts of well-being and agency 
within the notion of freedom (Crocker, 1991).  The first involves the opportunity to choose and 
achieve one’s own personal well-being, while the second is the freedom to choose options other 
than those that serve one’s own purposes (Crocker, 1991).  
 
Sen therefore elevates the notion of freedom from one that has merely instrumental value (i.e. as a 
means of achieving a good life) to one that has intrinsic value and is itself part of a good life 
(Crocker, 1991). Development is therefore defined as a “… process of expanding the real 
freedoms that people enjoy“ (Sen, 1999: 3).  Crocker (1991) explains that it isn’t the purpose of this 
approach to impose certain functionings on people. Rather, the aim is to enable them to cross 
certain thresholds (e.g. educational or resource thresholds) which allow them to make the choices 
that they value (Crocker, 1991).  
 
The question of what type of capabilities should be promoted through development then becomes 
critical. Nussbaum31 has formulated a list of basic human functional capabilities on which Crocker 
(1991) has mapped Sen’s scattered examples, as Sen has not developed such a list himself. In 
Box 3.1, I have summarised the list Crocker presented. He uses the letter ‘N’ to stand for 
Nussbaum and ‘S’ for Sen.  
 
                                            
31
  Nussbaum perceives capabilities slightly differently from Sen (Crocker, 1991). I have excluded an 
explanation of these differences, which are explained in Crocker (1991), as my intention is merely to 
provide examples of capabilities, the details of which I believe would require broad discussion in context, 
even beyond the dialogue between Nussbaum and Sen.  
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Box 3.1:  Basic Human Functional Capabilities as Identified by 
Nussbaum and Sen  
 
 
Being able to: 
 Live, as far as possible, to the end of a complete human life (N and S); 
 Have good health, adequate nourishment, shelter, opportunities for sexual satisfaction 
and the ability to move about from one place to another (N and S); 
 Avoid unnecessary and useless pain and to have pleasurable experiences (N and S);  
 Use the five senses, to imagine, think and reason (N and S); 
 Form attachments to things and people outside of ourselves and generally to feel love, 
grief, longing and gratitude  (N); 
 Form a conception of the good, choose the basic elements of ones own personal; 
existence and critically reflect on the planning of one’s own life; including the ability to form 
ones own values, goals and commitments (N and S); 
 Live, and show concern, for others; as well as being able to engage in various forms of 
social interaction (including being able to visit and entertain friends) and  to participate in 
the life of the community (N and S); 
 Have concern for nature and live in relation to it (N); 
 Laugh and enjoy recreational activities (N); 
 Live one’s own life in one’s own environment and context  (N); 
 Have self-respect and appear in public without shame (S); and 
 Live a fully human life and achieve valuable functionings, within the limits of natural 
possibilities (N and S). 
(adapted from Crocker, 1991) 
 
3.3.2.3. Rights and Justice 
Based on his concept of functionings and capabilities, Sen has formulated the beginnings of a 
theory of moral rights, which I will briefly describe in this section based on Crocker’s (1991) 
explanation. 
 
Sen describes moral rights in relation to basic functionings (e.g. the right not to be hungry) and 
capabilities or freedoms (e.g. having the means not to be hungry) (Crocker, 1991). He argues not 
only for negative rights that focus on a person’s right not to be interfered with, but also positive 
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rights (e.g. to adequate nourishment and shelter). In deciding whether human actions are right or 
wrong, Sen says that we must consider the state of affairs which results from those actions (i.e. the 
consequences) and that state of affairs should include the fulfilment and violation of rights 
(Crocker, 1991). 
 
Sen argues that what should be fairly distributed in development are basic functionings and 
capabilities (Crocker, 1991). The aim of government policy and planning should therefore be to 
fairly distribute amongst all citizens, the conditions (e.g. opportunities, as well as financial, 
educational and institutional support) in which individuals can choose a good human life. Such a 
life should not only allow them to function minimally, but to function well. This goes further than the 
equal allocation of goods and services, to enabling people to achieve certain basic capabilities 
(freedoms and choices) which allow them to function in particular ways. Sen argues further that for 
a development agency or government to be just it should focus on helping as many people as 
possible to make such choices, rather than merely further enhancing the conditions of the elite 
(Crocker, 1991). 
 
In terms of this theory of moral rights, stakeholder participation in the processes public planning 
and decision-making (e.g. EIA), on the basis of one’s own conception of the good, becomes 
critically important. Exclusion from these processes would, therefore, be unfair and unjust. 
However, Sen goes further to extend this argument to the importance of not excluding people from 
participating in the broader, ongoing social debate about society’s goals and how they should be 
achieved.  
 
3.3.3 Implications for environmental assessment  
 
In this section I will examine, in the light of Sen’s views, the development ethics that underlies the 
practice of environmental assessment in South Africa. A key objective of environmental 
assessment is the promotion of sustainable development (Sadler, 1996; Glasson et al., 2005) and 
therefore it is this concept that will be evaluated in this section. Although there are varied 
interpretations of sustainable development, it is the mainstream international definition, as 
presented in the World Commission on Environment and Development’s (WCED) Report (1987), 
entitled Our Common Future, which seems to most consistently influence South Africa’s 
governmental policy-making and planning.   
 
I will begin this discussion with an evaluation of the international concept of sustainable 
development in the light of Sen’s critique and development ethics. In this evaluation I will draw on 
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Max-Neef’s (1991) definition of needs, to provide an example of how human functionings and 
capabilities can be defined in more detail. Thereafter, I will analyse the South African concept of 
sustainable development presented in NEMA, as this is the framework legislation for environmental 
assessment in South Africa.  
 
3.3.3.1. Sustainable development in the mainstream international arena 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the report, Our Common Future, defines sustainable development as 
“… development that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987: 24).  This is clearly a Basic Needs 
Approach (BNA) and therefore displays both the positive and negative attributes that Sen argues 
are characteristic of the BNA (Table 3.1).  
 
On the positive side, it goes beyond a development approach that values goods and services in 
themselves, by drawing attention to the role these goods and services perform in meeting human 
needs. For example, the Guide to Our Common Future (Lebel and Kane, 1997: 3) states that: 
“Sustainable development is best understood as a process of change in which the use of 
resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and 
institutional change all enhance the potential to meet human needs both today and tomorrow”. In 
this statement, development is rightly viewed as the means to achieve the goal of meeting human 
needs, rather than an end in itself.   
 
On the negative side, however, human needs are not clearly defined in Our Common Future (Reid, 
1995). In his examination of the report, Reid (1995: 57) concludes that it “… fails to consider the 
nature of human need or its implications for development, despite its assertion of their importance 
…”. Where some reference is made to essential human needs, these are described mainly in 
terms of goods and services such as food, energy, livelihoods, housing, water supply, sanitation 
and health care, and not in terms of human functionings and capabilities, despite general 
references to the need to enhance the quality of life (WCED, 1987). This supports Sen’s argument 
that the BNA lacks an adequate theoretical foundation that substantiates its view of needs as being 
more than commodities, utilities and rights (i.e. more than a commodity or welfarist approach). It is 
also consistent with his argument that although the BNA approach shifts attention within the 
development debate from the production of goods and services to meeting human needs, this 
debate often reverts to a focus on commodities. As described in Table 3.2, a key problem with this 
is that it ignores the variabilities in life circumstances which enable people to convert, for example, 
increases in incomes and commodities to opportunities that improve their quality of life (Crocker, 
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1991). Consequently, the fact that sustainability has to be pursued differently in different societies 
and within different circumstances is not acknowledged.  
 
‘Reviving growth’ is identified in Our Common Future as a fundamental means of meeting human 
needs and reducing poverty and is the first critical objective for future environmental and 
developmental policies listed (WCED, 1987: 55). In Lebel and Kane’s (1987: 2) guide to the Our 
Common Future, it is emphasised that: “The problems of poverty and underdevelopment cannot be 
solved unless we have a new era of growth in which developing countries play a stronger role and 
reap greater benefits”. However, the concept of ‘growth’ and how it is to be achieved is not 
articulated in sufficient depth in the report (Reid, 1995).  My impression, supported by Reid (1995), 
is that for the most part, it is conventional economic growth that is being referred to. In speaking 
about growth, aims such as “… increasing productive potential…” and achieving “… a rise in per 
capita incomes …” are mentioned (WCED, 1987: 55 and 60). The main deviations from 
conventional economic growth include its reorientation towards meeting human needs, its 
restriction within ecological limits and the inclusion of equity concerns between and within 
generations (Lebel and Kane, 1987; Reid, 1995). 
 
As human needs are mostly defined in terms of goods and services, and economic growth is 
primarily equated with increasing incomes (albeit in an equitable manner), Our Common Future 
does not offer a fundamentally alternative conception of development that significantly improves 
the synthesis of environmental and economic goals, and therefore the achievement of 
sustainability (Reid, 1995). Reid (1995: 64-65) states that “… the comprehensiveness and detail of 
Our Common Future is overshadowed by the inadequacy of its treatment of human need and its 
bias towards economic growth”.  
 
Sen’s argument for development that goes beyond increases in GNP and per capita income 
provides a better chance than the BNA approach, for the integration between social, economic and 
biophysical concerns needed for sustainable development. This is because, as argued by Max-
Neef (1991)32 who developed a similar economic approach to Sen, it places goods in the service of 
human life, rather than life in the service of goods, the accumulation of which is often seen as an 
end in itself. In other words, as Max-Neef (1991) states, development becomes more about people 
than objects. This results in a shift in focus from purely economic indicators (e.g. levels of income), 
                                            
32
  Max-Neef is a Chilean economist who has an international reputation for his work on development 
alternatives (Right Livelihood Award Foundation, 2006). He worked for many years among the poor in 
South America and has articulated the ways in which conventional modes of development have led to 
poverty and ecological desctruction in the developing world (Rainforest Information Centre, 
http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/background/maxneef.htm, accessed 09/11/09).  
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to the consideration of quality of life issues, for example, the ability of individuals to fulfil particular 
functionings such as creativity (Max-Neef, 1991; Sen, 1999). This provides a better integration of 
social and economic concerns in development and also considers the human being in his/her 
entirety, addressing physical as well as spiritual and emotional needs (Max-Neef, 1991). 
 
When needs are viewed in terms of goods and services, such needs are typically thought of as 
infinite, as they change from one culture to another and between historical periods (Max-Neef, 
1991). However, if needs are conceived in terms of the functionings of human beings (Sen,1984) it 
is possible to define them in a finite way (Max-Neef, 1991) and to fulfil them through multiple 
means, not only resource-dependent ones. Although Max-Neef (1991: 27) does not use Sen’s 
terminology, he lists what he calls ‘fundamental human needs’ that arguably fall into Sen’s 
categories of functionings and capabilities. These include the need for subsistence, protection, 
affection, understanding, participation, idleness, creation, identity and freedom (Max-Neef, 1991). 
These needs are then fulfilled through ‘satisfiers’, which are ways of being, having, doing and 
interacting (Max-Neef, 1991). More specifically, satisfiers relate to forms of organisation, social 
practices, modes of behaviour and political structures. They may also include physical goods such 
as food and shelter, but are not limited to these. The need for protection, for example, may be 
fulfilled in numerous ways, including through the provision of parental care, insurance systems and 
shelter (Max-Neef, 1991). Max-Neef (1991: 25) states that: “This situation compels us to rethink 
the social context of human needs in a radically different way from the manner in which it has been 
approached by social planners and designers of policies for development. It is not only a question 
of having to relate needs to goods and services, but also to relate them to social practices, forms of 
organisation, political models and values. All of these have an impact on the ways in which needs 
are expressed”33.  
 
This approach, which Max-Neef (1991: 16) calls ‘human scale development’, therefore not only 
provides a better integration of the social and economic aspects of development, but places less 
strain on our resource-base. It does this by re-orientating the economic system from one which 
focuses on the production of goods and services as ends in themselves, to one that focuses on 
promoting the functionings of individuals and communities. These functionings can be promoted by 
a wide range of satisfiers that are not necessarily resource intensive.  
                                            
33
 It is important to note that Sen and Max-Neef do not deny that meeting people’s basic material 
requirements is a priority, particularly in the context of the developing world. However, they emphasise 
material goods and services as one of the means to achieve fundamental human needs, which they 
define in more intangible terms, such as the need for protection, affection, subsistence, creativity and 
identity (Max-Neef, 1991; Crocker, 1991).  
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3.3.3.2. Sustainable development in the South African National Environmental Management Act 
(NEMA) (No. 107 of 1998) 
The concept of sustainable development contained in NEMA is based on the WCED (1987) 
definition and follows the BNA approach adopted internationally. NEMA draws attention to the 
importance of meeting people’s basic needs stating, for example, in the preamble to the Act that 
“… the State must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the social, economic and environmental 
rights of everyone and strive to meet the basic needs of previously disadvantaged communities”.  
NEMA goes further to state that environmental management must place people and their needs at 
the centre of concern (Chapter 1, section 2(2)).  However, despite a reference to needs in 
Chapter 1 (section 2(2)) that extends beyond the material, to include psychological, social, 
developmental and cultural aspects, no further detail is provided on what is meant by the concept 
of ‘needs’. This omission leaves the implementation of NEMA open to an interpretation of basic 
needs that, as Sen argues, reverts back to a narrow focus on commodities, paying inadequate 
attention to the actual human functionings and capabilities that people should be enabled to 
achieve (Crocker, 1991).  
 
It is not only the concept of ‘needs’ that is vaguely defined in NEMA, but also the term 
‘development’. NEMA states that “… ‘sustainable development’ means the integration of social, 
economic and environmental factors into planning, implementation and decision-making so as to 
ensure that development serves present and future generations” (principle xxix, definitions: 10). 
This does not make the concept of development much clearer as, much like the WCED (1987) 
description, it is broad, open to various interpretations and does not specifically state what is to be 
sustained and what is to be developed (it seems that these answers are assumed). It is therefore 
arguable that NEMA, consistent with international approaches, is based on a conventional 
understanding of economic development, with the additional requirement that its environmental 
limitations be respected.  
 
The aspects listed in Chapter 1 (section 4(a)) of NEMA as issues of concern for sustainable 
development relate mostly to the avoidance of environmental degradation (e.g. avoiding 
ecosystem loss, pollution and the disturbance of landscapes) within the process of seemingly 
conventional development. It is only the last factor on the list that touches on the functioning of 
people themselves, as it calls for consideration of the negative impacts of development on people’s 
environmental rights.  Although this last point begins to include the fundamental needs of people, it 
is limited in its focus on rights (excluding other functionings and capabilities) and in particular, in its 
concentration on ‘negative’ rights (Crocker 1991) (i.e. the right not to be interfered with).  
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The absence of a clear definition of development and the limited attention paid to people’s needs 
within NEMA, is perhaps the result of the modernist divide between people and the natural 
environment, which is reflected in the powers and functions of sectorally-divided government 
departments. As NEMA is an ‘environmental’ Act, in a context in which the environment is defined 
in a way that emphasises its natural aspects, it is arguable that re-defining development in this Act, 
would venture into realms that extend beyond its ambit. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, such 
sectoral divisions are a key constraint to effective environmental assessment and are identified in 
Our Common Future as one of the ‘roots’ of environmental problems in general. As stated in the 
WCED (1987: 71) report: “Sustainable development requires that such fragmentation be 
overcome”.   
 
If environmental assessment is to promote its overall goal, which is sustainable development, such 
development needs to be conceived in a way that goes beyond promoting conventional economic 
development while attempting to limit its environmental impact. Sen describes such an alternative 
conception of development that extends the BNA approach to an interpretation that includes 
human functionings and capabilities. Testing such ideas within environmental assessment and 
other domains, is of critical importance, because, as Reid (1995: 141) states: “The construct of 
development that has prevailed for the best part of 50 years has represented, and continues to 
represent, a serious obstacle to sustainable development”.  
 
3.4 A view from Complexity Theory 
 
In this section I will focus on the work of Paul Cilliers, who is Professor of Philosophy at 
Stellenbosch University. He lectures mainly in cultural philosophy, deconstruction and the ethics 
and philosophy of science. After working as a research engineer, he completed a D.Phil in 
complexity theory in 1994 (Sustainability Institute, 2008). He published the internationally 
renowned book entitled Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding Complex Systems 
(Routledge, 1998) and won the Rector’s Award for Excellence in Research in 2000 (Cilliers, 
2008b). Cilliers was also awarded the Harry Oppenheimer Memorial Fellowship for 2006. 
 
Underlying much of Cilliers’ work is the problem of knowledge, what it is and the extent to which it 
is limited due to the fact that the world is complex. In the section below, I will present Cilliers’ 
argument that traditional reductionist science is inadequate for dealing with complexity, as well as 
his description of the characteristics of complexity and its implications for knowledge generation. I 
will then relate Cilliers’ work to the field of environmental assessment.  
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3.4.1 Description of the problem 
 
The world in which we live is becoming increasingly complex as communications improve and 
technology facilitates connectedness and trade on a global scale. As a result, changes in particular 
social-ecological systems often have effects that reverberate through a multitude of other systems 
at various scales and locations (Heylighen et al., 2007)34. Heylighen et al. (2007) argue that 
complexity is perhaps the most essential characteristic of today’s society. However, they state that 
the traditional scientific method of isolation, analysis and gathering of information, is incapable of 
dealing with such interconnectedness. The emerging science of complexity provides us with an 
alternative to this traditional scientific approach, as it has greater potential to deal with the 
interdependencies that typify modern society (Heylighen et al., 2007).  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, several scientific developments have challenged the Newtonian 
worldview since the beginning of the 20th Century. Heylighen et al. (2007) state that these ideas 
from systems theory, cybernetics, postmodern social science and the life sciences, are starting to 
become integrated within the emerging field of ‘complexity science’.  Cilliers (2008c) cautions, 
however, that although the limitations of Newtonian science are acknowledged in this field, work 
done under the heading of ‘complexity science’ often reverts to traditional reductive approaches. 
Cilliers (2005a: 254) points out that we no longer need to fight against ‘crude positivism’, 
nevertheless there appears to be a resistance against positions, such as postmodernism, that 
emphasise the interpretive nature of knowledge. Cilliers (2005a: 256) acknowledges that many of 
these postmodern positions are “… so open and vague that they really do not contribute to our 
knowledge of the world”, and are often too “… relativistic to produce any real understanding” 
(Cillliers, 2008a: 39). However, he states that since we live in a complex world, we need to 
acknowledge the limitations of our knowledge, and some of these positions help us to do that. For 
this reason, he argues that they “… should not be relegated to the junkyard of history” (Cilliers, 
2005a: 256).  
 
Heylighen et al. (2007) highlight the shortcomings of the modern, Newtonian worldview in dealing 
with complexity from both an ontological and epistemological perspective.  These authors explain 
that ontologically, all phenomena (including social and mental phenomena) are reduced to 
independent material particles in motion, the nature of which is controlled by the deterministic laws 
                                            
34
  One of the key references I have used is a chapter which Cilliers wrote with Francois Heylighen and 
Carlos Gershenson in a book entitled Complexity, Science and Society (Radcliffe Publishing, 2007) which 
was edited by Bogg and Geyer. Although Cilliers was not the first author, please note that reference to 
Heylighen et al., includes Cilliers’ work.   
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of cause and effect. Other basic categories of being, such as mind or purpose, are not 
acknowledged in themselves, but seen as epiphenomena that result from particular arrangements 
of particles in absolute time and space.  This means that differences between such phenomena 
are solely attributed to variations in the arrangements of matter (Heylighen et al., 2007).  
 
From an epistemological point of view, Heylighen et al. (2007) point out that our knowledge is seen 
as a reflection of the arrangements of matter outside us. Therefore, the purpose of science is to 
observe these material arrangements and map them as accurately as possible. It is assumed that, 
ultimately, this will lead to a complete, objective representation of external matter, which enables 
us to predict all phenomena in time and space. The process of mapping involves a continual 
reduction of the complexity of a system, through taking it apart, until it is reduced to its smallest 
parts (i.e. atoms or elementary particles). It is assumed that if the initial position and velocity of the 
particles of a system are known, as well as the forces affecting them, then it is possible to predict 
their future positions and velocities with certainty. Heylighen et al. (2007) explain that if phenomena 
appear complex, then it is assumed that such complexity can be removed through further analysis, 
until the simplest components are studied and their current and future state becomes predictable. 
 
Heylighen et al., 2007 also point out that the Newtonian idea of objective, observer-independent 
knowledge and the assumption of predictability become problematic when extended to human 
beings. They explain that human agents cannot freely act upon systems without contradicting the 
physical laws of cause and effect. A conflict therefore arises between free-will and scientific 
determinism. Descartes avoided this problem by assuming the independent category of mind 
which does not obey the mechanical laws that govern material objects. The Newtonian worldview, 
which reduces all phenomena to mechanical objects, therefore cannot accommodate purposeful 
action and consequently does not address issues related to values and ethics (Heylighen et al., 
2007).  
 
The laws of mechanics were assumed, not only to apply to physics, but to all other disciplines as 
well (Heylighen et al., 2007). Heylighen et al. (2007) explain that although such widespread 
application did not occur in practice, a general mechanistic, Newtonian worldview was often 
adopted in many other disciplines, including economics, psychology and biology. The result is that 
many social scientists attempted to describe human behaviour without contradicting most of the 
Newtonian principles (Heylighen et al., 2007).  Economists, for example, as shown in Sen’s 
(1988a) description of positive economics (section 3.3) and Heylighen et al.’s (2007) discussion, 
often reduce the sometimes inexplicable preferences of the human mind to predictable and 
deterministic choices through the introduction of the concept of utility. As discussed in section 3.3, 
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utility is defined as the well-being, ‘happiness’, ‘goodness’ or ‘desire-fulfilment’ produced by a state 
of affairs (Sen, 1988a; Heylighen et al., 2007; Goodstein, 2008). It is assumed that perfect 
knowledge of the utility of various options is possible and that individuals will always choose the 
option that maximises their utility. This enables a view of human economic choice that is as 
deterministic and predictable as the movement of material particles.  
 
One of the main reasons why other disciplines attempt to follow the modern scientific method is 
that, as Cilliers (2008c: 2) states: “We still live in a world where scientific knowledge, to a large 
extent, trumps all other forms of knowledge”. This is perhaps the result of the simplicity and 
coherence of the Newtonian worldview, but also because of the success of this worldview in its 
initial area of application to mechanical systems (Heylighen et al., 2007). However, Cilliers (2008c) 
explains that, when applied in a simplistic way to the social sciences, Newtonian logic (which is 
already problematic in the natural sciences) gives the impression that social problems can be 
addressed through reduction into their perceived components, experimentation and objective 
observation. This approach is inadequate when dealing with complex problems, as these change 
as we are studying them, and because we live in an interconnected world in which the whole, the 
parts and the relationships between these, need to be understood (Cilliers, 2008c).  A positivist 
view, which promotes Newtonian science as the highest or only form of knowledge, is therefore 
wholly inadequate for understanding the complex world in which we live and for addressing its 
problems.  
 
Cilliers has described the many implications of complexity for knowledge generation. In the 
sections below, I have summarised his description according to the following three categories:  
beyond objectivism, beyond universal determinism and beyond positivism. I have used the term 
‘beyond’ to emphasise that a regression to an undifferentiated pre-scientific era is certainly not 
what Cilliers is proposing, but rather a step forward where we acknowledge the limitations of our 
current understanding and move beyond such limitations. Before I describe this move forward, 
however, I will address the question, from Cilliers’ perspective, of what complexity actually is.   
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3.4.2 The Implications of Complexity Theory for Knowledge Generation 
 
Cilliers does not provide a definition for complexity, but rather presents a list of its characteristics, 
which he formulated in collaboration with Fred Boogerd and Frank Bruggemans at the department 
of Molecular Cell Physiology at the Free University, Amsterdam. This list is shown in Box 3.2 
below. The implications of these characteristics, in interaction with one another, for knowledge 
generation are discussed in the section that follows, while the meaning and importance of this 
complexity perspective for environmental assessment will be discussed in section 3.4.3.  
 
Box 3.2:  Characteristics of Complexity  
 
1. Complex systems are open systems; 
2. They operate under conditions not of equilibrium; 
3. Complex systems consist of many components. The components themselves are often simple 
(or can be treated as such); 
4. The output of components is a function of their inputs. At least some of these functions must be 
non-linear; 
5. The state of the system is determined by the values of the inputs and outputs; 
6. Interactions are defined by actual input-output relations and they are dynamic (the strength of 
interactions change over time); 
7. Components on average interact with many others. There are often multiple routes possible 
between components, mediated in different ways; 
8. Some sequences of interaction will provide feedback routes, whether long or short; 
9. Complex systems display behaviour that results from the interaction between components and 
not from characteristics inherent to the components themselves. This is sometimes called 
emergence; 
10. Asymmetrical structure (temporal, spatial and functional organisation) is developed, maintained 
and adapted in complex systems through internal dynamic processes. Structure is maintained 
even though the components themselves are exchanged or renewed; 
11. Complex systems display behaviour over a divergent range of timescales. This is necessary in 
order for the system to cope with its environment. It must adapt to changes in the environment 
quickly, but it can only sustain itself if at least part of the system changes at a slower rate than 
changes in the environment. This part can be seen as the ‘memory’ of the system; and 
12. More than one description of a complex system is possible. Different descriptions will 
decompose the system in different ways. Different descriptions may also have different 
degrees of complexity. 
(Cilliers, 2005a: 257) 
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3.4.2.1. Beyond reductionism  
The problem with attempting to understand complex phenomena through studying their component 
parts is clearly illustrated in Cilliers’ (1998) description of connectionist models. Cilliers explains 
that as these models share the characteristics of complex systems they can be used in 
conceptualising such systems. Connectionism is a way of processing information based on an 
understanding of the brain, which is used in computational modelling techniques such as neural 
networks (Cilliers, 1998).  
 
Summarising Cilliers’ (1998) extensive explanation, networks are comprised of neural units that are 
connected to one or more other such units. The strength of the connection, or relationship, 
between two of these is determined by a particular value or ‘weight’, which can be positive or 
negative and is usually non-linear. The total output of a unit is determined through the sum of its 
various inputs, after these inputs have been multiplied by the value of the connection between that 
particular unit and the others to which it is connected. The output of one unit then becomes the 
input of others. Cilliers (1998) explains that the characteristics of a system in its entirety are 
determined by the values of the weights (i.e. the relationship between units) rather than the units 
themselves, which on their own, or even collectively, do not have any particular significance. This 
is because information is not stored in the individual units, but in the multitude of relationships 
between them.  
 
In addition, Heylighen et al. (2007) explain that a system as a whole has a boundary that separates 
it from other systems, and which also has both incoming and outgoing streams. The output of one 
whole system can be the input of another. Moreover, if a group of systems, which are connected 
by various input and output relations, act in a fairly consistent way, they can themselves form a 
network, which can be considered a system, or super-system (Heylighen et al., 2007).   
 
Therefore, returning to the problem of reductionism, the concepts of connectionism and complexity 
show us that systems cannot be understood merely by studying their component parts (Heylighen 
et al., 2007). There are two primary reasons for this. First, a component (or subsystem) of a 
complex system is not an independent element, but rather a relation that processes input into 
output according to the nature of that relation. In merely studying the component parts, the 
relationships between components, which are the most significant aspects of the system, are lost.  
 
Secondly, as a result of the interconnectedness of the system, it has emergent properties, or 
characteristics that cannot be reduced to the properties of the parts (Heylighen et al., 2007). 
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Emergent properties result from the characteristics of the components (or sub-systems) within the 
system (i.e. upward causation), and from the constraints that being part of a super-system imposes 
(i.e. downward causation). Heylighen et al. (2007) use the example of an individual that is not only 
controlled by the neurology of her/his own brain, but also by the rules of the society in which s/he 
lives. Once a system has coupled with another system, the resulting super-system imposes a 
certain structure and consistency on the subsystems, so that one cannot change without affecting 
the others according to the relations within the super-system (Heylighen et al., 2007). The main 
focus within complexity theory is therefore placed on the state of the relationship between 
components, rather than on the components or sub-systems themselves  
 
3.4.2.2. Beyond objectivity  
An important insight from complexity theory is that when dealing with complex systems, we cannot 
escape the normative or ethical dimension of knowledge generation (Heylighen et al., 2007). 
Cilliers (2000a) does not use the term ‘ethics’ to mean a nice or altruistic attitude, or to refer to a 
specific set of moral principles. Rather, by ethics, he means “… the inevitability of choices that 
cannot be backed up scientifically or objectively (Cilliers, 2000a: 29)”. 
 
Cilliers (2000a) explains that there are multiple moments of choice that cannot be avoided when 
trying to understand complex systems. Therefore the ethical dimension is not something additional 
to knowledge generation, but rather something that is intrinsic to it. Cilliers (2008c) points out, that 
complex systems are open systems and, therefore, if we wish to understand them in all their 
complexity, we need to understand both the system itself, as well as its environment. To do this 
comprehensively we would need to accomplish the impossible task of modelling the system and its 
environment, which is in itself, complex (Cilliers, 2008c). Our models must, of necessity, reduce the 
complexity of the system, leaving some elements out, and thereby introducing subjective choice 
(Cilliers, 2001; 2008c). Cilliers (2000a) explains that we choose the boundaries of our models, 
basing them on certain assumptions and limitations. In other words, we are subjective in our 
selection of the framework through which we will gain knowledge of a system. Such frameworks 
cannot be developed through purely objective processes, as we cannot have prior knowledge of 
the entire system in all its complexity to guide the development of the framework. However, this 
process need not be an arbitrary choice either and Cilliers (2005a; 2005b) points out that this 
choice is influenced by a number of contextual and strategic factors (e.g. the context in which the 
knowledge is to be useful, the purpose of the research, considerations of expediency), as well as 
the structure and patterns of the system itself. As any of these aspects change over time, the 
framework (including the boundaries of the system) needs to be revised (Cilliers, 2005a; 2005b). 
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There is no way of developing complete, final, objective knowledge of the system (Cilliers, 2005a; 
2008c) because, as Cilliers (2005b: 612) states: “It is only from a situated position that we can 
have knowledge, never from an abstract position”, and as the situation (or context) changes, so 
should the framing of the models used for generating such knowledge (Cilliers, 2008c). Put simply, 
information produced by a model cannot be interpreted independently of its limitations and 
assumptions and those limitations and assumptions should be continually revised as 
circumstances change (Cilliers, 2000a).  
 
Cilliers (2000a) makes the important point that even if complex systems could be modelled in their 
entirety (including all their non-linear interactions) such a model would be as difficult to interpret as 
reality itself. If, however, we could understand a model that is as complex as reality itself, the 
information produced by that model would still need to be interpreted (Cilliers, 2000a). This 
intrinsically normative dimension of knowledge generation, as outlined above, means that 
responsibility for choices made cannot be placed on an external, objective process such as a 
general algorithm or particular scientific process (Cilliers, 2000a; 2008c). 
 
Cilliers (2005b) acknowledges that this view can be disconcerting to those that believe that science 
has to maintain pure objectivity and avoid relativistic approaches that would undermine scientific 
knowledge. Cilliers (2005b) explains, however, that complexity must be interpreted in a way that 
does not lead to relativism. Understanding knowledge as part of a complex system of interactions 
does not only deny that knowledge can be seen as atomised facts that have objective meaning, 
but also denies the view that knowledge is purely subjective (Cilliers, 2000b; 2005b; 2008c). A 
theory of complexity aims to go beyond the subject-object/relativism-foundationalism divide in a 
number of ways, including the following (the first one has already been briefly described above): 
1. Recognising that the framework within which our knowledge is constituted (including the 
spatial boundaries of a system being studied), is determined through both ethical 
considerations (e.g. strategic choices) and the characteristics and structure of the system 
itself (Cilliers, 2005a; 2005b; 2008c). Due to the characteristics of the system, some 
frameworks for knowledge generation are more meaningful and useful than others, but 
there is no predetermined process or formula that can be used to identify ‘the best’ 
framework. In any event, such a framework needs to be revised as the context changes 
(Cilliers, 2005b).  
2. Recognising the links between knowledge and the system or context within which it 
emerges (Cilliers, 2000b). Cilliers (2000b; 2005b) explains that it is not possible to first 
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identify the system and then sequentially derive the knowledge within that context, as the 
two are interlinked. 
3. Problematising the idea that data and information can be transformed into knowledge 
through an objective, mechanical process. It is acknowledged that there are facts that exist 
independently of the observer, but as Cilliers (2000b: 10) puts it, they “… don’t have their 
meanings written on their faces”. Meaning comes into being through the network of 
interactions and relationships between components of the system. Cilliers therefore states 
that knowledge is interpreted data (Cillilers, 2000b; 2003; 2005b).  
4. Acknowledging that to a large degree the natural sciences have to work with the 
assumption of objectivity, while realising the constraints of their knowledge claims due to 
the limitations of the particular framework they have chosen to generate that knowledge 
(Cilliers, 2008c). Cilliers notes that most good scientists acknowledge this, but the problem 
is exacerbated when the social sciences adopt the methods of the natural sciences in a 
simplistic way.  
5. Emphasising that the argument from complexity is not against calculation and the 
construction of models, but rather for an acknowledgement that these approaches are 
never sufficient, as choice and interpretation are an inherent characteristic of knowledge 
generation (Cilliers, 2000a).  
 
3.4.2.3. Beyond universal determinism  
The principle of universal determinism is another way, according to Morin (2007), in which classical 
science has rejected complexity. In general, determinism is the idea that “… all events and states 
of affairs are determined by antecedent events and states of affairs” (Mauter, 2000: 137).  This 
notion has several more specific nuances; however, it appears that the particular formulation which 
Morin (2007) criticises is one which holds that “… in a deterministic universe, its total state at any 
other time is deducible from knowledge of its total state at any one time, given complete knowledge 
of the universe’s ways of working” (Mauter, 2000: 137-138). Using ideas from complexity theory, 
Cillliers (2007), who builds partly on Morin’s discussion, counters this principle of classical science 
primarily through his argument, which I have paraphrased here, that not only is it impossible to 
have knowledge that applies at any time, we also cannot have complete knowledge of a system at 
a particular time. I will start with the first argument. 
 
We cannot have knowledge of a system that applies to any time because of the normative nature 
of knowledge, as described in section 3.4.2.2 above. As the context changes, so should our 
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understanding, which means that all knowledge is provisional (Cilliers, 2007; 2008c).  It is valid for 
the period in which the framework used to generate it, is appropriate or meaningful. However, even 
within that period the knowledge we have is limited due to a number of other factors including the 
following (Cilliers, 2001; 2005a; 2005b; 2007; 2008c): 
1. When modelling, we reduce the complexity of the system and therefore leave some 
components out of consideration, as explained in the previous section. Our 
conceptualisation of the system is therefore always limited. In addition, our ability to predict 
the consequences of this limitation is constrained by the fact that those aspects which we 
have left out interact with the system in a dynamic, non-linear way, through direct and in-
direct feedback paths. Cilliers (2005a; 2007; 2008c) points out, that such prediction 
becomes particularly difficult as the system and its environment change over time. Cilliers 
(2005a; 2008c) does not use this as an argument against modelling, but rather as the 
reason for modesty and caution regarding the scope of the knowledge claims we make as a 
result of such modelling. 
2. As we can only have knowledge in relation to a particular normative framework, all 
knowledge is situated or contextual knowledge. We therefore cannot make final and 
complete claims about the world; there is no ‘framework for frameworks’ (Cilliers, 2005a). 
Therefore various different descriptions of the same system can all have validity in relation 
to the framework in which they were developed. Some may be more useful that others; 
however, none can be a complete representation of the system.  
3. Although the macro (or emergent) behaviour of a system is purely the result of micro-
activities, it is not possible to take all these activities into account when trying to describe 
macro-level behaviour. Scientists therefore typically reduce complexity and focus on macro-
level descriptions that are approximations of micro-level activities. Having said this, Cilliers 
(2007) notes that the very idea of clearly divided ‘levels’ is problematic, as activities on the 
micro-level affect those on the macro-level and vice versa. Even more critically, Cilliers 
(2007) notes that the concept of ‘levels’ is usually the result of our description, rather than 
an inherent feature of the system itself.  
 
Cilliers (2005a) asserts that the fact that we can only have limited knowledge is not a disaster. 
Limiting frameworks make knowledge possible, as without them, absolutely everything, including 
the universe, would have to be encompassed in any complete description of reality, a task that is 
obviously impossible. Acknowledging the limits of our knowledge relieves us of the ‘terrible duty’ of 
finding the final, correct, complete and objective description of the system we are trying to study 
(Cilliers, 2007). Although Cilliers (2005a) argues for modest positions when dealing with complex 
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systems, he emphasises that this does not mean that he is proposing a weak approach. 
Acknowledging the limitations of our knowledge clearly, Cilliers (2005a) argues, is an ethical 
responsibility. We also need to deal with the implications of such limits which includes making 
choices, or put in another way, adopting an ethical position, as discussed in section 3.4.2.2 
(Cilliers, 2000a).   
 
3.4.2.4. Beyond positivism 
Due to the limitations of scientific analysis in understanding complex issues, Cilliers (1998) argues 
strongly against an understanding of scientific knowledge as the only form of legitimate knowledge. 
He states that we need to ‘actively resist’ the propensity of knowledge generated through the 
methods of the natural sciences to be considered more valuable than other types of knowledge 
(Cilliers, 2008c). Cilliers (1998) explains that science has traditionally been developed through a 
process of falsification, in which theories are disproved and everything containing too much 
uncertainty, complexity or unpredictability is excluded from the accepted body of knowledge (until 
such time as that uncertainly, complexity or unpredictability is removed). He points out that this has 
led much of human knowledge to be regarded as unscientific and therefore not valid.  
 
Cilliers (1998) draws on Lyotard’s (1988) postmodern position in order to develop an approach to 
knowledge that acknowledges complexity and goes beyond positivism. Lyotard (1988: 3) argues 
that: “Scientific knowledge is a kind of discourse” and multiple discourses, which obey different 
rules, coexist. The totality of knowledge cannot therefore be reduced to the scientific discourse “… 
which has always existed in addition to, and in competition and conflict with, another kind of 
knowledge, which I will call narrative in the interests of simplicity” (Lyotard,1988: 7). Lyotard argues 
further that there is no final, abstract way of legitimating knowledge, outside its ability to serve the 
goals of various groups within society (e.g. institutions, communities and disciplines). Therefore, 
there is no single ‘metadiscourse’, such as the scientific discourse, that unites all forms of 
knowledge (Lyotard, 1988: 36).  
 
Cilliers (1998: 128) draws on Lyotard’s contrast between what he describes as the ‘pragmatics of 
science’ and what he calls the ‘pragmatics of narrative knowledge’ before developing a ‘narrative’ 
interpretation of scientific knowledge. Lyotard’s classification, as interpreted by Cilliers (1998), is 
shown in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3:   Cilliers’ Interpretation of Lyotard’s Properties of the 
Pragmatics of Science and the Pragmatics of Narrative Knowledge 
 
Pragmatics of Science Pragmatics of narrative knowledge 
Scientific knowledge requires that only one 
language game, that of denotation, be 
retained. Other types of statements (e.g. 
interrogatives) may be used in the process, 
but the argument must always end in a 
denotative35 statement.  
Scientific knowledge generated in this way is 
not part of the general ‘social bond’, but the 
property of experts and professionals who 
organise themselves into exclusive 
institutions.  
Only the competence of the researcher is at 
stake in the process of research. In the case 
of the human sciences, competence is not 
required of the subject of the research.  
The validity of scientific statements does not 
increase through reporting or through 
popularity.  These statements are only as 
valid as their proof.  
Scientific knowledge is cumulative. Scientists 
should only add new statements to the 
accepted body of knowledge in their field, 
when they are different to accepted ones.  
The criteria for narrative knowledge are 
defined by the society in which the narrative 
functions and are flexible and dynamic.   
These narratives lend themselves to a 
variety of language games. No specific 
linguistic form is privileged.  
These narratives are ‘transmitted’ in a way 
that strengthens the social bonds.  
Narratives don’t function mainly as a 
reminder of past events, but as a re-
enactment of them. The meaning of the 
narrative lies not in the fact that it occurred 
in the past, but in the way that it is told in the 
present. 
No special procedure is needed to 
‘authorise’ the narrative and the process for 
its development. The narrator is not isolated, 
but performs the role of integrator. Those 
involved in the process can perform any of 
the roles, such as narrator or hero.  
(Cilliers, 1998: 128) 
 
Cilliers’ (1998) characterisation of narrative knowledge that is scientific, also builds on his 
understanding of knowledge as part of a connected system. In the connectionist model (section 
3.4.2.1 above), the self is understood as a node in a network, rather than an isolated, autonomous 
individual. This provides the basis from which to counter the critique that says that if all narratives 
are only legitimated locally, then the result will be fragmentation, with each discourse becoming 
isolated and independent of the broader community (Cilliers, 1998). This critique goes further, 
                                            
35
  The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy states that: “The denotation of a term is sometimes said to be any 
object to which the term applies, sometimes the class of object to which it applies” (Mauter, 2000: 106). In 
short, the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy states that ‘denotation’ is: “That which is … referred to by a 
term” (Blackburn, 1996: 99). 
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arguing that if each person only has themselves as a point of reference for the validity of the 
knowledge, there would be no way of ensuring the objectivity of such knowledge. The 
unacceptable result would be that ‘anything goes’ (Cilliers, 1998).  However, Cilliers’ (1998) argues 
that from the connectionist perspective, society is a network in which discourses cannot isolate 
themselves even if they form clusters within that network. The various local narratives are in 
constant interaction with other discourses, battling for territory. These narratives may expand or 
contract, but they only have meaning in relation to surrounding discourses. Cilliers (1998: 116) 
points out that it is through this dynamic self-organising process that meaning is generated, and 
not through the “… passive reflection of an autonomous agent that can make ‘anything go’ ”.  
 
A second argument that Cilliers (1998) presents against the critique described in the previous 
paragraph, relates to the distributed nature of information within a social network. In such a 
network, information is contained in the patterns across the entire system, rather than represented 
by a particular node. A specific node is part of many different patterns of information. Applying this 
to discourses, Cilliers (1998) says that narratives are spread over many ‘selves’ (or nodes) and 
that individuals, in turn, are part of many different discourses or patterns, such as mother, wife, 
researcher and artist. Cilliers (1998) defines discourses as a ‘pattern of activity’ over a large group 
of people who exchange information, again counteracting the argument that one individual can 
make ‘anything go’.  
 
Cilliers’ (1998: 130) ‘narrative’ interpretation of scientific knowledge therefore comprises the 
following propositions: 
▪ The world is complex and this complexity is diverse, but organised (not chaotic); 
▪ Descriptions of this world cannot be reduced to simple, coherent and universally valid 
discourses; 
▪ If complexity is modelled in terms of a network, any narrative will form a path through 
the network and there are many such paths; 
▪ The network is dynamic and changes as various narrative paths are traced through it. 
However, all paths are constrained by the local structure of the network which can 
either be fairly loose, or quite tight; 
▪ Although there are many narrative paths from one point to another in the network, it is 
not true that ‘anything goes’ as all narratives are constrained in some way, and some 
paths are not possible; 
▪ All paths are contingent and provisional; and 
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▪ Certain parts of the network can be ‘fixed’ for strategic reasons in a process of 
‘framing’ that is necessary for scientific inquiry. However, all knowledge produced as 
a result is relative to the particular frame used and cannot be generally applied to 
another time or space.  
 
3.4.3 Implications for environmental assessment  
 
In the sections that follow, I will relate Cilliers’ work to the field of environmental assessment. I will 
begin by applying Cilliers’ characteristics of complex systems to the social-ecological environment 
that is studied within an environmental assessment. Thereafter, I will again use the categories of 
‘beyond reductionism’, ‘beyond objectivity’, ‘beyond universality’ and ‘beyond positivism’, as a 
starting point for the discussion of the implications of complexity theory for environmental 
assessment. For convenience, I have summarised Cilliers’ arguments (as discussed above) in 
italics before the discussion in each of these categories, which begins in section 3.4.3.2.  
 
3.4.3.1. The environment as a complex system  
The social-ecological system that is studied within an environmental assessment displays the 
characteristics of complexity identified by Cilliers, as shown below (Cilliers, 1998; 2007; 2008a)36: 
▪ Social-ecological systems comprise a large number of elements. For example, they 
include many human individuals and communities that interact with ecosystems, 
which themselves contain numerous interacting plants, animals, micro-organisms and 
abiotic environments.  
▪ Social-ecological systems display characteristics (i.e. emergent properties) that 
emerge from the interactions between the components of the system and not only 
from the characteristics of the components themselves.   
▪ The interactions between the elements of social-ecological systems are dynamic and 
fairly rich. As technology becomes more sophisticated, for example, there is a 
constant flow of information between people on a global scale which is continuously 
changing as circumstances evolve. There are also dynamic and rich dependencies 
and interactions between natural species and between species and their 
environment. Such interactions, however, are currently changing towards an 
                                            
36
  To develop this list, I have combined, summarised and adapted the characteristics of complex systems, 
described in Cilliers, 1998 and 2007, to apply to social-ecological systems. Most of the ecological 
examples used are informed by discussions (February, 2007) that I had with Dr Belinda Reyers (CSIR) in 
developing material for a CSIR sustainability science course.  
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increasingly more fragmented state due to human activities such as rapid urban 
development. This highlights the third type of rich and dynamic interactions that occur 
in social-ecological systems, namely between humans and the natural environment. 
Perhaps the most basic of these interactions occurs when people drink water and 
breathe air. Other fundamental, rich and dynamic interactions occur between man 
and nature through the continuous development and cultivation of land.  
▪ The interactions within social-ecological systems are non-linear. For example, 
relatively small changes in the urban environment can have large effects on the 
system as a whole; a single keystone species, which has a disproportionately large 
defining influence on a system, can be adversely affected by a development, resulting 
in disproportionately significant system impacts.  
▪ Elements within a social-ecological system usually interact at a fairly short range (not 
necessarily spatially, but through technological developments such as the internet). 
For example, people usually interact with service providers in their local 
neighbourhood and with friends that live in close proximity or who are accessible 
electronically.  
▪ The activity of a component in a social-ecological system can directly or indirectly 
affect itself through feedback loops. A politician may make decisions, for example, 
that affect the governance of a country as a whole; however, as he is a resident of 
that country his decisions will also affect him on a personal level. Mining, for example, 
often results in the formation of small towns in the vicinity of a mine that service the 
needs of mine employees and their families. These towns are therefore dependent on 
mining activities for their survival. However, as minerals are non-renewable 
resources, those same activities take affected towns to the point where their 
economic base is eroded.  
▪ Social-ecological systems are open systems as they are always strongly connected to 
their environment. For example, a particular social-ecological system will be 
influenced by broader climatic, economic and political conditions. For this reason, the 
boundaries of such systems are difficult to define, as they are not simply the result of 
physical characteristics. These boundaries are also based on strategic and normative 
considerations (e.g. the purpose of studying the system) and will therefore partly 
depend on the person or group determining them.  
▪ Social-ecological systems do not exist in a state of equilibrium. For example, the 
economy is usually growing or shrinking, variations in climate are affecting agricultural 
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output on a yearly basis and patterns of migration, immigration and emigration, are 
influencing the demand for goods and services in a dynamic way.   
▪ Social-ecological systems maintain and adopt an asymmetrical temporal, spatial and 
organisational structure, despite changes within the components. 
▪ The functioning of social-ecological systems occurs at a variety of timescales. For 
example, changes in interest rates may occur at a faster pace than changes in 
consumer behaviour; farmers may adapt to changes in rainfall and temperatures at a 
much slower pace than those changes in climate actually occur.  
▪ Social-ecological systems are strongly influenced by their history as their current state 
is partly a consequence of factors such as their geological past, previous social and 
economic policies, historical agricultural practices and earlier forms of urban 
development. 
▪ Each element within a social-ecological system is unaware of the behaviour of the 
system as a whole and therefore acts mainly on the local information available to it.  
When making a decision whether to purchase a property in a particular location, for 
example, an individual usually considers factors such as the current trends in interest 
rates, their own ability to afford the property and their preferences concerning 
location, style, size and structure. Far less consideration is usually given to broader 
factors within the system, of which the individual is not likely to have certain 
knowledge (e.g. the influence of global market trends on the national economy and 
therefore on the particular property investment being considered).  
▪ A social-ecological system can be described in various ways.  Different descriptions 
will have various degrees of complexity and deconstruct the system in different ways.  
 
Although I have concerns regarding their literal application to human beings as components within 
social-ecological systems, there are a number of other characteristics of complex systems listed by 
Cilliers (2007) which I believe to be an important aid in understanding social-ecological systems. 
Importantly, they describe the significance of the interconnectedness of a system and the reasons 
why reductionism is not appropriate when understanding complex systems. They are also useful 
when developing computational models. These characteristics are as follows:  
▪ The components themselves are often simple or can be treated as such; 
▪ The output of components is a function of the value of their inputs. Some of these 
functions are non-linear; and 
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▪ Interactions between components are determined by input-output relations, the 
strength of which changes over time.  
 
My concerns, however, stem from Sen’s (1999) argument that human beings have both 
functionings and capabilities. Put in the terms described by Cilliers, the actual interaction between 
human individuals or components within the system is important, but so are their capabilities or 
potential for interaction (Sen, 1984; Crocker 1991). In my view, this extends the debate, in the 
context of humans, beyond actual inputs and outputs, and places at least equal importance on the 
individual’s state of being within him/herself. This may be an overextension of Cilliers’ description 
of complex systems, but I think that it is important to remember that models are limited, as Cilliers 
(2005b) himself argues. 
 
This point brings to the fore another important argument that Cilliers makes regarding the general 
use of complexity theory. Responding to questions posed by Gershenson, Cilliers (2008d: 20) 
states that he does not think that “… complexity theory as a computational technique will produce 
staggering new results … This is not because of incompetence or fundamental errors, it is the 
nature of the beast. The formal descriptions of complex systems can only address certain aspects 
of the complex human world, helpful as they are. Researchers working in the discipline should be 
very careful about the claims they make about future possibilities”. Cilliers then argues that the 
main contribution of complexity is not in its technological applications, but in the way it influences 
our understanding of the world. He therefore states that: “We should promote what can be called 
‘complexity thinking’, a style of thinking which is critical of claims based on reductionist thinking, yet 
at the same time mindful of its own limits” (Cilliers, 2008d: 20).   
 
3.4.3.2. Beyond reductionism 
The traditional scientific method of analysis, isolation and the gathering of complete information is 
inadequate for dealing with the interconnectedness of the world today. In general complexity 
theory, it is recognised that knowledge of the parts of a system is not enough, and neither is 
knowledge of the whole sufficient. There is a need for an understanding of both, as well as the 
relationships between the whole and the parts.  
 
In the early days of EIA, checklists and matrices were used to list the potential impacts of 
development on the environment, according to categories such as air, water, land and employment 
opportunities (Wathern, 1988; Sadler, 1996; Weaver, 1998). This approach involved the 
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fragmentation of the project and the environment into their component parts and the identification 
of first-order cause-effect relationships (Bisset, 1988; Burns, 2002).  
 
Various methods have developed internationally that aim to promote, a more integrated ‘systems-
level’ approach (Bisset, 1988). Among these are network and systems methods, in which the 
natural (and occasionally socio-economic) components of a system are linked together by lines 
that indicate the direction, and sometimes the magnitude, of energy flows between them (Wathern, 
1988). Bisset (1988) points out that systems diagrams are based on the assumption that energy 
flows are indicative of the measure of impacts of a development and can be used as a ‘common 
unit’ in determining these impacts. These systems diagrams focus mainly on determining the 
nature of ecological impacts; however, some have argued (e.g. Lavine et al., 1978) that they can 
provide a bridge between environmental and economic systems, as the energy flows can be 
expressed in monetary terms (Bisset, 1988). 
 
Bisset (1998) states that there are a number of disadvantages to the use of system diagrams in 
EIA, including that:  
▪ They are time consuming and expensive to construct and periodic revision may be 
necessary to accommodate natural and man-made changes;  
▪ Not all important ecological relationships can be represented in terms of energy flows; 
and 
▪ They are confined to ecological impacts as attempts to incorporate socio-economic 
issues are problematic from both a conceptual and practical point of view.  
 
Other approaches to developing a systems perspective include, for example, Adaptive 
Environmental Assessment and Management (AEAM) and the issue-orientated approach. AEAM is 
based on the work of Holling undertaken in 1978 and includes the construction of a computer 
simulation of the systems likely to be affected by the development (Bisset, 1988). This construction 
is undertaken through a series of small workshops with scientists, decision-makers and others, the 
purpose of which is to reach consensus on the components of the system and the relationships 
between them. As far as possible, the discussion at the workshops is converted by modelling 
experts into quantitative relationships between the various components of the system. The 
potential consequences of a proposed development is then determined through the use of the 
model under different scenarios. However, Bisset (1988) notes that the literature and practice of 
AEAM is biased towards the management of resources and although there have been attempts to 
incorporate social and economic concerns these have been limited to a few variables (e.g. per 
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capita incomes). He also notes that there is a tendency in AEAM to quantify relationships based on 
uncertain data.  
 
The current practice of environment assessment in South Africa is generally less reductionistic 
than the checklist methods described above. However, the reporting of the potential impacts of a 
proposed development is still typically divided into natural science and socio-economic categories. 
Such divisions are reflected in the current EIA regulations that require “… a description of the 
environment that may be affected by the proposed activity and the manner in which the 
geographical, physical, biological, social, economic and cultural aspects of the environment may 
be affected by the proposed activity” (DEAT, 2006a: Chapter 3, section 23(2)(d)). Although 
attempts are made, after analysis, to integrate the various aspects of the environment, as 
discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, undertaking this task effectively is one of the key challenges 
to the practice of EIA.  
 
The ‘issues-orientated’ approach, which was introduced by Taylor et al. (1990: cited in: Weaver 
and Rossouw, 1998: 312) in the context of social assessment, has influenced South African 
practice. In this approach the issues identified in scoping form the basis for drawing up the terms of 
reference for specialist assessment studies (Weaver and Rossouw, 1998). This is intended to 
promote a more integrated approach to environmental assessment, where several specialists 
collaborate in an inter-disciplinary manner to address a single issue (Weaver and Rossouw, 1998). 
However, I have noted several EIAs in which the issues, as they were expressed in scoping, are 
allocated in their entirety to the specialist whose disciplinary background seems most appropriate 
for its investigation. The possibilities for improved integration between specialists are therefore lost. 
In my view, supported by Will (2008) in the context of State of the Environment Reporting (SoER), 
an initial concept of the linked social-ecological system and the relationships within it, is required at 
the outset of an environmental assessment process, to guide the ‘issues-orientated’ approach. The 
links between a particular issue and specialist areas will then be clearer, which can assist the 
environmental assessment practitioner in assigning a number of specialists to a single concern.    
 
3.4.3.3. Beyond objectivity 
When dealing with complex systems, we cannot escape the normative or ethical dimension of 
knowledge generation. For example, the framework (or boundaries) within which our knowledge is 
constituted is determined through both ethical considerations and the characteristics of the system 
itself. Although some frameworks will be more useful than others, there is no pre-determined 
method for identifying the most appropriate framework or boundary. The normative dimension of 
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knowledge also arises in our interpretation of facts, which don’t have their meaning ‘written on their 
faces’. This meaning evolves through the interactions and relationships between the components 
of the system. 
 
As stated in section 3.2.3.1, an ethical decision or choice has to be made regarding several inter-
related dimensions of an environmental assessment, including the boundaries of the system 
(spatial and non-spatial), the values, principles and/or objectives that will inform the identification of 
impacts and their significance, and the types of knowledge or styles of rationality that are to be 
used in identifying and assessing such impacts. I will discuss each of these aspects below. 
 
A type of ‘boundary’ or framework for an environmental assessment is determined through scoping 
(DEA, 1992). This participatory process includes the identification of significant issues that are to 
be addressed in the assessment, the alternatives to be considered and the terms of reference for 
the study (Preston et al., 1994). In terms of South Africa’s EIA regulations (DEAT, 2006a) scoping 
should also include, inter alia, a description of the property on which the activity is to be 
undertaken, the environment that may be affected by the activity and the way in which this may 
occur (Chapter 3, section 29(1)(c)(d)).  
 
Among the key challenges within an environmental assessment is setting the spatial boundaries. A 
description of the property that is affected is clearly not adequate for this task, as the development 
may impact on communities and environments that are outside the site boundary. It can be argued 
that describing the affected environment is a better way of setting the spatial boundaries. However, 
according to complexity theory, to comprehensively identify this affected environment, an 
understanding is required of the links between this system and others (e.g. systems at the 
provincial, national and international scale; and biogeographical systems that do not follow 
administrative boundaries). As Cilliers (2008c) points out, having comprehensive knowledge like 
this is clearly impossible. Therefore the boundaries of an environmental assessment have to be 
drawn, based on both objective considerations (e.g. boundaries of a municipal area, a natural 
boundary such as a river or mountain), as well as value-based, strategic ones (e.g. issues being 
investigated). 
 
It can be argued that in the environmental assessment process, the strategic, value-based aspects 
of those boundaries are determined through the participation, in the scoping process, of 
stakeholders (based on their values and preferences). However, in my view, a strategic decision is 
made, either explicitly or implicitly, concerning the boundaries of the assessment before scoping 
takes place, as such a decision is needed to guide the identification of stakeholders and the means 
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(e.g. location of notices) by which potential stakeholders will be notified of the proposed 
development.  As those stakeholders are more likely to identify first-order issues that directly affect 
them and their immediate environment, the extent of the assessment is therefore strongly 
influenced by this initial decision. From my interpretation, the argument from complexity theory 
does not say that it is wrong to make this initial decision, but that it should be made explicitly; i.e. 
the reasons for defining the boundary in a certain way should be clearly explained. In addition, the 
influence of the boundary on the assessment should be acknowledged (i.e. what type of 
considerations would need to be left out). The current EIA regulations (DEAT, 2006a) require 
details concerning the stakeholder engagement process (Chapter 3, section 29(1)(h)) and the 
issues and potential impacts that have been identified (Chapter 3, section 29(1)(f)), from which the 
boundaries of the assessment could be broadly deduced; however, a rationale for these 
boundaries is not explicitly required.  
 
One of the most important normative considerations within an environmental assessment is 
determining the significance of the potential impacts identified. In the environmental assessment 
literature, it is generally recognised that facts need to be interpreted and don’t, as Cilliers (2000b: 
10) states, have their “… meaning written on their faces …” particularly when determining their 
significance.  For example, in the guidance provided by DEAT it is stated that: “The main challenge 
[is] to ensure that the environmental impact reporting recognises that different impacts have 
varying levels of significance for different stakeholders. Professional judgement should ideally be 
used in conjunction with the different value judgements expressed by various stakeholders” 
(DEAT, 2002d: 15, parenthesis added).   
 
Numerous methods have been developed internationally to determine the significance of impacts. 
These vary in a number of ways, including: the mix of technical information and stakeholder input 
that informs the judgement; the extent to which impacts are quantified; and the extent to which 
modelling techniques are used (Sadler, 1996; DEAT, 2002d). Although considerable literature 
exists on possible ways to include value-judgements in the determination of significance (e.g. 
Wathern, 1988; DEAT, 2002d; Glasson et al., 2005), in South African practice this judgement 
seems to be primarily based on expert opinion. For example it is stated in DEAT (2002d: 29) that 
“… the EIA team often determines impact significance from a professional perspective. Public input 
and values seldom informs determination of significance and acceptability of impacts …”. He also 
states that “… the value judgements contained within scientific information are not made explicit”. 
Glasson et al. (2005: 137) make a similar observation concerning EIA internationally, stating that: 
“Much, if not most, current evaluation of significance in EIA is simple and often pragmatic, drawing 
on experience and expert opinion …” 
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Despite the recognition of the subjectivity involved in determining the significance of potential 
impacts an attempt is often made in environmental assessment theory, to formulate an objective 
means of making these judgements. In the 1970s and early 1980s several methods were 
developed, most of which reflected that era’s emphasis on quantitative analysis (DEAT, 2002d). 
The focus was on attaining objectivity in assessment and many of these methods (e.g. the Leopold 
Matrix) required the weighting and ranking of the significance of potential impacts (DEAT, 2002d). 
Even those that incorporated stakeholder inputs and the expression of values, attempted to 
convert these into numerical ratings such as through the Sondheim Method and the Crawford 
Method (DEAT, 2002d).  These methods have been criticised for the false impression of objectivity 
that they often created (Bisset, 1988; DEAT, 2002d). Bisset (1988: 53), for example, comments 
that: “It is argued that the subjectivity involved in these computations is hidden within a spurious 
objectivity”.  
 
An attempt was made in the 1970s and 1980s to disaggregate stakeholder values by showing the 
costs and benefits of a proposed project according to the views of various stakeholder groups (e.g. 
business and industry, civic and non-governmental organisations and professional organisations) 
(Burns, 2002). An example of such a technique is the goals-achievement matrix, in which both 
quantitative and qualitative evaluation units are used to describe such costs and benefits (Burns, 
2002). However, this technique is not part of mainstream EIA in South Africa today. There is 
currently less emphasis on quantification, as many EIA systems move towards a qualitative 
description of the significance of impacts; however, the emphasis on attaining some form of 
objectivity persists. This occurs in many forms, with some countries requiring significance to be 
determined through the consideration of a pre-determined list of questions (e.g. the Canadian 
system), while others require consideration of a pre-determined list of actions or impacts that are 
regarded as significant (systems used in California and New York) (DEAT, 2002). In South Africa 
the attempt to achieve objectivity is made to an even greater degree. The South African EIA 
regulations require the significance of impacts to be described in terms of a list of criteria that does 
not include the acceptability of the proposal to various groups within the community. Although this 
criterion is included within the local literature on environmental assessment (e.g. DEAT, 2000), it is 
excluded from the list provided in the EIA regulations (Chapter 3, section 32(2)(k)), which are 
confined to the following ‘more objective’ measures:  
(i) Cumulative impacts; 
(ii) The nature of the impact;  
(iii) The extent and duration of the impact; 
(iv) The probability of the impact occurring; 
(v) The degree to which the impact can be reversed; 
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(vi) The degree to which the impact may cause irreplaceable loss of resources; and 
(vii) The degree to which the impact may be mitigated.  
 
To comprehensively determine the significance of the potential impacts of development on a 
community and the environment that sustains it, one would have to interview most individuals and 
understand the consequences of such impacts on most aspects of their lives. Although this is 
again impossible, complexity theory provides a way forward. The fact that the significance or 
meaning of the potential impacts identified is not objective and must be interpreted from a 
particular perspective must be made explicit in the EIA. As complexity theory points out, there is no 
objective ‘framework of frameworks’ (Cilliers, 2005a); therefore, we need to leave some things out 
and include others, making the development of the framework a choice and subjective exercise. An 
action will have either a positive or negative impact, which will vary in significance, depending on 
the perspective taken. What may be considered a considerably negative impact from an 
environmental point of view may have minor, but positive, consequences from an economic 
perspective. We can go further to say that determining impacts and their significance are not 
separate exercises. It is therefore critically important to develop and present the framework against 
which impacts and their significance are identified.  
 
It can be argued that the criteria contained in South African legislation for determining significance 
forms this framework. However, describing impacts in terms of their nature, extent and reversibility, 
is still dependent on individual perspective. This perspective or framework against which impacts 
(including their significance) are identified should be developed at the early stages of an impact 
assessment process. As shown by complexity theory, no pre-determined objective method can be 
prescribed to develop this framework, as it is an ethical task or a choice that should respond to the 
context in which it is applied.  
 
Such an approach is partially emerging in the development of sustainability assessment, in which 
the social, economic and biophysical impacts of a development are assessed, in an integrated 
way, against sustainability indicators, strategies and/or principles (Dalal-Clayton and Sadler, 2005). 
South African guidance on SEA (DEAT, 2000; 2007) includes such an approach, in which 
sustainability objectives, criteria and indicators are defined in a context-specific way. These 
objectives, criteria and indicators form a framework to guide the development and assessment of a 
policy, plan and/or programme. This is similar to the sustainability-led SEA approach introduced by 
Therivel et al. (1992) in which policies, plans and programmes are evaluated against sustainability 
objectives. Others such as Jay et al. (2007), Shandler et al. (1999) and Sadler and Jacobs (1990) 
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argue for a stronger link between impact assessment and sustainability objectives in the domain of 
EIA.  
 
The assessment of the effects of potential projects against sustainability objectives provides a 
means of making explicit the perspective from which the assessment is undertaken. It provides a 
way of showing the values against which the project will be evaluated. Although this is a significant 
improvement on the attempt to evaluate impacts according to a pre-determined template, it does 
not go far enough in recognising the subjectivity and interpretive elements in EIA. The potential 
effects of a proposed project on contextually defined sustainability principles and objectives, is still 
open to interpretation and dependent on the particular perspective being taken. Therefore, we will 
never escape the strong normative dimension in identifying and assessing the significance of 
potential impacts. Recognising this frees us, as Cilliers (2007: 109) states, from trying to find the 
“… final, correct and objective description of the thing that we are trying to understand” (in this 
case, the significance of impacts). If we accept the connectionist perspective in which society is a 
network in which various local discourses exist and interact with one another (Cilliers, 1998), then 
we can select the interpretation or narrative that appears to be most meaningful at the time, make 
this selection explicit and acknowledge that alternative discourses have been omitted.  
 
In practice this means that the existence of a range of discourses must be recognised and that an 
attempt must be made to select the types of knowledge, styles of rationality or particular narratives 
that are most suited to determining the consequences of a proposed project and their significance. 
A range of different discourses will need to inform a single environmental assessment, not merely 
a scientific one or one based on the general professional opinion of environmental practitioners.  
For example, determining the systemic effects of the clearing of indigenous vegetation may require 
both scientific knowledge (e.g. effects on erosion) and the local knowledge of the community (e.g. 
effects of the availability of plants on their use for medicinal and domestic purposes by a particular 
community). The need to acknowledge multiple epistemologies is increasingly being recognised in 
the literature, such as that on sustainability science (Burns et al., 2006; Burns and Weaver, 2008), 
as well as that on environmental assessment (e.g. Hill, 2004). The implications of a narrative 
interpretation of knowledge for environmental assessment and management are discussed in 
further detail in section 3.4.3.5 below.  
 
3.4.3.4. Beyond universality 
At any given time we cannot have complete knowledge of a system. Such knowledge is always 
contextual and provisional, as it can only be developed in relation to a particular framework (or 
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context). In addition, our knowledge is limited by the difficulties in predicting the consequences of 
non-linear interactions between the system and the components that were excluded when framing 
it. Our knowledge is also limited by the fact that we cannot identify all the micro-level activities 
within the system when trying to describe macro-behaviour (or emergent behaviour). Our 
descriptions are therefore approximations of such micro-level activity.  
 
Limitations in knowledge have been recognised within impact assessment in South Africa, since its 
inception, through what is known as the precautionary approach. This principle is currently 
contained in NEMA, as well as DEAT’s (2004a) best practice information document on Integrated 
Environmental Management (IEM). According to NEMA (Chapter 1, section (2)(4)(a)(vii)) a 
precautionary approach is “… a risk-averse and cautious approach … which takes into account the 
limits of current knowledge about the consequences of decisions and actions …” (Republic of 
South Africa, 1998).  
 
The limitations of knowledge are also recognised within the environmental assessment report itself 
and in the specialist studies that inform environmental assessments. According to South African 
best practice guidance (DEAT, 2002e) and the EIA regulations (DEAT, 2006a: Chapter 3, section 
33(2)(c)(e)), specialists must indicate the scope of their study, any gaps in knowledge and the 
assumptions that they have made. The EIA regulations (DEAT, 2006a: Chapter 3, section 32(l)) 
require that this information is also contained in the integrated environmental assessment report.  
 
Another way in which the limitations of knowledge are acknowledged is in the requirement within 
best practice guidance (DEAT, 1992) for assessment practitioners to provide an indication of the 
degree of certainty that accompanies each of their impact predictions. This requirement is partially 
included in South Africa’s EIA regulations (DEAT, 2006a: Chapter 3, section 32(2)(k)(iv)), in which 
an indication of ‘the probability of the impact occurring’ must be provided.  This legal formulation, 
however, contains a limited recognition of uncertainty as it places more emphasis on an evaluation 
of the likelihood that an impact will occur, than on the evaluation of the assessor’s certainty of 
his/her statements. A similar recognition of uncertainty is contained in international EIA 
requirements, such as the European Union EIA Directive, in which an indication of the probability 
of an impact occurring must also be provided (Glasson et al., 2005).   
 
There are various categorisations of uncertainty in the environmental assessment literature. 
Glasson et al. (2005), for example, draw on the work undertaken by Friend and Hickling (1987), in 
which they identify three types of uncertainty related to planning and strategic choice:  
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▪ Uncertainty related to the environment that is being studied, which creates a need for 
information which could possibly be met through, inter alia, further investigation, 
analysis, research and other methods;  
▪ Uncertainty related to guiding values, which leads to the need for clearer objectives 
that could be defined through, for example, clarifying aims, setting priorities and 
involving others; and 
▪ Uncertainty related to decisions (e.g. government policy), which leads to the need for 
coordination, which could be met, for example, through liaison, planning and 
negotiation.  
 
Another writer, De Jongh (1988), identifies two types of uncertainties within impact assessment, 
namely: uncertainty related to impact prediction, and uncertainty related to the EIA approach. The 
author argues that uncertainty is inherent in impact predictions and is therefore unavoidable. He 
provides a description of various ways in which uncertainty ‘creeps into’ impact prediction relating, 
for example, to difficulties in impact description, inaccuracies in data measurement, variabilities 
inherent in data, and uncertainties inherent in models (mathematical, conceptual or physical) of the 
environment.  De Jongh (1988) also discusses uncertainty related to the EIA approach as a whole. 
Here he lists a number of strategic choices that have to be made in the environmental assessment 
process, such as the impacts and alternatives to be investigated. He then describes numerous 
techniques to ‘manage’ uncertainty, or to reduce it to levels that are acceptable to the decision-
maker. 
 
Complexity theory reveals a number of concerns with the approaches to the limitations of 
knowledge within environmental assessment, such as the ones described above. These include 
the extension of scientific discourse and approach to knowledge to the value-domain; as well as 
the attempt to ‘manage’ uncertainty. I will discuss each of these below.  
 
The debate on uncertainty is an example of where scientific discourse has dominated, 
marginalising the value-domain. Glasson et al. (2005), for example, recognise three types of 
‘uncertainty’, two of which are clearly within the normative and ethical domain. However, the focus 
within EIA studies is usually on uncertainty related to the, ‘more objective’ category of the external 
environment (Glasson et al., 2005). This typically includes uncertainty concerning the proposed 
project, the receiving natural and socio-economic environment, and the assumptions underlying 
the methods used (Glasson et al., 2005). These authors state that socio-economic conditions of 
the environment may be difficult to predict, as societal values may change rapidly; however, they 
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do not discuss in any detail the choices that have to be made related to the other two more 
normative categories. This is perhaps a consequence of what Shandler (1999: 246) calls “… the 
identification of environmental practitioners with scientists and science …” and the resultant 
marginalisation of value-based concerns, as discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis.  
 
De Jongh (1988: 63) relates the issue of uncertainty in environmental assessment more 
specifically to scientific discourse when he says that: “It was only with the discussions about the 
scientific content of EIAs during the 1980’s that ‘uncertainty’ was first mentioned as an important 
issue”. Even the term ‘uncertainty’ itself, in my view, seems to be more appropriate when speaking 
about a scientist’s confidence in his/her statements than about strategic choices (which are also 
categorised as ‘uncertainties’) that have to be made. The scientific basis for the use of ‘uncertainty’ 
in environmental management, and therefore its application to strategic choices which are value-
based, is explained by Norton (2005: 101) who says that: “Perhaps no issue confounds 
environmental managers more that the ‘problem of uncertainty’. On a closer look the ‘problem’ of 
uncertainty is really a grab bag of more or less related problems, all resulting from the fact that our 
finite knowledge will always fall short of any ideal of ‘full’ knowledge upon which to base everyday 
decisions. Uncertainty, in this sense, is just a general label for all the failures of our scientific 
models”.  
 
It is important that the debate on uncertainty in environmental assessment does not interpret the 
normative choices that have to be made through a scientific lens or discourse. Despite difficulties 
in making strategic choices, it is, in my view, inappropriate to address these difficulties the same 
way one would address limitations in scientific knowledge.  Friend and Hickling (1987) move 
towards this with their three categories of ‘uncertainties’ in which they propose alternative ways of 
addressing each. However, categorising normative choices as ‘uncertainties’, reflects the 
dominance of the scientific discourse in the environmental field, and does not promote the explicit 
engagement with such choices that is needed.  
 
Although there are clearly uncertainties in impact prediction that we may try to reduce, Cilliers 
(2005b) provides us with an alternative way of viewing the strategic choices in environmental 
assessment. These choices are part of the contextual and provisional ‘framework’ that enables 
knowledge creation. If such a framework did not exist we would try to know everything about 
everything, which is impossible. Therefore instead of being ‘uncertainties’ which have to be 
managed or reduced, strategic choices make it possible to develop an understanding of the 
consequences of a particular development. This means, however, that we adopt a particular 
perspective in doing this, and the knowledge generated from such an assessment is therefore not 
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universal. The particular responsibility of an environmental assessment practitioner is to make this 
perspective, as well as the reasons for choosing it, as explicit as possible.  
 
Complexity theory also highlights another problem with attempts to ‘manage’ uncertainty, as 
described, for example, by De Jongh (1988). To undertake such management, a fair 
understanding, either quantitatively or qualitatively, of the nature and extent of uncertainty is 
needed. However, gaining such an understanding is particularly difficult as non-linear and dynamic 
interactions occur within, and between, social-ecological systems (Cilliers, 2005a, 2007, 2008c). It 
is also particularly difficult, he states, because we don’t always know what it is that we have left out 
when defining a system, and those excluded elements may also interact with the system in a non-
linear way (Cilliers, 2008c). This means that there is uncertainty in our estimations of uncertainty. 
Often we don’t know what we don’t know. So, although indications of degrees of certainty may be 
provided (as suggested in DEAT’s (2002d) best practice guidance) and various methods to 
‘manage’ uncertainty put in place, environmental practitioners, stakeholders and decision-makers 
should never assume that the social-ecological system will not behave in completely unpredictable 
ways.  They should also always acknowledge that this uncertainty exists.  
 
In contrast to De Jongh (1988), Lawrence (1997) recognises, to a greater degree, the uncertainty 
inherent in impact prediction due to the open nature of complex systems. Lawrence (1997) 
acknowledges the importance of concepts of non-linearity, complexity and emergence in 
developing EIA practice and specifically mentions the “… inherent variations in complex systems 
…” as a factor that contributes to uncertainty in impact prediction (Lawrence, 1997: 87). However, 
despite such recognition, this uncertainty is not always made explicit in practice (Glasson et al., 
2005). Glasson et al. (2005: 135) state that environmental assessments “… often appear more 
certain in their predictions than they should”. This points to a huge problem, as a greater concern 
than uncertainty is the appearance of certainty that doesn’t exist. This is because it could lead to 
false confidence in decision-making, insufficient caution in the implementation of projects and 
inadequate monitoring of the actual effects of a development once it is implemented.  
 
In summary, complexity theory provides us with an approach to the limitations of knowledge, or to 
what are called ‘uncertainties’ in environmental assessment, that: 
▪ Relieves us of trying too hard to ‘manage away’ uncertainty when there will always be 
changes in the system that we cannot predict and which we don’t even know that we 
don’t know;  
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▪ Promotes what Cilliers (2005a) calls a ‘modest’ approach to predictions37; and  
▪ Gives us a more proactive view on the strategic choices that have to be made, and 
which comprise the perspective from which the environmental assessment is 
undertaken, turning these from ‘uncertainties’ to be reduced to positive choices that 
enable knowledge generation.  
 
Following Cilliers’ (2005a) call for modest claims when dealing with complex systems, we can say 
that environmental assessments are valid so long as the perspective or framework that is adopted 
in the assessment is meaningful and even then, there are non-linear interactions and other 
difficulties in prediction that limit its preciseness. Currently, approaches to environmental 
assessments are generally not seen to provide such a ‘perspective’ on the potential environmental 
impacts of a proposed project, but rather a scientific evaluation of these impacts that is as objective 
and accurate as possible. This is despite several authors (e.g. Jay et al., 2007) questioning the 
assumptions of value-free objectivity and universality in EIA.  
 
The modest position to knowledge generation, when applied to environmental assessment, also 
means that environmental assessment practitioners should be cautious in the way that the 
assessment is communicated and used in decision-making. Moreover, it means that assumptions 
cannot be made that all the potential impacts of a proposed development are identified and 
therefore monitoring of what actually occurs is essential. 
 
3.4.3.5. Beyond positivism 
Scientific knowledge should not be understood as the only form of legitimate knowledge, as this 
limits our ability to understand systems, particularly their social aspects. Cilliers proposes a 
‘narrative’ interpretation of scientific knowledge that, inter alia, acknowledges that descriptions of 
the world cannot be reduced to a single discourse. Various narratives, which are locally 
legitimated, exist and should be recognised. This will not lead to isolation and fragmentation of 
discourses as individuals are part of a system in which narratives are in constant interaction with 
other discourses. These narratives expand or contract as a result of this interaction, but they 
cannot isolate themselves. For these reasons, and the fact that all discourses are constrained in 
the system in some way, a narrative interpretation of knowledge will also not lead to a situation 
where ‘anything goes’.  
                                            
37
  Cilliers (2005a) emphasises that a modest position is not one that is weak, relative, self-contradictory or 
vague. Rather, he states that: “We can make clear, testable assertions about complex systems. We can 
increase the knowledge we have of a certain system, but this knowledge is limited and we have to 
acknowledge these limits” (Cilliers, 2005a: 263).  
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Environmental assessment processes vary in the degree to which they are based on scientific 
discourse, value-judgements and stakeholder views (Cashmore, 2003). To illustrate this Cashmore 
(2003) identifies a range of approaches to EIA which he places either in the category of an applied 
science or a civic science, as summarised in Table 3.4 below (Cashmore, 2003: 408-414). Within 
each of these categories he identifies various EIA models, while explaining that, although there has 
been a general shift away from the analytical approaches towards EIA as a civic science, the 
models do not represent a temporal trend in the literature.  
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Table 3.4:   Cashmore’s Categorisation of EIA Models 
 
EIA as applied science EIA as civic science 
Analytical science model Environmental design 
model 
Information provision 
model Participation model 
Environmental governance 
model 
In this model the foundation of 
EIA is considered to be the 
scientific method and an 
epistemology of positivism in 
particular.  
EIA is not necessarily seen as a 
science in itself, but, as a 
minimum, the process should be 
based on scientific principles and 
norms, to be credible. A 
demarcation is maintained 
between facts and value 
judgements.  
The research problem is the 
design and undertaking of the 
EIA. Scientific objectives must be 
identified, literature reviewed, 
modelling and experimental 
manipulation undertaken, 
recommendations made and 
Most forms of EIA, in which the 
focus is on the EIA documentation 
that informs the development 
decision, are criticised for being 
separate from the design of the 
development and therefore limited 
to a reactive analysis of the 
proposed development once the 
design is complete. This creates 
the impression that EIA is just an 
obligatory step at the end of the 
process, which is required to 
obtain development consent.  
In this model a technocratic 
approach to EIA is supported in 
which it is integrated into the 
design of the development or 
policy.  
Extensive emphasis is placed on 
technical expertise. 
Main purpose is to inform 
decision-making. 
A strict separation of facts and 
values is often maintained and 
extensive use is made of natural 
science methods, with a limited 
role assigned to the social 
sciences.  
The differences between EIA and 
science are recognised. EIA is 
viewed as generally more driven 
by time and resource constraints 
than science and more oriented 
towards a specific outcome (i.e. a 
decision). Unrealistic time 
constraints are accepted as 
inherent to the decision-making 
process. 
 
 
There is a central role for science 
in analysing the environmental 
impacts of alternative 
development options and best 
practicable scientific techniques 
are promoted. However, this 
approach is more pragmatic than 
the previous model. The focus is 
on sound environmental 
management and on substantive 
outcomes, rather than the 
scientific method. 
Quantification is considered 
important where it is possible; 
however, qualitative predictions 
are still considered useful for 
effective environmental 
management.   
There is a more substantial and 
inclusive role for stakeholders 
EIA is viewed as a decision tool 
used in environmental 
governance to empower 
stakeholders, promote equity in 
society and advocate an 
ecocentric interpretation of 
sustainable development. EIA 
must be a civic science and 
therefore inclusive and 
deliberative. 
It is also recognised that EIA is a 
political process used, for 
example, to promote, social 
justice and to make institutions 
accountable. EIA, like all political 
processes, is a framework for 
negotiation. The role of science is 
based on a different conception of 
science to that in the other 
models, which are based mostly 
on natural science, modified by 
social theory. This model is based 
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EIA as applied science EIA as civic science 
Analytical science model Environmental design 
model 
Information provision 
model Participation model 
Environmental governance 
model 
monitoring undertaken. EIA report 
subject to peer review.   
Impact predictions are 
constructed as quantified 
hypotheses that are tested. 
Monitoring is therefore considered 
very important.  
Unrealistic time constraints are 
seen in the analytical science 
model as the result of poor 
planning. 
There is limited consideration of 
this model in the literature, 
perhaps because it would be very 
difficult to legislate.  
Based on the same 
epistemological and ontological 
assumptions as the analytical 
science model.  
Stakeholder engagement is seen 
as part of the broader planning 
process rather than explicit aim of 
the EIA itself 
EIA is not seen as an 
experimental science or a 
research exercise; however, it is 
still seen as mainly analytical (e.g. 
feasible alternatives are identified 
and evaluated and modelling 
techniques used for quantification 
of impacts). The same degree of 
scientific rigour as that found in 
academic research is not 
expected. Rather, best practicable 
scientific techniques are promoted 
and it is considered important to 
balance rigorous analysis, 
stakeholder engagement and 
administration.  
Differences surrounding EIA 
outputs are seen as the result of 
differing values, rather than 
scientific issues. Although EIA is 
expected to confront subjectivity, 
a division between facts and value 
judgements is often maintained. 
than in the previous model. The 
project proponent engages with a 
wider range of stakeholders and is 
prepared to modify the proposal 
based on these discussions. 
Extensive use is made of social 
science techniques. 
Stakeholder involvement is seen 
as a substantive, scientific 
process, not just a procedural 
exercise. It is driven by the need 
to make environmental decision-
making more transparent and the 
need to embrace the plurality of 
values. The individualistic nature 
of values is recognised. There is a 
legitimate role for discourse 
containing both objective facts 
and subjective values and the 
demarcation between the two 
becomes blurred. 
on a postmodern view in which 
the possibility of theory-neutral 
observation is rejected. Meaning 
and value are not derived from 
observing objective, scientific 
facts, but are socially constructed 
and dependent on local and 
historical context.  
Science is not used by the 
technical elite for the political elite, 
but rather to empower all 
stakeholders. 
The sciences are considered 
important in evaluating the 
impacts of societally defined 
alternatives, but the focus is on 
various social interpretations of 
resource value and the 
interactions between stakeholders 
and institutions. 
(summarised from Cashmore, 2003) 
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Cashmore (2003) highlights certain similarities between the models described in Table 3.4. He 
points out that each one is primarily based on existing philosophies of science (either positivism or 
relativism) and that all are founded on poorly defined conceptions of the purposes of EIA. 
Environmental assessment in South Africa displays certain characteristics of each of Cashmore’s 
(2003) models; however, I would argue that our mainstream approaches to EIA are primarily 
founded on the ‘information provision model’. A possible exception is the sustainability-led 
approach to SEA promoted in the DEAT (2000; 2007) guideline documents, which is strongly 
aligned to the environmental design model. The discussion that follows, however, relates to the 
model of EIA which is more commonly practiced and which is the focus of this thesis.  
 
The emphasis within EIA in South Africa on informing a single authority decision concerning a 
proposed development, is reflected in the current Regulations, which define EIA as “… process of 
collecting, organizing, analyzing, interpreting and communicating information that is relevant to the 
consideration of the application” (DEAT, 2006a: Chapter 1, section 1).  This has not always been 
the case, as IEM incorporated more elements of the environmental design model. For example, the 
Council of the Environment (1988: iii) guideline document describes IEM as “… a systematic 
approach for ensuring the structured inclusion of environmental considerations in decision-making 
at all stages of the development process”. However, this latter emphasis was not carried forward 
into the current legislation, which centres mainly on the role of EIA in informing the authority 
decision of whether or not to approve a proposed development.  
 
Although the emphasis on stakeholder engagement in South Africa is perhaps more than is implied 
in the ‘information provision model’, the perceived divide between facts and values remains. For 
example, the stakeholder engagement process, in which the values and priorities of stakeholders 
are elicited, is typically seen as a somewhat separate process and is often not properly integrated 
into the overall EIA (Greyling, 2000). This situation is not unique to South Africa, and as Greyling 
(2000: 154) states: “A difficulty experienced world-wide in environmental impact assessments 
(EIAs) is the proper integration of public issues and technical assessment”. 
 
The strong bias towards science and science-based approaches within environmental assessment 
contained in each of Cashmore’s (2003) models (with the possible exception of the ‘governance 
model’) is also reflected in the South African approach to EIA in a number of ways that have 
already been discussed. Briefly, these include the emphasis on objectivity, the requirement that 
impacts are presented according to a universal, pre-determined template defined in legislation, the 
separation of facts and values discussed above and the division of the environment into its 
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component parts for investigation, followed by an attempt by the environmental assessment 
practitioner to integrate these parts.  
 
Each of Cashmore’s (2003) models is also, to a varying degree, based on a utilitarian approach, a 
point which Cashmore does not explicitly discuss. Utilitarianism contains many of the 
characteristics associated with positivist science, including a focus on objectivity, universalism and 
quantification. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), the founder of traditional utilitarianism, and his 
followers were influenced by philosophers such as the materialist, Hobbes (1588-1679) and the 
empiricist, Hume (1711-1776) (Magee, 2001). They sought an objective way of making value 
judgements that would provide a common, acceptable means of developing social policy 
(Velasquez, 2006).  
 
Such objectivity and universality is sought in utilitarianism in various ways. First, a single maxim is 
followed that states that the social policy that should be implemented is the one that leads to the 
greatest utility or good for the greatest number of people (Velasquez, 2006; Des Jardins, 1992). 
Secondly, objectivity is required in the definition of ‘the good’, which must apply to all contexts and 
be good for all people and all times (universality) (Des Jardins, 1992). Thirdly, objectivity is 
required in the way that alternative policies are evaluated and selected. To determine which action 
or policy produces the greatest good for the greatest number of people, the utilitarian principle 
assumes that all the benefits and costs from such an action or policy can be measured on a 
numerical scale and added or subtracted (Velasquez, 2006). The action or policy that is ethically 
‘the best’ is the one whose net benefits are greatest when compared to the other alternatives. Not 
only direct costs and benefits should be measured, but also foreseeable future effects and 
significant indirect effects (Velasquez, 2006).  
 
Utilitarianism has strongly influenced both economics, as well as social and environmental policy-
making (Des Jardins, 1992; Velasquez, 2006). Its influences on environmental assessment are 
numerous and significant. For example: 
▪ There are strong similarities between the stages of the various environmental 
assessment processes and those of traditional utilitarian approaches to decision-
making, which usually involve: determining what alternative projects or policies are 
available, estimating the consequences (positive and negative) that are likely to occur 
in the foreseeable future; and choosing the most ethically appropriate project or policy 
design by identifying the alternative that produces the greatest utility (Velasquez, 
2006). In the case of environmental assessment, the final choice concerning the most 
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appropriate project or policy design is usually undertaken by the relevant 
governmental authorities. The South African EIA regulations (DEAT, 2006a: Chapter 
3, section 32(2)(m)); however, now require the environmental assessment practitioner 
to express an opinion on whether the proposed activity should be authorised or not 
and under what conditions. 
▪ Specialist studies, commissioned as part of environmental assessment processes, 
may draw on a variety of discourses and sources of information; however, they are 
required, in EIA, to reduce these to a utilitarian description of the positive and 
negative consequences of the proposed development or policy. The way in which 
these impacts are to be described (e.g. in terms of their nature, extent, duration and 
probability of occurring) is pre-determined within the legislation in order to obtain as 
much objectivity and uniformity as possible. 
▪ Initial approaches to environmental impact assessment relied strongly on the 
quantification of impacts or, if this was not possible, the description of impacts in 
terms of some numerical score (Wathern, 1988; DEAT, 2002d) which enabled the 
comparison of alternatives. Although there is arguably less reliance on quantitative 
approaches today, a bias towards such approaches is still evident in some parts of 
the literature and in practice.  
 
A number of constraints to utilitarianism (e.g. difficulties in trying to quantify essentially 
unquantifiable phenomena) have been recognised within both the economics and environmental 
literature, by authors such as Sen (1988a), Goodstein (2008) and Velasquez (2006). Des Jardins 
(1993) points out that many of these can be countered through amendments in the way that 
utilitarian principles are applied. However, he argues that a more fundamental critique relates to 
the assumption within utilitarianism that no act is fundamentally right or wrong. Its ‘rightness’ or 
‘wrongness’ depends on the context. Des Jardins (1993) points out that this excludes the domain 
of ethical concern in which a particular action is ethically incorrect, based on certain principles, 
even if the consequences of that action are beneficial. He also points out the reverse. Some 
actions may be ethically right in principle, but the consequences are unfavourable. One of the 
examples that Des Jardins (1993) uses relates to an environmental controversy in the United 
States, in which logging is threatening to destroy the habitat of the endangered spotted owl and 
result in its extinction. A number of social benefits are incurred from the logging activities. Des 
Jardins (1993: 32-33) explains that: “Because there is no known human use for the owl and 
because the owl does not contribute to human society in any obvious way, a utilitarian calculation 
might suggest that the logging be allowed. However, environmentalists charge that it is wrong in 
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principle to cause the extinction of a species, even if doing so results in a net increase in beneficial 
social consequences”.  
 
As discussed in section 3.2.3, I propose that a phronétic approach to environmental assessment is 
adopted which takes the form of a rational argument on whether a development should proceed or 
not and under what conditions. This means that value-deliberation would form a central part of 
such studies, which would not be dominated by a single discourse. This has several implications 
for the scientific and utilitarian discourses that currently direct the field and its procedures.  
 
First, to accommodate multiple narratives, including the scientific, the assessment should not be 
required to predict all the changes caused by a proposed development, within a social-ecological 
system, in an ‘objective’, pre-determined way. It may be appropriate to portray some changes 
according to the current template (i.e. impact nature, extent, duration, probability, etc); however, in 
other cases, particularly when social concerns are dominant, it may be more appropriate to provide 
a more nuanced description. For example, the inclusion of an analysis of values within the 
phronétic approach would require, inter alia, a description of how such values conflict and how they 
correlate to contextually defined sustainability principles, among other factors. Changes in the 
social-ecological system should be described using the most appropriate means among the range 
of techniques available to the natural, social and economic fields of endeavour.  
 
Secondly, I acknowledge that the utilitarian consideration of the costs and benefits of a proposed 
development are key factors to consider in deciding whether such a development should be 
approved or not. However, I propose that the dialogue is altered to one which focuses on changes 
in the social-ecological system which are identified and described in terms of contextually defined 
sustainability principles/objectives. The question then changes, (incorporating Sen’s insights) from 
what the positive and negative impacts of a proposed development on the (objectively described) 
environment are, to how the social-ecological system is likely to change and what opportunities 
and constraints this provides for achieving the life stakeholders have reason to value? The latter 
question, I believe, moves the focus of the argument beyond the utilitarian description of 
consequences, to the consideration of aspects that are valued by stakeholders, irrespective of 
whether they appear to be consequential in a cost-benefit analysis or not. This enables the debate 
to more effectively recognise the intrinsic value of particular aspects of the social-ecological system 
being considered.  
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3.5 General principles for an approach to environmental assessment that 
addresses its current modernist constraints 
 
Based on the discussion of the work of the radical ecologists in the previous chapter and of 
Flyvbjerg, Sen and Cilliers in this chapter, I have identified a number of general principles to guide 
the development of an approach to environmental assessment that begins to address the 
problematic modernist assumptions listed in Chapters 1 and 2.  I have considered environmental 
assessment to be a part of the overall decision-making process regarding development and, 
therefore, where I refer to ‘decision-making’ in the principles below, I do not refer exclusively to the 
government’s role in such decision-making, but include the environmental assessment process. 
The principles, which are discussed in further detail in Chapter 4, are as follows: 
 
(i) The environment should be conceived as a complex social-ecological system, that 
should not only be understood in terms its component parts, but also in terms of the 
relationships between these parts; 
(ii) Social-ecological systems should be understood both in terms of their more interior, 
subjective aspects, as well as their exterior, objective ones; 
(iii) The contextual and normative nature of all knowledge of social-ecological systems 
should be recognised, as well as the subjective nature of the environmental decision-
making process itself; 
(iv) A phronétic approach should be adopted to understanding the social-ecological system 
as well as to decision-making concerning such systems; 
(v) A range of epistemologies should be used as appropriate to understand the various 
aspects of social-ecological systems and to make decisions concerning human 
activities within these systems; and 
(vi) The provisional and limited nature of our understanding of social-ecological systems 
and therefore our predictions of their behaviour should be acknowledged. 
 
3.6 Summary  
 
In this chapter I have presented aspects of the work of three researchers, Flyvbjerg, Sen and 
Cilliers, who have addressed some of the constraints of modernism within their respective fields. I 
propose that they have achieved this through their ability to explore beyond the boundaries of their 
disciplinary domains.  
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Flyvbjerg’s core argument is that a better balance between instrumental rationality and value-
rationality is required within the social sciences, in particular, within development planning 
processes. The aim of this is to elevate the contribution to these processes of value deliberation, 
which has become marginalised as there has been a trend towards tools and procedures that are 
narrowly aimed at achieving certainty in prediction. This trend, argues Flyvbjerg, reflects an 
attempt by the social sciences to emulate ‘the modern scientific ideal’, which has resulted in social-
science activity being dominated by whichever instrumental rationality prevails and by whichever 
power relations happen to be prevalent.  The narrowing of society’s rationality to primarily an 
instrumentalist one, in which theory is judged mainly in terms of its efficiency and usefulness in 
making predictions and controlling events, rather than in terms of its ability to reveal literal truth or 
falsity, reflects the modernist emphasis on objectivity and the marginalisation of the subjective 
value domain. I have suggested that this trend also influences the field of environmental 
assessment in which much of the focus is on the development and application of tools, processes 
and techniques aimed at prediction. 
 
Flyvbjerg’s proposal is described for an alternative role for the social sciences that can relieve this 
sphere of knowledge of inappropriate attempts to emulate the natural sciences, and their emphasis 
on analytical rationality and universal knowledge. It is a role that acknowledges a wider range of 
intellectual virtues than that of traditional science, drawing on Aristotle’s categorisation of epistémic 
science, techné and phronésis. It is argued that social science should be seen as action-orientated 
phronésis, emphasising context-dependent knowledge and ethics and involving ‘practical wisdom’ 
as well as the values within society. I have suggested that this also has application to 
environmental assessment, due to the strong influence of values on the process, and that it too 
should be seen as a form of phronésis, whilst drawing on techné and epistémic science. This is in 
contrast to the current dominance of techné and epistémic science and inadequate integration of 
stakeholder values into environmental assessment processes. 
 
In my discussion of Sen’s work, I show that like Flyvbjerg’s, it explores the modernist divide 
between the subjective and objective spheres of knowledge. Central to Sen’s work is his argument 
that a perceived divide between ethics and economics has impoverished both disciplines. In this 
regard, positivist economics has marginalised normative analysis and ethical questions that affect 
human behaviour.  
 
In an attempt to integrate the normative dimension back into the concept of development, Sen 
provides us with a means of understanding economic concepts that goes beyond the current 
emphasis on goods and services.  He provides a critique of a variety of development approaches 
M o d e r n i s m ,  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  A s s e s s m e n t  a n d  t h e  S u s t a i n a b i l i t y  A r g u m e n t :   
M o v i n g  t o wa r d s  a  N e w A p p r o a c h  t o  P r o j e c t - b a s e d  D e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a   
 
 
 
 
Page 169 
including those in which commodity, welfarist and basic needs are centrally represented. The 
mainstream concept of sustainable development, which strongly influences South African 
environmental legislation, is most akin to a basic needs approach (BNA), which goes beyond the 
focus on goods and services within the commodity approach and beyond the focus on utilities (i.e. 
happiness and desire fulfilment) within welfarism. However, Sen does state that the BNA lacks an 
adequate theoretical base, particularly in relation to what are defined as ‘needs’. As needs are 
often articulated in terms of the provision of goods and services, Sen argues that the BNA typically 
reverts back to a commodity approach, not paying enough attention to fundamental issues, such 
as the inequalities between people and nations, which are significant causes of poverty.  
 
In response to these problems, Sen proposes that development should promote and enhance 
valued functionings and capabilities. He states that a developed society enables its citizens to be, 
live and act in certain ways that are considered valuable, which he calls ‘functionings’. These 
functionings range, for example, from being adequately nourished to being able to participate in the 
community. What a person is achieving are his/her functionings, while what s/he is free and able to 
achieve, but may choose not to, are his/her capabilities. In defining development in this way, Sen 
changes the debate from a focus on the material (i.e. the goods and services that should be 
provided) to the more normative question of what human functionings and capabilities should be 
enabled and how goods and services can assist in achieving this.  
 
Cilliers’ critique of the modern worldview focuses on its limitations in dealing with the complexity of 
systems, particularly due to its reduction of all phenomena to predictable movements of particles in 
time and space. If phenomena appear complex, it is assumed that such complexity can be 
removed through further analysis, until predictability is restored.  Cilliers points out that the modern 
worldview is further limited in its ability to deal with complex systems, due to its assumptions 
regarding determinism and objective, observer-independent knowledge. Among many other 
limitations, these assumptions do not accommodate purposeful action taken by human beings, 
which is typically based on non-deterministic factors such as values and ethics.  
 
In an attempt to acknowledge complexity, Cilliers describes its characteristics and implications. In 
this chapter I have categorised these according to how complexity moves us beyond reductionism, 
objectivity, universal determinism and positivism. I indicate that an acknowledgement of complexity 
has important consequences for the field of environmental assessment, which deals with complex 
social-ecological systems, but has inherited, to varying degrees, modernism’s reductionism, 
scientism and emphasis on making objective predictions. The many consequences of this include 
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the  difficulties experienced in the field of addressing value-based issues, which are typically 
placed within the category of ‘uncertainties’.   
 
In the chapter that follows, I will draw on the work of the radical ecologists presented in Chapter 2, 
as well as the ideas discussed by Flyvbjerg, Sen and Cilliers, described in this chapter, to 
deconstruct the three problematic modernist assumptions listed in Chapters 1 and 2 and to 
propose an alternative conceptual approach to environmental assessment that can overcome 
these problems.  
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CHAPTER 4. 
THE ‘SUSTAINABILITY ARGUMENT’: 
WEAVING THE THREADS TOGETHER 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will summarise the constraints to effective environmental assessment, as well as 
their philosophical roots, as described in Chapters 1 and 2. Thereafter, drawing on the ideas 
presented in Chapter 3, I will deconstruct the three problematic assumptions of modernity, and 
explain the implications of this deconstruction for environmental assessment in South Africa. The 
assumptions that will be discussed are as follows: 
▪ That a system can be understood by observing the behaviour of its parts;  
▪ That all processes flow along linear, deterministic, predictable and orderly paths; and 
▪ That technical, objective, natural science-based information and processes are 
separate from, and superior to, non-technical, subjective, and value-based 
information and processes. 
 
My focus will then turn to developing a new conceptual approach to environmental assessment. I 
will begin by adding a philosophical tenet, based on Sen’s work, to the list presented in Chapter 2 
and explaining the principles listed at the end of Chapter 3 in more detail. Thereafter, I will describe 
the characteristics of the ‘sustainability argument’ approach that I propose. Parts of this proposal 
began to evolve in the discussions on the work of Flyvbjerg, Sen and Cilliers in the previous 
chapter; however, I will now synthesise and mould these into a more complete description which is 
presented in section 4.5.3. Thereafter, I will discuss the ways in which the ‘sustainability argument’ 
approach addresses the problems identified in Chapter 1. Finally, in section 4.6, I present some of 
the key challenges to implementing this proposal, as well as ideas for future research.  
 
4.2 Revisiting the Problem 
 
Environmental assessment is currently experiencing a number of problems that can be attributed, 
from a philosophical perspective, to the strong influence of modernism within the field (Audouin 
and Hattingh, 2008). The modernist roots of environmental assessment are well recognized and a 
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similar argument has been made by several authors in South Africa (e.g. Scott and Oelofse, 2001; 
Burns 2002; Audouin and Hattingh, 2008) and internationally (e.g. Jay et al., 2007).  
 
The roots of these problems are found mainly in the following three modernist assumptions (Capra, 
1982; Pepper, 1984; Magee, 2001; Rihani, 2002): 
▪ That a system can be understood by observing the behaviour of its parts: this has 
caused difficulties in predicting impacts, particularly social and cumulative ones;  
▪ That all processes flow along linear, deterministic, predictable and orderly paths: this 
assumption has not only led to problems in the ability of environmental assessment 
practitioners to predict cumulative impacts, but also in their ability to deal with 
uncertainty in the environmental assessment endeavour; and 
▪ That technical, objective, natural science-based information and processes are 
separate from, and superior to, non-technical, subjective, and value-based 
information and processes: this has constrained inter-disciplinarity in environmental 
assessment, the effectiveness of stakeholder engagement, and the ability of 
environmental assessment practitioners to address the normative aspects of impact 
prediction. 
 
4.3 The Philosophical Roots of Environmental Assessment 
 
The modernist view of the world was initiated by Descartes, who is widely considered the father of 
modern philosophy (Capra, 1982). From this perspective, the material world is conceptualised as a 
machine and life is viewed as a competitive struggle in which there is a strong belief in the value of 
economic and technological growth (Baumann, 1992; Capra, 1996). Integral to this view is a 
division between science and values, based on a fundamental split between mind and matter, 
called the Cartesian division. In this view the mind, or humans, aim to control matter, or nature 
(Benton, 1994). People provide the material world with its meaning, as this world, being analogous 
to a machine, has no purpose of its own (Baumann, 1992). Nature is therefore valued primarily in 
terms of its utility to human beings and not for the fact that it exists (Capra, 1982; Reid, 1995).  
 
Scientists, who have been strongly influenced by the Cartesian division for centuries, have 
developed their expertise mainly in the natural sciences, concentrating on observing matter 
objectively, or in the humanities, concentrating on the subjective individual and collective human 
mind and its values (Capra, 1982). Wilber (2001) makes an important point, that it is not 
modernity’s initial differentiation between these spheres that is concerning, as it enabled each to 
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develop on its own terms, but it is the subsequent dissociation between them and the dominance 
of science over the others that is problematic. 
 
A further assumption of the modern worldview is that if the right process is followed, objective and 
certain knowledge of the world is possible (Magee, 2001). This process involves applying logic to 
empirical facts, in a way which does not permit anything to intervene that is susceptible to doubt in 
any way (Magee, 2001). The goal of modernist science, therefore, is to describe the world 
objectively, with no reference to the subjective observer (Capra, 1982). As a machine, this world 
functions according to completely determinate universal mechanical laws (Capra, 1982), and once 
global patterns are defined, it is assumed that the future behaviour of the world can be predicted 
using the right inputs into a model thereof (Rihani, 2002). The emphasis is not only on prediction 
and certainty, but also on orderliness and homogeneity (Baumann, 1992).  
 
Modernist science is rooted in positivism, which holds that all knowledge is based on sense-
experience and that different kinds of knowledge do not exist (Mauter, 2000). In this view, all 
genuine inquiry relates to the explanation of empirical facts (Mauter, 2000). Consequently, any 
knowledge that cannot be tested against reality in an empirical manner (e.g. intuitive, emotional or 
spiritual knowledge) is not considered as valid or meaningful. Judgements based on scientific 
reasoning are therefore considered superior to subjective judgements and scientific knowledge is 
promoted to the detriment of knowledge founded on values, ethics, morals, intuition and emotion 
(Pepper, 1984).  
 
Modernist science led to numerous developments, which Wilber (2001a) points out should not be 
ignored in any critique of modernism. These developments were in fields such as medicine, 
physics and biology, among many others. The success of the mechanistic worldview in the natural 
sciences led to the study of human nature and society adopting this worldview and approach, 
resulting in the formulation of the social sciences (Capra, 1982). The inadequacies of Newtonian 
mechanics began to surface in the nineteenth century as a result of developments in the fields of 
quantum physics, the life sciences, philosophy and others, which contradicted many of the basic 
assumptions of the mechanistic view (Capra, 1982). In response to these developments many 
post-modern approaches to reality have developed, in which the idea that the world is a machine 
comprised of simple, static, discrete and atomistic mechanisms ruled by laws of order and 
causality is strongly rejected (Best and Kellner, 2001). From the postmodern perspective, the world 
is conceptualised as comprising multiple complex, dynamic, interrelated and holistic processes 
(Best and Kellner, 2001).  
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Postmodern thinkers reject the idea that there is a single discourse or truth that should govern the 
generation of knowledge and argue that there are a multitude of agencies, such as community 
groups, that give the world meaning and therefore a multitude of discourses or truths (Baumann, 
1992; Gare, 1995).  In particular, post-modern thinkers reject modernism’s ‘grand narrative’ of 
economic and technical growth as the guide for all political action (Gare, 1995). They also reject 
modernism’s extreme faith in reason and the type of scientific knowledge that can only result from 
the application of reason (Gare, 1995). They argue that postmodernism has led to the 
commodification of life, a focus on quantity rather than quality, the fragmentation of the material 
world and the loss of value and meaning in our culture (Capra, 1991; Wilber, 2001).  
 
In their response to modernism, postmodernists negate the perceived split between mind and 
matter. These thinkers argue that knowledge does not objectively mirror an outside reality, but is 
socially constructed (Best and Kellner, 2001) and is therefore influenced by numerous subjective 
factors (e.g. political context, values of the observer). The meaning of a particular observation is 
potentially limitless, as it is context-dependent and contexts (e.g. perspectives of an individual or 
collective) are limitless (Wilber, 2001). Wilber (2001) argues, however, that post-modernism has 
gone to extremes in recognising subjectivity as it has denied the reality of the objective world. He 
argues for a balance between objectivity and subjectivity, where the interpretive aspects of 
knowledge do not replace objective ones, but rather place them within a context.  Perhaps such a 
balance is now possible as a fight against ‘crude positivism’ is no longer needed, as pointed out by 
Cilliers (2005). However, this author also states that a resistance remains to philosophical positions 
that emphasise the interpretive aspects of knowledge.   
 
The evolution of modernism and post-modernism is reflected in the environmental debate through 
the development of technocentric and ecocentric approaches to environmental problems 
(O’Riordan, 1981). Technocentrism is based on modernity and is therefore a view of human well-
being associated with growth, technological progress and economic expansion (O’Riordan, 1981; 
Reid, 1995). Although the limits to such growth are recognised in some modes of technocentrism, 
the natural environment is generally seen as a resource for human development and not regarded 
for its intrinsic value (Benton, 1994; Reid, 1995). Objective, rational science is considered an 
important means of managing nature for human benefit, through techniques such as cost-benefit 
analysis (O’Riordan, 1981; Benton, 1994).  
 
Although there are many forms of ecocentrism, which is associated with a postmodern approach to 
environmental problems, they all oppose technocentrism in some way. Where technocentrists 
focus on processes and techniques for environmental management, the ecocentrists place the 
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emphasis on the type of relationship humans should have with nature. They all criticise 
technocentrism’s lack of questioning of the fundamental social and economic assumptions on 
which society rests, as they typically describe the environmental problématique in relation to one or 
more of these assumptions. The deep ecologists, for example, focus their critique on the dominant 
Western view that sees humans as separate from, and superior to, nature; the social ecologists 
question the social hierarchies on which Western society rests; while the eco-feminists criticise the 
patriarchal conceptual framework that dominates this society (Warren, 1987; Zimmerman, 1994). 
In general, the ecocentric approach promotes the virtues of reverence, humility, responsibility and 
care in people’s relationship to the environment (O’Riordan, 1981), as well as an approach to 
knowledge that includes the explicit consideration of subjective factors such as society’s values 
(Bookchin, 1982; Zimmerman, 1994).   
 
In general, environmental assessment in South Africa reflects the current position of mainstream 
Western thinking, which Best and Kellner (2001) place somewhere between the modern and post-
modern worldviews, with the modern perspective still dominant.  The modern and technocentric 
emphasis on empirical, objective knowledge to the detriment of subjective views and values is 
partially relieved in this field through recognition, among practitioners and researchers, of the 
subjective nature of many elements of the EIA process (e.g. determining the significance of 
impacts). However, the problems that the profession encounters indicate that it continues to be 
plagued by modernism’s dissociation between science and values and the dominance of science 
to the detriment of other forms of knowledge.  
 
In the section that follows, I will re-examine the basic assumptions of modernity within the context 
of environmental assessment as it is currently practiced. The findings of the researchers whose 
work I have investigated in this thesis will be used to inform this task. My purpose is to deconstruct 
the three main modern philosophical assumptions that are consciously or unconsciously 
influencing the field of environmental assessment, and which I believe led to many of the current 
constraints being experienced. An alternative way of undertaking environmental studies that inform 
development decision-making will then be proposed based on a new philosophical understanding.   
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4.4 Deconstructing the assumptions of modernity within the field of environmental 
assessment  
 
4.4.1 Re-examining the assumption that the system can be understood by observing the 
behaviour of the parts (i.e. reductionism) 
 
The need to understand the environment as a system, and not merely its component parts, has 
been recognised within the environmental assessment community through, for example, the use of 
network and systems diagrams, and the development of Adaptive Environmental Assessment and 
Management (AEAM) (Bisset, 1988). However, both systems diagrams and AEAM have met with 
significant constraints which include their inability to effectively incorporate social and economic 
concerns (Bisset, 1988; Wathern, 1988). Environmental assessment practice in South Africa, as in 
many other parts of the world has generally continued in a relatively reductionist manner in which 
the natural and social environment are not usually studied in an integrated way. Researchers in the 
field of sustainability science (Burns and Weaver, 2008), for example, are attempting to address 
this problem and refer to the environment as a social-ecological system (Resilience Alliance, 
2006). Environmental assessment would benefit from adopting this terminology and learning from 
this emerging field (Audouin and Hattingh, 2008). Of critical importance is that the concept of 
social-ecological systems is supported by a solid theoretical understanding of how systems 
operate and what recognising the systemic nature of the environment implies for practice within a 
particular context.  Ideas for such an understanding are being developed in the field of 
sustainability science, many of which are based on complexity theory (e.g. Du Plessis, 2008).  
 
Complexity theory provides a compelling argument for linking humans and nature, particularly in 
our generation of knowledge of the world’s systems. From this perspective such systems cannot 
be understood merely by studying their component parts (e.g. the social environment separately 
from the ecological environment) for two primary reasons (Heylighen et al., 2007): 
 
▪ A component (or subsystem) of a complex system is not an independent element, but 
rather a relation that processes input into output according to the nature of that 
relation; and 
▪ The system has emergent properties, or characteristics that cannot be reduced to the 
properties of the parts.  
 
M o d e r n i s m ,  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  A s s e s s m e n t  a n d  t h e  S u s t a i n a b i l i t y  A r g u m e n t :   
M o v i n g  t o wa r d s  a  N e w A p p r o a c h  t o  P r o j e c t - b a s e d  D e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a   
 
 
 
 
Page 177 
In my view, an understanding of complex social-ecological systems should be founded on some 
conception of the inter-relationship between humans and nature, from the perspective of 
environmental philosophy.  The radical ecologists (i.e. deep ecologists, social ecologists and eco-
feminists) provide examples of such conceptions. I don’t believe one particular philosophical view 
to be ‘correct’ or that there is indeed a single ‘correct’ way of conceptualising these links, as this 
question is one that concerns values to a greater extent than scientific exactitude. However, I do 
think that it is important that those trying to understand social-ecological systems have some 
philosophical idea on which to base their scientific descriptions. Otherwise, it is likely that the 
dominant view of humans and nature as separate, and of nature as primarily a resource for human 
growth and development, will consciously or unconsciously dominate by default, no matter what 
terminology is used.   
 
Examples of different philosophical concepts of the human-nature relationship are provided by the 
radical ecologies, namely deep ecology, social ecology and eco-feminism. Each, however, has its 
own version of this relationship and emphasise different aspects. Deep ecologists, for example, 
stress that all objects in the world are nodes in a web of interconnections (Harding, 1997). As all 
human and non-human entities are part of an inter-connected whole, they are all seen as equal in 
intrinsic worth (Devall and Sessions, 1985). It is therefore unnecessary, from a deep ecological 
perspective, to create a hierarchy in which humans are at the pinnacle (Devall and Sessions, 
1985).This biocentric equality is disputed by the social ecologists, who argue that not all life forms 
are morally interchangeable with one another in terms of their intrinsic worth (Bookchin, 1994). 
They argue that biocentric equality denies the uniqueness of humans and devalues their increased 
ability for rationality (Bookchin, 1993; Des Jardins, 1993). 
 
The social ecologists describe the interrelatedness between humans and nature in a different way. 
Their concept is based on an idea of natural evolution in which humans (or 2nd nature), like other 
mammals, evolved out of the non-human (or 1st nature) (Bookchin, 1987). This evolutionary 
process tends towards increasing complexity, subjectivity and flexibility (Bookchin, 1982). Humans, 
although part of the same evolutionary process as the biological environment and therefore 
intrinsically linked to this environment, are distinguished from 1st nature by their greater capacity for 
rationality, communication and culture (Bookchin, 1993; Des Jardins, 1993).  
 
Finally, the eco-feminists see the link between humans and non-humans as one of co-members of 
an ecological community (Warren, 1987). The differences between humans and non-humans are 
recognised by eco-feminists, but they emphasise that one is not superior to the other and therefore 
has no right to dominate it (Warren, 1987).  Their argument is based on a critique of a value-
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dualism in which humans are separated from, and considered superior to, nature, enabling the 
exploitation of the latter (Warren, 2003). Similarly, the eco-feminists argue, the male (which is 
associated with mind, rationality, spirit and culture) is considered separate from, and superior to, 
the female (which is associated with nature, emotions and the body). Rather than viewing these 
dualisms as complementary, they are viewed in modern society, in competitive ‘either-or’ terms 
(Warren, 1987; Zimmerman, 1994; Warren, 2003).  
 
Various individuals are likely to have their own versions of the precise nature of the human-nature 
relationship, influenced by their own values, belief-systems and cultural backgrounds. What is 
important, however, is that the interconnectedness of this relationship is acknowledged, in order to 
increase the value that modern society places on the natural environment and to promote a more 
caring, responsible attitude towards it.  
 
When applied to current environmental assessment practice, the discussion above implies the 
following: 
▪ That nature is not simply a resource for human development and economic growth, 
but a vital aspect of a complex system of which humans are a part, and on which they 
are dependent for their survival. Notwithstanding the increased capacities of humans 
for rational thinking, communication and culture, viewing humans and nature as co-
members of various systems on all scales, calls into question the goal of ‘managing’ 
nature. The terminology of ‘management’ implies a pre-determined hierarchy within 
the system in which humans, as separate and superior to nature, have a pre-given 
right to dominate it. In my view, it would be better for humans to strive towards finding 
a way to inhabit the social-ecological systems of which they are a part, which does 
not degrade the system or its components.   
▪ That the environment typically considered in an environmental assessment comprises 
a system of relationships between humans and the natural environment, as well as a 
large number of human and non-human elements. For this reason it is a 
misperception to structure an EIA according to ‘development’ on the one hand and 
the ‘environment’ on the other, and then attempt to determine the impact of the former 
on the latter. The proposed development, if approved, becomes part of a system that 
is changing constantly and this needs to be accommodated in the assessment 
process.  
▪ That the environment cannot be understood through merely examining its component 
parts (e.g. land, water, air and population) since it has emergent properties that result 
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from the interaction of these parts and these interactions, in turn, restrict the 
behaviour of the parts.  
 
4.4.2 Re-examining the assumption that all processes flow along linear, deterministic, 
predictable and orderly paths  
 
Through the lens of complexity theory we can see that complex systems have a large degree of 
unpredictability by definition and, therefore, we can never have complete understanding of such 
systems (Cilliers 2005a; 2007). Cilliers explains that the predictability of complex systems is 
constrained by the necessity to omit certain components when drawing its boundaries. Without 
doing this it is impossible to gain even an approximate understanding of a system and the 
environment to which it is inexorably linked. This leads to unpredictability within the system as the 
aspects which are left out in the bounding process may well interact with the system in a dynamic 
non-linear way. Small causes may have large effects and vice versa. The unpredictability of the 
behaviour of complex systems is increased further by the fact that we do not always know what it is 
that has been left out in the modelling process.  
 
The predictability of complex systems diminishes even further when we consider the nature of the 
knowledge that we have of such systems. Cilliers (2005a; 2005b; 2008c) shows that this 
knowledge is limited to the boundaries (both spatial and non-spatial) that we develop when 
conceptualising or modelling them. As these boundaries are informed by both subjective factors 
(e.g. purpose of the study) and the structure of the system (e.g. catchment boundaries), there is no 
pre-determined way to formulate them, although some may be more meaningful in a particular 
situation than others.  Cilliers (2005a) explains that our knowledge is therefore valid within a 
particular context and as that context changes, so should our knowledge. As a result, the 
behaviour of a complex system in one time and place cannot necessarily be used to predict the 
behaviour of the same system at another time, or another system in a different location.  
 
Cilliers (2000a; 2005a) does not use the above argument to negate the need for models, but rather 
to call for modesty in their use and recognition of the limitations of the knowledge we generate 
concerning complex systems. Importantly, the view from complexity relieves us of the impossible 
task of finding a final, correct, objective and comprehensive description of systems (Cilliers, 2007).  
 
The unpredictability of complex systems and the limitations of our knowledge of these systems 
have a number of implications for environmental assessment as it is currently practiced, including 
the following: 
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▪ That our understanding of social-ecological systems and the predictions made in 
assessments are only applicable in terms of the normative framework or context (e.g. 
strategic choices about the type of issues to be considered and the spatial boundaries 
of the study) within which they were developed. If another framework is used, or any 
aspect of a framework or context changes, such understanding and predictions are 
likely to be different. It is impossible to gain an entirely objective understanding of a 
social-ecological system and therefore to make entirely objective predictions of the 
effects of development. 
▪ That our knowledge of social-ecological systems and therefore our predictions of their 
behaviour will always be inherently limited in ways we will not, in many instances, be 
able to identify, let alone quantify.  
▪ That simply addressing what are considered to be significant first-order cause-effect 
relationships within the environment is wholly insufficient, as it does not reflect the 
systemic, interconnected and non-linear nature of social-ecological systems. Such an 
approach excludes feedback loops and does not take into account the fact that small 
causes can have large effects and vice versa.  
▪ Since social-ecological systems themselves, and the contexts in which we gain 
knowledge of them, are dynamic, we cannot have a single, final understanding of 
such systems, or make final, objective, unchanging predictions of their behaviour. 
 
4.4.3 Re-examining the split between technical, objective, natural science-based 
information and processes, and non-technical, subjective, value-based information 
and processes and the dominance of natural science-based rationality  
 
The dissociation between subjective value-based information and processes and more objective, 
science-based ones begins on the philosophical and conceptual level. Complexity theory reveals 
how all knowledge has intrinsically subjective elements (Cilliers, 2000).  In particular Cilliers points 
out that the framework within which our knowledge is constituted is developed using both 
subjective (e.g. the purpose of the research) as well as objective considerations (e.g. the 
boundaries of a water catchment). He also points out that data cannot be transformed into 
knowledge through an objective, mechanical process, but that interpretation is required, a task 
which is influenced by the subjective perspective of the observer.  
 
Applying this understanding to environmental assessment reveals the ethical choices within the 
process, as well as values which underlie the environmental assessment approach as a whole. My 
purpose in summarising this is to show, that what is often thought of as a predominantly objective 
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exercise, is permeated with subjectivity, not only in its processes and techniques, but also in its 
philosophical foundations.  
 
Many of the normative choices that are made within the environmental assessment process make 
up the contextual framework within which environmental assessment is undertaken and include, for 
example: 
▪ Identification of the stakeholders to be involved in the engagement process; 
▪ The selection of methods to elicit data; 
▪ The spatial boundaries of the assessment; 
▪ The temporal boundaries of the assessment; and 
▪ The way in which the significance of potential impacts is determined.  
 
In addition to this framework, subjectivity is involved in the many instances of interpretation that are 
part of the environmental assessment process. These include, for example, the interpretation of 
the views and concerns of stakeholders in order to identify the strategic issues that should be 
addressed in the assessment; and the interpretation that the specialist must undertake to convert 
his/her data into knowledge of the potential positive and negative impacts of a development and 
the significance thereof.  Drawing from the insights of the radical ecologists, it can be argued that 
such interpretation is strongly influenced by the environmental ethics of those involved in 
undertaking this task, as well as by prevailing social attitudes. If this is the case, and I believe that 
it is, then the arguments of the radical ecologists that attitudes of domination have spilled over into 
the mainstream position towards nature, is of particular relevance to environmental assessment 
practitioners.  
 
More generally, mainstream environmental assessment, as an approach to incorporating 
environmental aspects into decision-making, is based on a value-system that is predominantly 
technocentric (O’Riordan, 1981). As described in Chapter 2, the managerialist mode of 
technocentrism is underpinned by numerous normative assumptions, including, for example, the 
following (O’Riordan, 1981; Benton, 1994; Reid, 1995):  
▪ A view of nature as primarily a resource for humans;  
▪ A view that human well-being is associated with technological progress, growth and 
economic expansion;   
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▪ An acknowledgement of the natural limits to meeting increasing human needs and 
the use of control and regulation to prevent these limits being exceeded; 
▪ A high degree of confidence in the ability of technology to solve problems such as 
poverty and ecological destruction; 
▪ A view of scientific knowledge as a means to control nature through technological 
innovation; and 
▪ A reliance on scientific rationality, value-free scientific and managerial techniques, 
modelling and prediction.  
 
These characteristics are evident in a number of ways in environmental assessment. For example: 
in the emphasis on objectivity; the requirement for impacts to be presented according to a 
legislated and universally pre-determined template; the emphasis in current debates in the field on 
the administrative and technical aspects of the procedure; as well as the fact that environmental 
assessment is considered a ’tool’ or ‘technological process’ that is used to ‘manage resources’.  
Even more recently formulated terminology, for example, the introduction of the concept of 
‘ecosystem services’ (Scholes and Biggs, 2004), is orientated towards a view of the environment 
as primarily a resource for human development. However, it is in fact this instrumentalist 
technocentric worldview that the ecocentric philosophers describe as one of the primary causes of 
our current environmental problems. 
 
The ‘managerialist’ technocentric view is also evident in the overall goal of environmental 
assessment to promote sustainable development (Cooper, 2001). The focus of this concept, in its 
mainstream interpretation, tends to be on minimising the consequences of development on the 
environment through managerial techniques, with limited questioning of the core economic and 
social values on which mainstream society is based (Pepper, 1984; Benton, 1994). This 
technocentric view is therefore self-sustaining, as its emphasis on objectivity and its 
marginalisation of normative concerns, including those related to its own perspective, limits such 
questioning. Benton (1994) points out that although decreased economic growth or even no growth 
is considered within the framework of sustainable development, essentially different forms of 
social, cultural and economic existence are not proposed. The socio-economic value system that 
underlies the concept of sustainable development, as described in the Limits to Growth (WCED, 
1987), is therefore largely based on conventional economic growth (Reid, 1995).  
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Environmental assessment is also influenced by the value-system associated with the utilitarian 
approach to decision-making. Within such an approach the consequences of an action or 
development are valued as the dominant factor to consider in making a decision, excluding the 
area of ethical concern in which an act may be considered ‘wrong’ based on certain principles, 
despite its potential consequences (Des Jardins, 1993). Flyvbjerg (2001) points out that the 
emphasis on objectivity within the scientific approach has led to an emphasis on instrumental 
rationality in society, to the detriment of value-rationality. This can be seen within the 
environmental assessment context in the many attempts within the local and international arena, to 
deal with the shortcomings of the assessment approach mainly by revising the process or the tools 
used within it.  
 
The argument above illustrates the following: 
▪ That the current mainstream approach to environmental assessment as a whole, is 
not as value-free as it attempts to be, but is rather based on a worldview (i.e. 
technocentrism) that has a bias towards scientific rationality, with its requirements for 
objectivity and uniformity. This bias has led to the value-based assumptions upon 
which environmental assessment rests (e.g. current modes of social and economic 
development) remaining largely unquestioned to any significant degree. As a 
consequence, the dominant worldview currently underlying mainstream 
environmental assessment procedures is not necessarily congruent with the goals of 
reducing environmental destruction and alleviating poverty. 
▪ That within the environmental assessment endeavour, knowledge, tasks and 
processes should not be conceived in the dualistic terms of being subjective or 
technical, objective and scientific. Rather, as argued by Wilber (2001), every external, 
objective occasion has its interior, subjective correlates. Our knowledge and activities 
have both objective and subjective components, each of which need to be recognised 
on their own terms, without one dominating the other. Interpretation, for example is 
involved in many aspects of environmental assessment and such interpretation is 
influenced by the environmental ethics of the individual, as well as the society of 
which that individual is a part. This means that an environmental assessment is not 
simply the provision of objective scientific environmental information into the 
subjective political task of decision-making.  
▪ That the environmental assessment process as a whole, the tasks within it and the 
problems that are currently being experienced in their implementation cannot be 
addressed using predominantly scientific rationality, but require an appropriate 
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balance between such rationality and value-deliberation. For example, the subjective 
dimensions of all aspects of environmental assessment are not ‘uncertainties’ to be 
‘managed away’ through some ‘objective’ tool. Rather, they are normative choices 
that need to be made explicit within environmental assessment and addressed in a 
way that is appropriate to their subjective and often emotive nature.  
 
4.5 An alternative conceptual approach to project-level environmental assessment 
 
In this section I will propose an alternative conceptual approach to environmental assessment, 
which aims to address many of the constraints experienced in this field due to its modernist roots. 
First, I will list the philosophical tenets of the ‘sustainability argument’ approach that I propose, 
which include an additional tenet to the ones listed in Chapter 2, based on the work of Sen. 
Thereafter I will present the principles, as listed in Chapter 3, on which the proposal is based. 
When describing these principles I will begin to present the ‘sustainability argument’ approach, but 
will describe it in more detail in section 4.5.3. It is important to note that I consider this proposal to 
be one perspective on how practitioners may begin to address the modernist constraints to the 
current practice of environmental assessment, and not a final, correct ‘answer’. It would be 
possible to develop other approaches which do not contradict the essence of the philosophical 
tenets and principles described.  
 
4.5.1 Philosophical tenets of the ‘Sustainability Argument’ approach 
 
Drawing primarily on the work of the radical ecologists as discussed in Chapter 2, as well as on 
Sen’s idea of development (discussed in Chapter 3), a more sustainable relationship between 
humans and nature would be one in which: 
 
▪ Humans and nature are seen as part of an interrelated social-ecological system in 
which neither dominates the other, but in which their differences are acknowledged. 
The connection between the well-being of humans and nature is therefore 
recognised; 
▪ The link between a person’s philosophy or conceptual framework and the way in 
which they practically interact with others and the environment is recognised and 
considered an important factor in improving the sustainability of social-ecological 
systems. Attitudes and structures of domination between social groups are seen to be 
detrimental to a social-ecological system as a whole; 
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▪ All life is considered part of an evolutionary process in which it unfolds its inherent 
potential. In human beings, this process of self-realisation involves an increasingly 
wider sense of self that moves from an ecocentric to a sociocentric to a worldcentric 
orientation; 
▪ Nature is valued for its existence beyond its use to humans, and therefore certain 
activities are prohibited irrespective of their benefits to people; 
▪ Diversity, both human and natural, is valued as a pre-requisite to the sustainability of 
a social-ecological system.  An attitude of inclusion is adopted in which opposites are 
not seen as being in competition with one another, but as being complementary; 
▪ Development is understood as a means to enhance the basic capabilities of people to 
function in a way that is deemed valuable, of which meeting basic needs is only a 
part; and 
▪ Decision-making regarding social-ecological systems is guided by an ‘ethics of care’ 
in which a central place is provided for contextual factors, as well as general 
principles.  
 
4.5.2 Principles on which the ‘Sustainability Argument’ approach is based 
 
The principles listed below, which are drawn from Chapter 3 of this thesis, form the foundation for 
the ‘sustainability argument’ approach which I begin to describe in this section, but explain in more 
detail in section 4.5.3. Many of these principles pertain to the general characteristics of social-
ecological systems, as I consider this understanding to be fundamental in the design of an 
alternative conceptual approach to environmental assessment. Each of the principles will be briefly 
discussed in the sections that follow.  
 
4.5.2.1. The environment should be conceived as a complex social-ecological system that should 
not only be understood in terms of its component parts, but also in terms of the 
relationships between these parts 
Understanding the social-ecological system requires some conception of its boundaries and the 
components and relationships within it, which should be developed with the input of key 
stakeholders (Audouin and Hattingh, 2008; Du Plessis, 2008; Will, 2008). Developing this 
conception should also be guided by the general characteristics of complex systems, as described 
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by Cilliers (1998; 2007) and discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.4.3.1)38. This concept (or model) 
should then guide the understanding of the system as a whole, as well as the investigation of its 
component parts. The former should be gained from both a deductive (top-down) and inductive 
(bottom-up) perspective. The inductive understanding should be informed by the investigation of 
the component parts, which is now made easier by the existence of a conceptual understanding of 
how the parts relate to one another.  
 
In order to overcome the current human-nature (or development-environment) division inherent in 
environmental assessment, the proposed development should be seen as a potential change to 
the social-ecological system. The components of this system comprise individuals, societal groups, 
elements from nature, as well as the built environment. The focus should then be shifted from 
predicting the potential impacts of a development on the environment, as is currently the case in 
environmental assessment; to describing, as part of the sustainability argument, how the system is 
likely to change under different conditions. It is important that not only the likely effects of the 
proposed change on the social-ecological system (under various assumptions) are described, but 
also the influence of that system on the implementation of the proposed change39. These effects 
should be evaluated in terms of a contextually-defined understanding of sustainability40. 
 
4.5.2.2. Social-ecological systems should be understood both in terms of their interior, subjective 
aspects, as well as their exterior, objective ones 
It can be deduced from Wilber’s (2001) Integral Framework, that a thorough understanding of a 
social-ecological system should be informed by a comprehension of both its exterior (or material) 
aspects, as well as its related interior dimensions (e.g. values and ethics)41. For example, Flyvbjerg 
(2001) states that institutional structures should be understood from ‘within and without’, as agency 
and structure are interlinked. This means that power-relations within organisations (e.g. between 
government departments), as well as the values that support them, should be researched, as well 
as the capacity, structure and functions of those institutions.   
                                            
38
  The view of the social-ecological environment as a complex system is promoted in several other spheres, 
including that of development planning and of adaptive management. Van Huyssteen and Oranje (2008: 
521), for example, describe the recognition of complexity within a development planning pilot project in 
South Africa and state that this project “… sought to identify emergent patterns amidst the seemingly 
unpredictability of the complex systems that it was engaged with”.  The concept of the social-ecological 
environment as a complex system is also supported within Norton’s (2005) approach to adaptive 
management. Norton (2005: 93) states that in this approach “… there is a commitment to open systems, 
to understanding nature and the environment as a complex and multiscalar interaction of parts”.  
39
  If the sustainability argument is being formulated in conjunction with the development design process, a 
description of how the social-ecological system should influence the design of the proposed change 
should also be included.  
40
  This understanding should be based, however, on the philosophical tenets listed in section 4.5.1. 
41
  This argument is also made in Du Plessis (2008). 
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4.5.2.3. The contextual and normative nature of all knowledge of social-ecological systems should 
be recognised 
Drawing from complexity theory (Cilliers, 2005b) it is important to note that there are multiple 
perspectives on any particular social-ecological system, some of which are more useful or 
appropriate than others. These perspectives, which cannot be developed objectively, are strongly 
influenced by the normative framework or context in which they are formulated. This framework 
includes aspects such as the definition of the system, the purpose of the study and the values of 
the researchers and stakeholders. The collection of data related to a social-ecological system, for 
example, depends on the reason why that data are being collected, and the process of 
interpretation is influenced by the values and perceptions of the specialist researchers and 
stakeholders.  
 
There are several implications of the contextual and normative nature of knowledge for 
environmental assessment. Most fundamentally, as discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.2.3.1), I 
propose that rather than attempting to implement an ‘objective’ procedure, in which impacts are 
identified and assessed according to a pre-determined, legislated template, the focus should be on 
developing a rational argument. Lawrence (2007) includes the ‘rational argument’ approach, 
among others, in his proposal for evaluating significance, but does not transform the entire 
environmental assessment process along these lines. The purpose of such an argument would be 
to formulate an opinion, drawing on scientific knowledge as well as value-deliberation, on whether 
a proposed development should be accommodated within a social-ecological system or not, and if 
so, under what conditions42.  
 
This sustainability argument should draw on situational ethics by, for example, relating to what are 
defined as valuable functionings and capabilities (Sen, 1984) within a particular context. The 
specific process for developing the argument should also be defined in a context-specific way, 
based on the philosophical tenets listed in section 4.3, the principles presented in this section, as 
well as the principles for sustainability contained in national legislation. The focus on situational 
ethics, guided by general sustainability principles, is congruent with a phronétic approach to 
research and decision-making as described by Flyvbjerg (2001), as well as the eco-feminist call for 
a shift away from ethics as mainly a matter of pre-determined abstract rights and rules, to an 
approach in which the context influences what is considered appropriate (e.g. Plumwood, 1993). 
 
                                            
42
  This argumentation approach is similar to that advanced by Elling (2008) in his discussion on 
environmental assessment as a reflexive arrangement, as described in Chapter 3. 
M o d e r n i s m ,  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  A s s e s s m e n t  a n d  t h e  S u s t a i n a b i l i t y  A r g u m e n t :   
M o v i n g  t o wa r d s  a  N e w A p p r o a c h  t o  P r o j e c t - b a s e d  D e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a   
 
 
 
 
Page 188 
The normative framework, context or perspective from which the sustainability argument is made 
should be fully explained. Stakeholders should participate in making the choices that comprise this 
framework, including the spatial and temporal extent of the study, the conceptualisation or 
modelling of the social-ecological system, the aspects to be studied, the interpretation of the data, 
as well as the interpretation of what sustainability means in the particular context under 
discussion43. Stakeholder engagement should not be considered a separate and secondary 
process, to the technical one. Rather, selected key stakeholders should be considered a part of a 
sustainability team that coordinates the development of the argument and which comprises 
specialist researchers and a sustainability practitioner that coordinates the process. These 
stakeholders should participate in developing the sustainability argument as determined by that 
team on a case-by-case basis (and according to principles set in legislation), and not according to 
a pre-determined format that is simply applied in every instance.  
 
Within this context, the role of government departments, shifts from merely an administrative role in 
which they focus on ensuring that certain steps are followed, to understanding what principles 
should be promoted in legislation, developing non-legislated guidelines for best practice on how 
these principles can be met, determining whether these have been met in an appropriate way in 
particular cases and deciding whether or not a particular development should be approved based 
on the argument provided by the study team.  
 
4.5.2.4. A phronétic approach should be adopted to understanding social-ecological systems as 
well as to decision-making concerning such systems.   
The overall task of developing a sustainability argument should be seen (as suggested in 
Chapter 3, section 3.2.3.1) as a form of phronétic research, rather than a type of epistémic 
science, although the latter should certainty inform this task. As such, the research which supports 
the development of the argument should display the characteristics of phronésis, as described by 
Flyvbjerg (2001; 2004) and emphasise power-relations, values and the views of multiple 
stakeholders. Practical, context-dependent knowledge should also be emphasised and there 
should be a focus on concrete examples, detail, description, background, qualifications and 
practice rather than theory and general rules. This does not mean, as Flyvbjerg (2001) states, that 
attempts at generalisations should be excluded, but rather that the social-ecological system should 
not be explained in terms that do not reflect its particular characteristics and which ignore 
exceptions to general trends. 
 
                                            
43
 This interpretation should be based on the philosophical tenets listed in section 4.5.1. 
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Consistent with Flyvbjerg’s (2001; 2004) phronétic approach, as well as Cilliers’ (1998) narrative 
one, the sustainability argument should not see itself as having a privileged position from which the 
final truth can be determined, but rather as a perspective that contributes to the debate concerning 
a proposed change to the social-ecological system. This perspective should draw on a range of 
epistemologies (including scientific analysis, stakeholder views, myths and stories) and a variety of 
methods, including specialist scientific studies and first person narratives.  If the argument is based 
on a set of situational ethics of what sustainability means, as recommended in the section below, it 
will further display the characteristics of phronétic research.  
 
4.5.2.5. A range of epistemologies should be used as appropriate to understand the various aspects 
of social-ecological systems and to make decisions concerning human activities within 
these systems 
The fact that social-ecological systems have interrelated subjective and objective dimensions and 
that all knowledge has a normative dimension, means that scientific rationality, which focuses on 
knowledge that can be attained through empirical testing, should be mixed with what Flyvbjerg 
(2001) calls value deliberation. There are many aspects of social-ecological systems which cannot 
be understood in all their complexity through traditional scientific techniques alone. These include, 
for example, the views of stakeholders concerning a proposed development, ethical aspects of a 
decision-making process, poverty issues, employment problems and social tensions. Flyvbjerg 
(2001) makes the important point that traditional scientific thinking, or what he calls epistémé, has 
strongly influenced the social sciences to the extent that they typically attempt to deal with these 
issues in an instrumental way that does not engage sufficiently with the values and subjective 
interpretations that influence such concerns. Value-deliberation, which Flyvbjerg (2001) argues is a 
more appropriate role for the social sciences, should include, for example, an engagement with the 
various narratives and stories that Cilliers (1998) points out are not logically structured, but which 
guide the activities of social groups and provide these activities with meaning.  
 
Such value-deliberation also requires an engagement with the felt experiences of social groups, 
particularly those that are traditionally marginalised, such as women, children and traditional 
communities. In addition, the sustainability team which develops the sustainability argument should 
be aware of, and informed by, their felt experiences and intuition, and not only the scientific 
information that is available to the study. This information should be presented in a way that is 
appropriate to its particular nature, and not automatically reduced to empirical forms.  
 
M o d e r n i s m ,  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  A s s e s s m e n t  a n d  t h e  S u s t a i n a b i l i t y  A r g u m e n t :   
M o v i n g  t o wa r d s  a  N e w A p p r o a c h  t o  P r o j e c t - b a s e d  D e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a   
 
 
 
 
Page 190 
4.5.2.6. The provisional and limited nature of our understanding of social-ecological systems and 
our predictions of their behaviour should be acknowledged 
Through the lens of complexity theory (Cilliers, 2001; 2005a; 2005b; 2007) we can identify a 
number of inherent limitations to our knowledge of social-ecological systems. The first relates to 
the contextual nature of such knowledge, which compels us to view our understanding of these 
systems as provisional. In addition, our knowledge is limited because we have to reduce the 
complexity of social-ecological systems when modelling them or developing some concept of their 
boundaries, their components and the relationship between these. As a result, Cilliers (2005a) calls 
for a modest approach to the knowledge claims and predictions that we make. Since we cannot 
assume full control of a social-ecological system, a high degree of spontaneity and unpredictability 
should be anticipated, as we attempt to understand trends and navigate our way through these 
(Bookchin, 1982). 
 
This modest approach, as well as the dynamic nature of social-ecological systems, is also 
accommodated by the shift in focus, as described in section 4.5.2.1., from predicting the potential 
impacts of a development on the environment, to describing how the system is likely to respond 
under different conditions, as a result of the proposed change. This could involve the generation of 
scenarios, which are already a part of the practice of certain types of SEA. The impact of 
alternative development options on the environment are already identified in EIAs; however, this 
assessment is usually undertaken from a single perspective of what the underlying social and 
economic trends in the environment are likely to be. Different stakeholder groups and specialists, 
though, are likely to have varying opinions on these trends. The introduction of alternative 
scenarios within the sustainability argument therefore accommodates, to a greater degree, this 
subjectivity, as well as the continually changing nature of the environment. This approach also 
relieves the sustainability team of finding a single, correct answer of what the potential impacts of a 
development are, when there is no such answer. The illusion that there is one is removed, enabling 
the sustainability argument to be more accommodating in its presentation of the variables and 
subtleties that should be considered when making a development decision.  
 
Acknowledging the inherent uncertainty in understanding social-ecological systems, and our 
inability to determine the effect of elements that have been left out of our description of the system, 
also relieves the environmental community from trying to find a fool-proof, predetermined way of 
quantifying, and dealing with, uncertainty. I am not arguing against a description, by the 
sustainability team, of their confidence in their scientific statements, but rather that the focus 
should be shifted away from trying to find a pre-determined, objective method to identify all 
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uncertainties and manage them, a task that is impossible. Instead, the team should focus on ways 
to improve the ability of social-ecological systems to adapt to change in a manner that promotes 
the movement of the system towards sustainability, as defined within the normative framework 
discussed in section 4.5.2.3. 
 
4.5.3 Formulating the Sustainability Argument 
 
In this section I will present the key characteristics of the ‘sustainability argument’ approach that I 
propose. Some of the ideas presented have already been discussed above; however, in this 
section I will synthesise and expand these into a coherent description. As explained in the 
introduction to this thesis, the approach presented is a conceptual one and the details of 
implementing each stage would need to be determined and tested in practice. Such testing is 
outside the scope of this thesis, but would need to form the next step in any research undertaken 
as a follow-up to this study.  
 
I will now move away where relevant in this section, from using the terms ‘environmental 
assessment’, ‘environmental assessment practitioners’ and the ‘environmental assessment team’. 
Rather, in order to accommodate a range of values, perspectives and epistemologies, I will refer to 
‘the sustainability argument’, ‘sustainability practitioners’ and the ‘sustainability team’. This change 
in terminology also explicitly indicates the subjectivity inherent in the proposed approach.  
 
It is also important to note that, as explained in the introduction to this thesis, I have related the 
approach described below to the stage in the decision-making process at which traditional EIA is 
currently undertaken in South Africa, namely at the point at which an authority decision is made as 
to whether the proposed development44 should proceed or not and under what conditions. It is 
possible, however, to apply this approach during the process of designing the development, 
guiding it onto a sustainable trajectory. To achieve this, the characteristics listed below would need 
to be adapted to the context-specific design process being followed. I have, however, added some 
footnotes to the description that follows, to provide initial, conceptual examples of how this might 
be achieved, in relation to some of the characteristics listed.  
 
The specific step-by-step process of developing the sustainability argument should, in all instances 
be constructed on a case-by-case basis by the sustainability team. This process should, however, 
                                            
44
  The term ‘proposed development’ is used in a broad sense to include any proposed change to the social-
ecological system that requires governmental authorization. This may include, for example, the 
establishment of regional parks, undertaking certain mining and agricultural activities and the construction 
of housing projects. 
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be developed in accordance with the principles of accountable, equitable and transparent decision-
making and display the characteristics described below45.   
 
1. The sustainability team for the study should comprise disciplinary specialists, selected key 
stakeholders from sectors such as industry, commerce, Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs) and at least one sustainability 
practitioner who coordinates the development of the argument46.  
2. Specialist and stakeholder input should be designed to answer specific questions 
throughout the process of developing the sustainability argument47. This approach is 
aligned with the ‘issues-based’ approach to environmental assessment proposed by 
Weaver and Rossouw (1998), based on the work in social assessment undertaken by 
Taylor et al. (1990). This approach is also aligned with the Principles for Transdisciplinary 
Research proposed by the Swiss Academy of Arts and Sciences (Pohl and Hadorn, 
200748). The sustainability team as a whole should be involved in framing the questions and 
determining how they should be answered (e.g. what forms of knowledge are required). 
Information and opinions should be sought from a variety of sources including: scientific 
specialist studies; personal narratives; people’s felt experiences; historical databases; and 
the practical wisdom of the sustainability team, among others. Emphasis should be placed 
on providing concrete, practical examples of the functioning of the social-ecological system, 
rather than abstract descriptions.  
3. The type of engagement that is undertaken at various stages of the process should be 
adapted to the nature of the questions asked, rather than only applying a pre-determined 
                                            
45
  Some of the concepts that are central to the characteristics listed, such as the conceptualization of the 
environment as a social-ecological system and the acknowledgement of multiple forms of knowledge, are 
also being explored within the broader context of sustainability science research (Burns et al., 2006). As 
stated in the introduction, my participation in such research has influenced the ideas and proposals made 
in this thesis.  
46
  If the sustainability argument is being developed in conjunction with the development design process, the 
design professional (e.g. architects and town and regional planners) should be part of the team.  
47
  In cases where the sustainability argument is being formulated in conjunction with the development 
design process, answering these questions would include investigations into how the design of the 
development can enhance the surrounding ecological environment (e.g. through maintenance and 
enhancement of biodiversity in the area and through capital expenditure on alien plant eradication), 
minimize resource use (e.g. through promoting energy efficiency) and minimise waste production (e.g. 
through recycling and reducing carbon emissions).  
48
  The Swiss Academy of Arts and Sciences’ (Pohl and Hadorn, 2007) approach to Transdisciplinary 
research places strong emphasis on the participatory identification of problems and the division of these 
problems into sub-problems, to be answered using the most appropriate knowledge forms and the most 
appropriate means of collaboration between disciplines and organizations.   
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‘one-size-fits-all’ method such as a scoping workshop49. Some engagement activities, for 
example, may only involve certain parts of the community, while others may be broader in 
terms of involvement. The views of stakeholders should be sought on a broader range of 
topics than is usually the case in traditional EIAs, which typically focus on stakeholder 
opinion regarding the proposed development and the assessment process to be followed. 
Stakeholder views should inform, for example, the description of the social-ecological 
system, the understanding of current trends within the system and the values that influence 
the formulation of the sustainability argument50. The views of traditionally marginalised 
groups such as women and indigenous communities should be explicitly sought in ways 
that respond to their time and resource constraints.  
4. Early in the process, the social-ecological system should be conceptualised as a complex 
system, placing equal emphasis on the links between the elements within the system, as on 
the elements themselves51. Will (2008) suggests developing such a conceptualisation as 
the first stage in undertaking State of the Environment Reporting (SoER), Weaver and 
Rotmans (2008) include this task in the ISA process related to the policy-level of decision-
making and Du Plessis (2008), drawing partly on Wilber (2000), provides conceptual 
guidance on how to accomplish this. In addition, Walker et al. (2002) propose a similar step 
in their framework for analysing the resilience52 of social-ecological systems, which begins 
with developing a conceptual model of such systems, with extensive involvement from 
stakeholders.  
The conception of the social-ecological system should relate both to what Wilber (2001) 
calls its ‘interior’ (e.g. value systems and power relations) and ‘exterior’ (e.g. institutional 
structures, ecology) aspects and should include a description of its history. This task should 
be undertaken with the participation of selected key stakeholders as part of the 
sustainability team. As suggested by Will (2008) in relation to SoER, the concept of the 
                                            
49
  In cases where the sustainability argument is being formulated in conjunction with the development 
design procedure, the respective requirements for participation should be integrated into a single process.  
50
  Involving stakeholders from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds in the description of social-ecological 
systems, the trends within these systems, the problems that should be addressed and the objectives that 
should be achieved, has been tested in several other domains in South Africa, particularly that of 
development planning (van Huyssteen and Oranje, 2008). Van Huyssteen and Oranje (2008), for 
example, describe ‘difficult discussions’ regarding values and worldviews as part of a National Spatial 
Development Planning (NSDP) pilot study that was coordinated by The Presidency in 2006.  
51
  Conceptualising the social-ecological system should be undertaken as early as possible when the 
sustainability argument is informing the development design process.  
52
  Walker et al. (2002: 1) state that the term ‘resilience’ refers to the ability of a system to maintain its 
functionality when it is perturbed, or to maintain “… the elements needed to renew or reorganize if a large 
perturbation radically alters structure and function”.   
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social-ecological system should evolve throughout the process of developing the 
sustainability argument, as more information becomes available to the team.  
5. The strategic decisions made throughout the process of developing the sustainability 
argument should be made explicit through their inclusion in a ‘normative framework’. This 
framework, as it develops, should guide the formulation of the questions to be addressed 
and the way in which they are answered. The framework should include aspects such as: 
the purpose and duration of the study; the basis on which the spatial, temporal and non-
spatial boundaries of the system were determined; the basis on which stakeholders were 
selected to participate in the process; the reason for the inclusion or exclusion of system 
elements; the type of information that was used to describe the system and the 
assumptions contained in this information; as well as the variables that were used in 
developing the scenarios/narratives that provide the context for anticipating the breadth of 
possible changes in the system (see point 7). The specific process that is to be followed in 
developing the argument should also be described as part of the strategic choices made.  
6. Importantly, the normative framework should also include a description of the range of 
sustainability values that should guide the study. These values should be informed by the 
views of key stakeholders and guided by the philosophical tenets and principles listed as 
part of this sustainability argument approach. One way that these values should be 
expressed is through a description of what the notion of ‘human needs’ means in the 
context of the particular social-ecological system being studied. This description should go 
beyond focusing on an increase in goods and services, to include the enhancement of key 
functionings and capabilities within the system, as described by Sen (1984).   
7. The sustainability argument should also be informed by the following: 
• A value-based discussion on the ways in which the proposed development is and/or 
is not aligned with the diverse range of values within the various stakeholder groups, 
irrespective of its consequences; and 
• A discussion, using alternative scenarios53 and/or narratives, on how the system is 
expected to change under various assumptions, both with and without the proposed 
development54, and the ways in which these changes are likely to move the system 
and its parts away and/or towards the sustainability values described in point 6 
above. The influence of the social-ecological system on the implementation of the 
                                            
53
  Walker et al. (2002) propose the use of possible future scenarios in their framework for examining the 
resilience of social-ecological systems and Weaver and Rotmans (2008) include such scenarios in the 
ISA approach to assessment at the policy-level.  
54
  This task may relate to alternative designs and building configurations if the sustainability argument is 
formulated in conjunction with the development design process.  
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proposed development should also be described. These effects and changes should 
be presented in the most appropriate form, which need not be consistent and should 
not be pre-determined before the process begins. Some changes, for example, could 
be easily quantitatively described while others may require a more nuanced 
discussion. 
8. The sustainability argument should be communicated, not only through reporting, but 
through a verbal presentation to a multi-sectoral government panel55. As suggested by 
Norton (2005) in the context of risk assessment, the sustainability argument should be 
presented in ordinary language that omits jargon as far as possible. Most importantly, that 
argument, as stated by Cilliers (2005a), should be presented modestly, fully acknowledging 
the uncertainty that is inherent in making predictions within complex social-ecological 
systems.  
 
4.6 Addressing the problems being experienced in the current approach to 
environmental assessment in South Africa 
 
In the sections that follow, I will discuss how the ‘sustainability argument’ approach could address 
the problems currently being experienced in environmental assessment field in South Africa, as 
described in Chapter 1. The effectiveness of the proposed approach in addressing these problems 
in practice would need to be tested through its implementation in specific contexts.  
 
4.6.1 Difficulties in achieving inter-disciplinarity in environmental assessment 
 
In the approach that I have described above, social and natural scientists (as well as key 
stakeholders) would need to work together from the outset, as part of the sustainability team. The 
first task of conceptualising the social-ecological system provides a means for the various 
specialists to develop a shared understanding of the links between their various domains. Any 
subsequent work that they undertake in order to understand parts of, and relationships within, the 
system, would then be done within the context of this shared systems perspective, jointly 
constructed by the inter-disciplinary sustainability team. This will enable more effective integration 
of the inputs of various specialists, than if their studies are undertaken in relative isolation, with the 
sustainability practitioner left to piece them together at the end of the process.  
 
                                            
55
  If the sustainability argument is being developed in tandem with the development design process, the 
results of the studies undertaken as part of formulating the argument should continually inform the design. 
The final argument can then be presented to decision-makers, as well as a description of the way in 
which it has influenced the design of the proposed development.  
M o d e r n i s m ,  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  A s s e s s m e n t  a n d  t h e  S u s t a i n a b i l i t y  A r g u m e n t :   
M o v i n g  t o wa r d s  a  N e w A p p r o a c h  t o  P r o j e c t - b a s e d  D e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  i n  S o u t h  A f r i c a   
 
 
 
 
Page 196 
In addition, the development of a normative framework for the sustainability argument would 
require social and natural scientists, as well as key stakeholders, to collaboratively define the 
boundaries of the system as well as other aspects, such as the basis on which stakeholders are 
selected to participate. Importantly, they would also determine the sustainability values (e.g. the 
recognition of the intrinsic value of the natural environment and of people’s freedom to live the life 
that they have reason to value) that will guide any specialist work and the development of the 
sustainability argument. This last aspect is not typically included in scoping procedures as they are 
currently undertaken, although as mentioned in Chapter 1, the development of sustainability 
assessment is moving in this direction. Specialist work is therefore not considered to be totally 
‘objective’ but to be undertaken within a particular normative framework that is debated and 
collaboratively defined. The diverse range of values that underlie various specialist spheres and 
which influence the views of stakeholders would most likely lead to several areas of contestation in 
the development of such a framework. The aim is not to subsume these disputes into an artificial 
consensus, but rather to highlight, as part of the sustainability argument, the areas where 
agreement could not be reached and the reasons for this. Where relevant, this could focus the 
attention of the final decision-making authority on these areas of contestation where difficult 
strategic choices still have to be made.   
 
In the proposed approach, the use of specialists to answer specific questions raised by the 
sustainability team also facilitates greater inter-disciplinarity in a number of ways. For instance, 
multiple specialists are involved in framing problems and developing the questions to be answered. 
Also, many of the questions identified may not relate to one specialist area in particular (e.g. 
questions concerning the causes of poverty or environmental degradation) and the answers 
therefore, would be sought with the input of as many different specialists as deemed necessary. In 
this process specialists should also gain a greater understanding of the linkages between the work 
that they undertake and those of others in different domains.  
 
Shifting the emphasis from developing an ‘objective, uniform assessment’, to developing a 
perspective or argument which is partly supported by scientific findings, enables the inclusion of a 
wider range of knowledge forms than is currently the case. Answers to the questions posed by the 
sustainability team would be sought not only through specialist scientific input, but also through 
other means, such as interviews with people, narratives and workshops. As the knowledge gained 
would be presented in a way that is most appropriate, all forms of knowledge (including indigenous 
knowledge and that of the social sciences) would not be forced into an artificial pre-determined 
template, such as that used to currently describe potential impacts. This would enable more 
effective inter-disciplinary work as one knowledge form, such as scientific knowledge, would not be 
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considered superior to others and dominate the way in which information should be interpreted and 
communicated.  
 
Although the sustainability practitioner may be finally responsible for presenting the sustainability 
argument, the components of the argument (e.g. concept of the social-ecological system, the 
questions asked and discussed, and the answers provided) are developed by an inter-disciplinary 
team. The outputs are therefore not interpreted through the lens (values and training) of merely 
one individual.  
 
The verbal presentation made by the team to an inter-sectoral governmental panel promotes inter-
disciplinarity in the final decision-making phases of the process. The current procedure, which in 
most cases involves mainly the circulation of the report among government departments, with each 
providing written comments, is cumbersome, time consuming and does not easily promote inter-
disciplinary debate.  However, if the panel receives the report before the presentation and is 
therefore able to raise concerns at the meeting, these concerns can then be discussed 
immediately in an inter-disciplinary setting.  
 
The proposed approach also begins to address the current perceived divide between researchers 
and decision-makers, which is promoted through the idea that the purpose of environmental 
assessment is to provide ‘objective’ information to inform ‘subjective’ political decision-making. This 
is undertaken through the explicit recognition of the normative choices (e.g. the boundaries of the 
social-ecological system) that have to be made before final decision-making by the authorities and 
therefore the inclusion of governmental representatives in making those choices early in the 
process. More fundamentally, however, shifting the emphasis from developing an ‘objective’ 
scientific statement to developing a sustainability argument, more closely aligns the process with 
political decision-making, which is inherently based largely on perspectives, arguments and 
opinions.  
 
This change should also assist in expediting the decision-making process, as the authorities are 
presented with an argument for a particular decision, supported by scientific evidence and value-
deliberation, rather than an ‘objective’ statement of impacts and their significance, upon which they 
then need to make a value-judgement in a short space of time. This judgement typically needs to 
be made without these authorities necessarily having personally engaged with the affected 
community and developer, and without them having specialist knowledge of the development and 
the environment, beyond that provided to them in EIA reports. The change proposed here is 
congruent with the current EIA regulations (Chapter 3, section 23(2)(d)) that require the 
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environmental assessment practitioner to provide an opinion on whether the proposed 
development should be approved or not. However, these regulations do not go so far as to 
structure the entire process as an argument that is not only supported by the scientific evidence, 
but also value-deliberation and other forms of knowledge.  
 
4.6.2 Difficulties in undertaking stakeholder engagement 
 
In the proposed approach, stakeholder engagement permeates the entire process in a way that 
does not separate it from the development of the overall sustainability argument. Stakeholder 
engagement practitioners and certain key stakeholders are members of the sustainability team and 
are therefore an integral part, from the outset, of defining the process to be followed. Stakeholder 
engagement practitioners are not sub-contracted to ‘sustainability practitioners’ in the way that they 
are currently often subcontracted to environmental assessment practitioners. Instead, they are 
involved as an equal member in the sustainability team. They participate from the outset in 
identifying the questions to be answered in developing the sustainability argument and in 
determining how these should be answered. As the type of engagement activities undertaken 
depends on the nature of the questions asked, continual interaction between stakeholder 
engagement practitioners and the rest of the sustainability team is essential.  
 
The inclusion of stakeholder views in conceptualising the social-ecological system and in 
developing the normative framework ensures that stakeholders are able to influence the process 
beyond merely expressing their views on the proposed development and the process to be 
followed. Stakeholder involvement in defining the social-ecological system also ensures that their 
values and priorities, not merely those of disciplinary specialists, are included from the outset of 
developing the sustainability argument. Stakeholders also assist in determining what sustainability 
values should guide the evaluation of the proposed change and whether this change is likely to 
move the social-ecological system towards or away from these values. 
 
The recognition that every aspect of the social-ecological system, and the changes that are likely 
to occur as a result of the proposed development, has both interior (i.e. non-material) and exterior 
(i.e. material) dimensions, means that greater attention is likely to be paid to power-relations, 
value-systems and feelings, among other subjective elements. In addition, defining development in 
terms of Sen’s (1988b) functionings and capabilities requires an understanding of the values of 
stakeholders, beyond their material needs for goods and services (e.g. the need for self-respect 
and for opportunities to express themselves creatively). The explicit and integrated inclusion of 
these subjective aspects in developing the sustainability argument raises the importance of 
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stakeholder engagement, significantly reducing the risk that it merely becomes an obligatory ‘add-
on’ to a technical procedure, a problem Greyling (2000) identifies with the current EIA approach.   
 
The proposed approach requires that the views of people from marginalised groups, such as the 
poor and those from rural communities, are elicited. Although the practical problems in undertaking 
this task still need to be overcome, the views of these groups cannot be overlooked simply 
because they may not participate in traditional engagement processes such as scoping workshops, 
despite being invited to do so.   
 
Finally, the issue concerning independence is a particularly difficult one. As pointed out in 
Chapter 1, the longer term involvement of an environmental assessment practitioner with the 
community is constrained by legal requirements within NEMA for the consultant to be independent. 
Also, what one person that I interviewed called ‘flash-in-the-pan’ involvement characterises current 
environmental assessment procedures. If independence is equated to objectivity, then this clearly 
does not apply to the approach that I have proposed, which is overtly an opinion or perspective on 
whether the proposed development should be approved or not, and under what circumstances. 
This opinion is developed using Flyvbjerg’s (2004: 293) phronétic approach in which all the 
researchers ‘get close to reality’, understand the practical details relevant to the social-ecological 
system concerned, dialogue with the community and individuals, and present their argument using 
narratives and examples. The sustainability team draws, inter alia, on their common sense, 
experience, wisdom and a sense of what is ethically appropriate (Flyvbjerg, 2001).  
 
However, if being independent means retaining the ability, as Flyvbjerg (2001) puts it, to be critical 
of all that is observed and to acknowledge how local power relations may have affected these 
observations, then I think this is particularly important. Retaining this ability would mean that the 
members of the sustainability team are not financially affected by whether the proposed 
development is approved or not56. However, I do not believe that they should be prohibited from 
participating in tender processes for further work that may result from the development being 
approved (e.g. implementing monitoring programmes), so long such processes are equitable and 
transparent.  In essence, I agree with the view expressed by an interviewee that “… independence 
should be more about the quality of the work rather than the length of relationship with the client”. 
 
                                            
56
  The question may arise as to whether it is possible for the sustainability team to have no financial interest 
in whether the development is approved or not. However, I believe that independence, from a financial 
point of view, is an important principle to follow. Particular threats to this principle would need to be 
responded to in specific circumstances, as they arise in practice.  
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4.6.3 Difficulties in predicting social and cumulative impacts and in dealing with 
uncertainty 
 
Developing the sustainability argument requires an explicit recognition of the inherent uncertainties 
in attempting to make predictions, but also an acknowledgement that it is often impossible to 
characterise such uncertainties. The modest approach proposed by Cilliers (2005a) should lead 
decision-makers to view the sustainability argument as a perspective and input into a debate on 
the proposed development and not as the ‘final answer’.  A key way in which it aims to do this is 
through the use of alternative scenarios/narratives, based on varying assumptions (e.g. economic 
growth rates and government policy on energy provision). This facilitates debate on these 
assumptions that underlie the changes predicted, rather than providing a single statement of 
impacts. This is particularly important as, following the post-modern argument, I do not believe that 
there is a single ‘final, right answer’, but rather that some answers are more appropriate than 
others at a particular time and in a particular context. What is more or less appropriate should be 
debated, and it is this debate that the sustainability argument aims to enhance.  
 
This modest approach also increases the importance of monitoring the actual changes that occur 
in a particular social-ecological system as a result of a new development (e.g. the actual number 
and type of employment opportunities created and the effect which construction has on land 
degradation). Such monitoring is important as an ‘early warning system’ of any problems that arise 
in the construction and implementation of the development. The results of such monitoring should 
also broadly inform the process of social learning in which stakeholders involved in the 
development of ‘sustainability arguments’ in the future, share the knowledge they gained from 
relevant previous experience (Norton, 2005). 
 
Strategic choices, which are typically characterised as ‘uncertainties’ in current approaches to 
environmental assessment, would be made more explicit through their inclusion in the normative 
framework, developed as part of the sustainability argument. The subjectivity of such choices 
would be acknowledged, relieving sustainability practitioners of trying to find ways to make them 
objectively. No attempt would therefore be made to develop the normative framework through 
objective means and therefore opportunities for discussion and debate would be revealed, rather 
than ‘shut down’. This framework would be an account of the choices that are made (e.g. the type 
of knowledge forms that support the sustainability argument), the sustainability values that will 
guide the development of the argument, the aspects on which there are agreement and those on 
which there is not, as well as a description of the stakeholders who participated in making these 
choices. I recognise that such a framework does not relieve those involved in developing the 
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sustainability argument of finally being responsible for the decisions that they make, but it can 
assist in making the values that influence such decisions more explicit. 
 
There would also not be an objective way of determining the meaning (or significance) of the 
changes in the social-ecological system as a result of the proposed development becoming part of 
the system. The core of the sustainability argument is the discussion on the ways in which the 
proposal is likely to move the social-ecological system towards and/or away from the sustainability 
values defined by key stakeholders. Making these values and the information considered in this 
argument clear, would enable decision-makers, in discussion with the sustainability team, to 
debate the views expressed and re-evaluate them should they be able to convincingly argue 
differently. Such arguments, however, should be supported by the views of affected communities, 
scientific evidence and other relevant forms of knowledge.  
 
The concept of the social-ecological system, developed at the beginning of the process, would 
assist in identifying cumulative changes, as it would help to determine the paths along which such 
changes would occur and therefore extend the discussion beyond first-order cause-effect 
relationships. Current developments in computer modelling, for example, can assist in the task of 
conceptualising the system and therefore in identifying such cumulative responses (e.g. Peter, 
2008). This would go some way towards addressing the concern expressed by Binedell et al. 
(1998) that a key constraint to addressing cumulative effects are the problems experienced in 
conceptualising cumulatively. Of critical importance, however, is that the assumptions used in such 
modelling are made explicit and that the results are communicated to stakeholders in a transparent 
and accessible way. The argument concerning the inherent nature of uncertainty in the predictions 
of the behaviour of complex systems also applies to cumulative effects and therefore the same 
attitude of modesty is required. In addition, the use of alternative scenarios in the discussion will 
not only respond to uncertainty in the system’s direct responses to changes, but also to uncertainty 
in its indirect responses.  
 
Addressing the concerns, described in Chapter 1, regarding the prediction of social impacts follows 
from the point made in section 4.5.2.5, that knowledge gained in developing the sustainability 
argument, would be presented in the most appropriate way and will not be forced into a pre-
determined template. In some cases qualitative explanations, using examples, narratives and 
descriptions of people’s felt experiences may be appropriate, while in others quantitative analyses, 
graphs and statistics may be more suitable. More fundamentally though, not all information would 
be reduced to predicting changes in the system. Such problems as undertaking empirical 
measurements, fulfilling requirements for standardized reporting, and making predictions of 
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continually changing human behaviour, are symptomatic of the requirement in EIA that all issues 
are reduced to definable predictions of impacts. In the approach that I have proposed, social 
scientists would only focus on predicting and measuring changes in the system where this is 
appropriate (e.g. increases in the number of houses or employment opportunities). However, a 
large proportion of their work would be in undertaking what Flyvbjerg (2001) calls value 
deliberation. Such deliberation would contribute to formulating the normative framework for the 
study, including defining (with the participation of stakeholders) what development means in the 
particular context being studied. Importantly, the role of the social scientist would therefore include 
facilitating value-based discussions on whether the proposed development is aligned with the 
range of values within the various stakeholder groups, irrespective of its consequences. For 
example, it may be possible to mitigate the negative consequences (e.g. degradation of the 
environment) of introducing a large commercial development into a predominantly rural social-
ecological system; however, this may set a precedent that constrains the connection with nature 
that the community wishes to maintain and promote. 
 
4.7 Back to the Beginning and Future Challenges 
 
I began this thesis by explaining my discomfort with the disparity between our highly structured, 
rational and uniform environmental assessment processes and the more spontaneous, dynamic, 
political, diverse and value-based nature of reality – a discomfort which prompted me to undertake 
this research. I have therefore attempted to develop a ‘sustainability argument’ approach to 
project-level development decision-making that is more flexible, responsive to local circumstances, 
and aware of its own limitations. The approach is adaptable and context-specific in numerous 
ways, for example: by not being overly prescriptive in the exact tasks that have to be undertaken in 
developing the sustainability argument; by focusing the argument on the way in which changes in 
the social-ecological system affect contextually-defined priorities; and by enabling the incorporation 
of a range of knowledge systems and the communication of their findings in a variety of ways. The 
dynamic nature of social-ecological systems is also recognised in the generation of alternative 
future scenarios, the focus on the explicit inclusion of the assumptions made throughout the 
process and the modest approach to the perceptions, predictions and ideas expressed in the 
argument. Finally, the conceptual approach that I have proposed is overtly value-based. The 
sustainability argument is presented as a perspective into the broader decision-making process, 
which represents a set of values that are both contextually defined and guided by national 
legislation. The normative framework, developed as part of the sustainability argument, with both 
its points of agreement and areas of contestation, not only guides those developing the argument, 
but also explicitly informs final decision-makers of the particular view from which it is made.   
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There are, however, a number of key challenges that would need to be overcome in implementing 
such an approach. Most fundamentally, perhaps, is the current bias within the environmental 
assessment community towards ‘objectivity’, instrumental rationality and scientific analysis. 
Challenging this bias is difficult, not only because it is supported by the dominant worldview within 
society, but also because in my experience, the broad community of practice of environmental 
assessment focuses predominantly on the methods and techniques with which to undertake 
assessment processes, rather than on the philosophical assumptions on which the field as a whole 
rests. Transforming environmental assessment into a perspective on whether a development 
proposal should proceed or not, and if so under what conditions, is likely to be seen by some 
practitioners as an ‘unsafe’ and ‘groundless’ way to proceed, that would enable any set of values to 
be promoted. For this reason, it is essential that the sustainability argument is developed in relation 
to the philosophical tenets presented in section 4.5.1 (which include enhancing what key 
stakeholders define as their valued functionings and capabilities) and is informed by the principles 
of sustainable development expressed in national legislation.   
 
The process of identifying what stakeholders consider valuable functionings and capabilities is a 
particular challenge that needs to be overcome. Stakeholder values are diverse and in many 
instances, conflicting. In my view, this is a reality which will always exist and therefore should be 
accepted and acknowledged, rather than subsumed into a uniform expression of the ‘goals of the 
community’. Transforming environmental assessment into a sustainability argument would provide 
scope for a nuanced discussion of the diverse range of stakeholder values and the various ways in 
which these are likely to be enhanced or constrained by the proposed development. Although the 
sustainability argument is formulated from the particular perspective of the sustainability team 
(which includes key stakeholders) and is rooted in their values, it would not be assumed that these 
values represent a consensus among all stakeholders. Rather, the perspective from which the 
argument is made would be explicitly described, showing where it either concurs with, or 
contradicts, other values and priorities expressed within the process of stakeholder engagement. 
The emphasis on developing a perspective implies the existence of other views.  Nevertheless, the 
task of effectively identifying such values, whether they are conflicting or not, requires further 
research with the extensive inclusion of ideas from the humanities, such as psychology, 
anthropology, philosophy and ethics.  
 
Another challenge involves identifying the key questions that should be answered when 
formulating the sustainability argument. These questions should arise out of discussion and debate 
and not the application of an ‘objective’ technique. This process calls for inter-disciplinary 
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interactions in which the participants are open to the views of others and able to transcend their 
disciplinary boundaries. Enabling such debate again requires further research, but most 
importantly perhaps, it calls for practice, experience and what Flyvbjerg (2001) calls phronésis (i.e. 
practical wisdom).  
 
Current legislation in South Africa, which necessitates a very specific environmental assessment 
process to be followed, is another challenge that needs to be overcome. From my experience in 
the development of Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) in this country, it is not easy to 
legislate for contextually defined processes, as the law requires a very detailed prescription of what 
is, and what is not, permissible. However, we need to find a way to address this problem, as the 
application of a pre-determined, uniform approach to environmental assessment, is inhibiting the 
ability of multiple epistemologies and the diverse range of values that characterise this country, to 
effectively inform public debate on whether a development should proceed or not, and under what 
conditions.  
 
Beyond addressing these challenges, future research should focus on implementing and testing 
the sustainability argument approach within particular contexts. There are numerous issues 
regarding the way in which the approach is implemented that should be investigated in such 
research. These issues include, for example: 
• Conceptualising the social-ecological system in a manner that is accessible to all stakeholders; 
• Effectively dealing with power relations in the process of formulating the sustainability 
argument; 
• Ensuring stakeholder equity and inter-disciplinarity in the generation of scenarios; 
• Ensuring that the results of modelling (particularly computer modelling) are presented in a way 
which is accessible to all stakeholders; 
• Facilitating effective knowledge-sharing between stakeholder groups within the process of 
formulating the ‘sustainability argument’; 
• Effectively facilitating value-based discussions within the context of developing the 
sustainability argument; and 
• Translating personal views of stakeholders into a shared understanding of the social-ecological 
system.  
 
If we are to move beyond the recurring problems of the current approach to environmental 
assessment, it is certainly worth embracing these challenges and exploring the ‘sustainability 
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argument’ in practice, as an alternative way of addressing environmental decision-making at the 
project-level.  
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Schedule for Informal Interviews  
with Decision-Makers,  
Environmental Assessment Practitioners  
and Researchers 
 
22 August 2006 
 
 
A. INTEGRATION WITH OTHER DISCIPLINES 
1. Do you work with other disciplines? Which ones do you typically work with and why do you 
do this? 
2. How do you use the information generated from other disciplines? 
3. What benefits do you derive from working with a range of disciplines? 
4. Scientists: What are the key obstacles to effectively cooperating with other scientists and 
using their information? 
5. Environmental Assessment Practitioners: What are the key obstacles to integrating the 
information from a range of disciplines into an environmental assessment report? 
6. Do you make any effort to overcome these obstacles? How do you do this? 
 
B. STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS AND PERSONAL CONVICTIONS 
1. How do you invite effective consideration and response to stakeholder interests in the work 
that you do? 
2. What obstacles are there to effectively engaging with stakeholders in your work? 
3. Do you make an effort to overcome these obstacles? How? 
4. At what stage in your work, if at all, is the normative question of what should/ought to be 
done considered (what would be good/bad, right or wrong)? Why at this particular stage? 
5. Do your personal convictions influence the work that you do? If yes, is this in a direct or 
indirect way? Can you give an example? 
6. Can you give an example where you had to make a professional decision, in which you 
went against the grain of your personal convictions? How did you deal with the tensions 
that resulted?  
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C. INFLUENCING DECISION-MAKING 
Researchers and Environmental Assessment Practitioners 
1. In your field of work, do you provide information, data or recommendations that lay the 
basis for decisions made at a national, provincial or local government level? 
2. Assuming that you work within recognised guidelines for environmental decision-making, 
how would you describe the nature or type of information that you provide? 
3. Do you think that your work informs or influences decision-making? If it influences decision-
making, how does it do this? 
4. Does the outcome of your activities lead to ‘good’ environmental decisions? If not, what 
would be the typical problems that you experience? How have you dealt with these? 
5. Have you been in a situation where your recommendations have been changed or over-
ridden? What were these changes. Why do you think these changes were made? 
6. Have you ever made recommendations, within environmental guidelines, that went against 
the grain of your personal convictions? Can you give an example? 
7. Can you suggest ways in which your field of work could more effectively enhance 
environmental decisions.  
 
Decision-makers 
1. In your field of work, do you receive information, data or recommendations from scientists 
that lay the foundation for decisions made within a particular sphere of government? 
2. How would you describe the nature or type of information that you receive? 
3. Do you ever feel that aspects of the scientific reports that you receive are value-laden or 
subjective, aimed at influencing you? How do you recognise this? How do you deal with 
this? 
4. Have you ever been in a situation where you have over-ridden recommendations provided 
to you by the scientific or environmental assessment community? What were the changes 
that you have made? Why have you made these changes? 
5. Have you ever made environmental decisions, within recognised guidelines, that went 
against the grain of your personal convictions? Can you give an example? 
6. Can you suggest ways in which science and/or environmental assessment reports can 
more effectively enhance the decision-making process? 
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Radical Environmental Philosophies 
 
There are three main radical responses to the modernist, technocentric agenda within 
environmental philosophy, namely deep ecology, social ecology and eco-feminism (Zimmerman, 
1994). A summary of these approaches is presented in Table B.1 that follows. For ease of reading, 
the references for the description of each approach have not been placed in the text, but in the last 
row of the table. An earlier version of this table was published in Audouin and Hattingh (2008).  
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Appendix Table B.1:  Summary of Radical Enveirnmental Philosophies 
 
 Deep Ecology Social Ecology Eco-feminism 
Cause of the 
environmental 
problem 
The root cause is the dominant philosophy or 
worldview of techno-industrial societies that 
sees humans as separate from nature and as 
superior to it. This dominant worldview 
results in nature being seen as mainly a 
resource for economic growth and 
technological progress, goals which are 
highly valued in mainstream Western society. 
The associated excessive materialism and 
consumerism, diverts us from the more 
important work of spiritual growth and 
maturity.  
Ecological problems have their roots in 
authoritarian, hierarchical social structures, 
especially those of capitalism and state socialism, 
which enable powerful elites to suppress others, 
while exploiting the environment for their own 
profit. The mentality of domination (which is also 
seen in racism and sexism) inherent in such 
hierarchical structures, extends to the natural 
world and it results in human exploitation of the 
non-human world.  
The cause of the environmental problem is a 
way of thinking that has resulted in both the 
domination of nature and the domination of 
women. This way of thinking is called the 
‘logic of domination’ which says that 
men/humans are different and superior to 
women/nature.   
View of the 
world 
All life is involved in a process of unfolding its 
innate potential. Arne Naess, who coined the 
term ‘deep ecology’, calls this the process of 
self-realisation. In humans this involves an 
increasingly deeper and broader sense of 
self that moves from identification with the 
personal ego, that strives for its own 
gratification, to identification with others such 
There is a link between the way people deal with 
each other and the way they deal with the 
environment. Therefore ecological problems 
cannot be fully understood and addressed without 
dealing with the fundamental social, political, 
cultural and ethical questions at their core. The 
entire system of domination within current social 
structures should be challenged from an 
There are connections between the 
domination of women and the domination of 
nature. The philosophical element of these 
connections is what Warren calls the ‘logic of 
domination’ inherent in the patriarchal 
conceptual framework of mainstream Western 
culture. This patriarchal conceptual framework 
places more value on what is traditionally 
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 Deep Ecology Social Ecology Eco-feminism 
as family and friends, to identification with our 
species as a whole and finally to inclusion of 
the non-human world as part of the bigger 
Self.  
The natural process of identification with 
others leads to greater sensitivity, 
consideration and empathy for them (e.g. 
sharing in the suffering of those we may not 
know personally). As Arne Naess puts it: “We 
see ourselves in others”.  He therefore 
argues for the widening and broadening of 
our sense of self to include both the human 
and the non-human world, as no laws or 
moral rules are needed to make us to care 
for that which we see as part of ourselves. 
Naess further explains that joy and meaning 
in life are increased through this process of 
self-realisation which enables the fulfilment of 
the potential and uniqueness of all beings.   
This ecological consciousness is best 
achieved through a process of questioning 
the fundamentals (deep-questioning) which 
underlie our understanding of society, 
economy and the relationship between man 
ecological point of view, as it is linked to the 
domination of nature.  
 Humans, like other mammals, are a product of 
the natural evolutionary process that tends 
towards increasing complexity and flexibility. In 
other words, humans arose out of the evolution of 
the non-human. They have, however, created a 
social world that often threatens both the human 
and non-human.  
As man is a result of the continual evolution of 
nature, he is not separate from it. The human and 
non-human are part of a non-linear, evolutionary 
and increasingly complex system.  
All living beings are not equal. Although the non-
human (or 1st nature) and human (or 2nd nature) 
are intrinsically linked, 2nd nature is distinguished 
from 1st nature by its increased capability for 
developing rationality, communication and culture. 
The uniqueness of human beings should not be 
denied.  
The evolution of 2nd nature (humans) is an 
unfinished development of nature as a whole. 
Overcoming current environmental problems 
viewed as male, rather than what is seen as 
female.  
Western philosophical tradition has identified 
maleness with the sphere of rationality and 
the mind which is typically contrasted to the 
sphere of women, emotions, the body, 
passions, nature, the non-human world, faith, 
matter, physicality and experience.  
Value-hierarchical thinking, which divides 
reality into elements which are ‘up’ or more 
valuable and elements which are ‘down’ or 
less valuable, has led to a justification  
(termed the logic of domination) of 
maintaining the subordination of an ‘inferior’ 
group by a ‘superior’ group.  This thinking has 
influenced Western culture which has placed 
the male, reason and the mind above the 
female, emotions, the body and matter, 
leading to the subordination of the female by 
the male and of non-human nature by human 
nature.  In value-hierarchical thinking then, 
some elements or characteristics are given 
more value than others, rather than merely 
recognising and valuing diversity. Also this 
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and nature, amongst other factors.   
All beings have value that extends beyond 
their use to humans (i.e. they have intrinsic or 
inherent worth) and therefore have an equal 
right to life and the fulfilment of their own 
form of self-realisation.  
All beings (human and non-human) are part 
of an interrelated whole.  
Economic growth as conceived and 
implemented today is incompatible with many 
of the basic tenets of deep ecology, such as 
the belief that humans have no right to 
reduce the richness and diversity of life 
forms, except to satisfy basic vital needs.  
 
depend on transcending 2nd nature in a new 
system of human/nature relationship that 
decreases the problems experienced in both 
society and the environment. This would result in 
a conscious, ethical and ecological society.  
In nature, stability and integrity is a result of 
increasing complexity and diversity and not of 
simplicity, uniformity and homogeneity. 
Wholeness is not a mere adding of parts into a 
uniform whole or the reduction of phenomena into 
the lowest common denominator.  Ecological 
wholeness is ‘unity in diversity’.  
Communities are fundamentally influenced by 
their history, which is as important as social forms 
and structures. Humans create their society and 
are also created by it.  
Modern capitalism is amoral, because the market 
has priorities of its own that are not based on any 
particular ethical principles but on the laws of 
supply and demand.  
Humans should strive for fully conscious activity 
which is self-determined, being free from external 
and internal (e.g. belief system that limits the 
thinking reflects an ‘either-or’ approach where 
opposites are seen as exclusive rather than 
complementary in a ‘both-and’ relationship.  
Rejects any way of thinking about nature that 
reflects an attitude of domination. A world is 
needed where difference does not lead to 
domination.  
Humans and non-humans are co-members of 
an ecological community.  Their differences 
are recognised, but this does not mean that 
one is superior to another.  
Abstract individualism is rejected. 
Relationships, including that with the non-
human environment, are an integral part of 
who an individual is. Such relationships are 
not an extrinsic ‘add-on feature’ of human 
beings. Individuals are beings-in-a-web-of-
relationships. It is not possible to give a 
description of what it means to be human 
without recognising that humanity is part of an 
ecological community.  
Scientific and technological responses to the 
environmental problem are a part of the 
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individual’s idea of what s/he can achieve) 
controls. In this way, individuals can attain their 
potential as conscious, thinking human beings.   
 
solution. The perspectives of women and 
indigenous peoples should also be recognised 
as relevant data.  
A person’s view of the world and the type of 
theorising they undertake is influenced by the 
conceptual framework they employ – their 
way of thinking or worldview. An oppressive 
patriarchal framework leads to environmental 
problems and the oppression of women.  
There is no one, single ‘objective’ (value-
neutral, unbiased) view of the human and 
non-human relationship that is correct.  
Knowledge is socially constructed. Objects 
are both materially given and socially 
constructed. How particular objects are 
viewed is influenced by the social context, 
cultural norms and other factors. For example, 
in South Africa a particular tree may be seen 
as a rare component of the ecological 
environment to be preserved, while in 
Australia, the same tree could be seen as an 
alien invasive that should be removed.  
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Proposals An ecological worldview is needed in which 
people not only identify the self with the 
personal ego, or the social group, but also 
with the non-human world.  
A shift is needed away from a human-centred 
view of the world (anthropocentric) to an 
ecosystem-centred view (eco-centric).  
More searching and fundamental questions 
must be asked about the values (i.e. the 
normative aspects) which underpin our social 
and economic systems, and the way in which 
we view the relationship between humans 
and nature (e.g. ontological questions).  For 
example, what kind of society would be best 
for maintaining ecosystems? 
Sessions and Naess identified basic 
principles from which others could develop 
their own versions of deep ecology. In 
summary these principles (called the Deep 
Ecology Platform) are that:  
 Human and non-human life has 
value in itself, independent of the 
Diversity in social structures and in the 
environment should be maintained, as this is a 
pre-requisite for a harmonious human/nature 
relationship.  
The split between humans and nature inherent in 
the dominant Western worldview should be 
overcome and the mentality of human domination 
of nature transformed into one of complementarity 
between the human and non-human world. 
Humans should be supportive and protective of 
the needs of nature. There should also be an 
ethics of complementarity between and within 
social institutions.  
There should be recognition that human well-
being is intricately linked to the well-being of the 
natural world.  
An understanding is needed of the forms and 
patterns within social and natural communities 
that give it its character. This understanding 
should relate to the community as a whole, not 
only to its component parts.  In particular, it is 
important to identify patterns of domination and 
oppression and to evaluate these in terms of 
Environmentalism should be informed by a 
feminist perspective, because of the 
connections between the domination and 
nature and the domination of women.  
Make visible and challenge the disproportional 
effect that environmental degradation has on 
women, the poor, dislocated indigenous 
persons and developing countries.  
A shift is needed away from ethics as a matter 
of pre-determined, individual and abstract 
rights, rules and principles exclusively, to 
ethics that recognise the particular context in 
which these general rights and rules are 
applied and the important relationships within 
that context. The context should influence 
what is considered appropriate behaviour 
towards the non-human environment.  
Story-telling, myths, rituals and first person 
narratives are important means of identifying 
patterns of meaning that emerge in the social 
and ecological environment. Logic should be 
mixed with story.  
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usefulness of the non-human world 
for humans; 
 Richness and diversity of life forms 
contribute to the realisation of these 
values and are also values in 
themselves; 
 Humans have no right to reduce this 
richness and diversity except to 
satisfy vital needs;  
 The flourishing of human life and 
cultures is compatible with a 
decrease of the human population. 
For non-human life to flourish, such a 
decrease is needed;   
 Present human interference in the 
non-human world is excessive and 
rapidly getting worse;  
 Policies must therefore be changed 
in a way that deeply affects basic 
economic, technological, and 
ideological structures and results in a 
principles of justice and equity.  
As evolution is an intrinsic part of the nature of 
reality, the history of a social or ecological 
community should be considered as important as 
its current form and structure.  
We cannot assume that humans can fully 
understand and control the complex, continually 
changing interrelationship between the human 
and non-human environment through science. 
Therefore it cannot be assumed that humans can 
change this system as they wish. A high degree of 
spontaneity and unpredictability within the system 
must be accommodated. An attempt can be made 
to understand trends within the system and to 
navigate our way through them, but full control 
over these trends cannot be assumed.  
The idea of freedom should be manifested 
through ‘libertarian municipalism’. This involves 
turning local municipalities into direct democracies 
and coordinating these municipalities through a 
bottom-up system, as opposed to the top-down 
system of the nation-state.  This approach is 
different from bioregionalism as it is based on 
A central place should be given to the values 
of care, love, friendship, trust and appropriate 
reciprocity. These are values that recognise 
that our relationships to others is central to an 
understanding of who we are.  
Non-hierarchical modes of conflict resolution 
(e.g. mediation) are needed.  
The perspectives of indigenous people and 
women’s felt experiences concerning the non-
human environment should be taken seriously 
and considered as ‘data’.  
Theory building and knowledge is socially 
constructed and historically situated. It is 
therefore not static, but consistently emerging 
and changing over time.  
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significantly different state of affairs;  
 An ideological change is needed 
from increasingly aiming for a higher 
standard of living to appreciating life 
quality. There will be an awareness 
of the difference between big and 
great; and 
 Those who support these points 
have an obligation to try to 
implement the changes needed, 
either directly or indirectly. 
In addition, Naess developed a four-level 
system for deep questioning, which flows 
both from top-down and from bottom-up, and 
includes: uncovering a person’s ultimate 
norm from which all actions result; 
questioning based on the principles of the 
Deep Ecology Platform; exploring ones own 
situation to identify alternative ways of 
implementing the norms identified in the first 
two levels, and finally, identifying specific 
ways of implementing the general actions or 
policies developed in the previous stage.  
politically defined communities and boundaries, 
rather than ecologically defined ones. The idea of 
self-sufficient communities inherent in 
bioregionalism is also rejected in favour of 
ecological and economic interdependence and 
voluntary political association between 
autonomous, self-determined communities.   
Social structures should be based on small-scale, 
egalitarian communities which aim to serve 
common needs and goals. The democratic 
principles of full participation and freedom should 
be the prevailing norms and any institutions or 
practices that allow one group to dominate 
another should be avoided. Decision-making 
should be decentralised and the community 
should be freed from any outside control.  
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In more detail, the four levels are as follows:  
Level 1:  Uncovering a person’s ultimate 
norm from which all actions result. This norm 
will always belong to the philosophical or 
religious domain. For example, Arne Naess’ 
ultimate norm is self-realisation. These norms 
are not absolute truths but hypotheses from 
which other norms, for example minimise 
ecological footprint, are derived.  
Level 2: Questioning based on the views that 
form part of the Deep Ecology Platform (see 
principles above). These views can be 
adapted to the relevant context.  The Deep 
Ecology Platform was developed as a set of 
principles that could be accepted by deep 
ecology supporters irrespective of their 
ultimate norm. 
Level 3: Exploration of one’s own situation 
and the broad options available for action 
based on the norms identified in levels 1 and 
2.  This level includes the identification of 
broad policies.  
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Level 4: Specific ways to implement the 
general policies and action identified in level 
3. For example, documenting extinction of 
species and/or focusing on the alleviation of 
poverty.  
Policies advocated by Arne Naess include: a 
radical reduction of the world’s population; 
the abandonment of the goal of economic 
growth in the developed world; the 
conservation of biotic diversity and the 
development of small, simple, self-reliant 
communities.  
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